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1992-2006 
Juan Carlos Rodríguez-Raga, PhD 
University of Pittsburgh, 2011 
Under what conditions are justices able to make decisions that are contrary to the executive‘s 
preferences in strong Latin American presidentialisms? To answer this question, I formulate a 
theory of interbranch relations, particularly of the interplay between courts and justices, on the 
one hand, and executives and legislatures on the other. The model of strategic prudence involves 
a game between two players –a court and a government–as well as a stage in which this game 
takes place, including the institutional design and the political environment. It specifies how 
players‘ policy preferences and their assessments of the personal and institutional risks involved 
in their decision making interact with the institutional setting and the political context. Based on 
the empirical implications derived from the game, I hypothesize that when courts are 
institutionally insulated, justices are more likely to decide based on their own preferences, while 
an institutionally weak court makes them act strategically based on their perception of how the 
political environment enhances or hinders the government‘s ability to build a coalition to 
sanction the court. I test the empirical predictions of the game with the case of the Colombian 
Constitutional Court (CCC). I combine qualitative evidence, including press coverage and 
interviews with former justices and law clerks, with a systematic quantitative analysis of an 
original dataset of abstract review cases decided by the CCC between 1992 and 2006. Given its 
well-deserved reputation of autonomy and progressive activism, the CCC provides a ―crucial 
case‖ test of the strategic prudence theory. The analysis of individual judicial decisions provides 
 v 
strong evidence supporting the hypotheses derived from the game‘s comparative statics analysis. 
Justices tend to be prudent when they face a strong administration and when the case under 
review is salient for the executive. In addition, they are more likely to annul legislation when 
they have stronger preferences against it and when they anticipate that the incumbent would have 
to pay a higher cost should it attempt sanctioning the court. This dissertation contributes to the 
subfield of judicial politics in Latin America and is the first comprehensive study of the 
Constitutional Court in Colombia. 
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
What determines the level of independence of high courts in presidential democracies? Under 
what conditions are justices able to make decisions that are contrary to majorities in Congress 
and, more importantly, that run against executive preferences in strong Latin American 
presidentialisms?  Asking these questions is part of the research agenda of the political science 
disciplinary subfield of judicial politics, a subfield that views courts as key institutions in the 
political system and judges as political actors. This dissertation, therefore, shares the view that 
―explanations of politics are incomplete unless they incorporate courts‖ (Epstein, Knight, and 
Shvetsova 2001b: 120).  
Judicial independence, understood as ―the idea that a judge ought to be free to decide the 
case before her without fear or anticipation of (illegitimate) punishments or rewards‖ (Ferejohn 
1999: 355), is considered a central factor enhancing the quality of democracy and the rule of law 
(Epstein, Knight, and Shvetsova 2001b). In fact, the judiciary is ―the institution normally 
charged with the enforcement of the constitution, rights, and other democratic procedures in 
constitutional democracies‖ (Larkins 1996: 606). Independence has consequences for various 
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aspects of democratic performance, including economic growth (Feld and Voigt 2003)
1
 and the 
fight against corruption (Ríos-Figueroa 2006). 
The theoretical argument of this dissertation relates to the institutional and political 
factors impacting constitutional review, defined as ―the power of judicial bodies to set aside 
ordinary legislative or administrative acts if judges conclude that they conflict with the 
constitution‖ (Vanberg 2005: 1). It attempts to investigate those factors from a comparative 
perspective with a special emphasis on Latin America.  In doing so, it focuses on the so-called 
European or Kelsenian model of constitutional review (Ferejohn and Pasquino 2002). In fact, 
although most comprehensive studies and sophisticated theories of judicial behavior have been 
conducted with a focus on American courts, particularly the Supreme Court, the American 
model, despite having been a pioneer of judicial review in the world, has become the exception 
rather than the norm in the specific ways in which judicial review operates. Unlike in the U.S. 
where courts at all levels are able to exert review, the European model, which follows the 
Austrian constitution of 1920, introduces a centralized body outside the judicial hierarchy, a 
constitutional court, with exclusive jurisdiction to review the compatibility of legislative acts 
with the constitution. Moreover, these constitutional courts typically study not only concrete 
controversies involving actual alleged violations of citizens‘ constitutional rights, as in the U.S., 
but also abstract challenges to the constitutionality of entire pieces of legislation. Finally, 
centralized constitutional review is exerted both after the legislative act has been enacted and 
implemented and before such enactment (Epstein, Knight, and Shvetsova 2001b; Navia and 
Ríos-Figueroa 2005).  
                                                 
1
 Feld and Voigt (see 2003) parallel the impact of judicial independence on economic performance to that 
of an independent central bank in mitigating the problem of credibility governments face in the eyes of economic 
actors. 
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The Kelsenian model of constitutional review has flourished in the post-World War II era 
in formerly fascist countries such as Germany and Italy. Constitutional courts were also created 
in the aftermath of democratic transitions in Spain in Portugal, and even France has adopted this 
model. After the demise of communist rule, constitutional tribunals were created in the vast 
majority of new democracies in Eastern Europe (see Sadursky 2002). Although the pace has 
been different, the centralized model of judicial review has also gained prevalence in Latin 
America, where constitutional courts separated from the judiciary operate in Bolivia, Brazil, 
Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, and Peru (Lara Borges, Castagnola, and Pérez-Liñán 
2010; Ríos-Figueroa 2011). 
The focus of this dissertation is on democracies with strong presidentialisms, where 
interbranch relationships tend to be more tense and contentious. In fact, one expression of hyper-
presidentialism is the concentration of power in the hands of the executive precisely at the 
expense of the judiciary (Larkins 1998). In this sense, the theory distances itself from accounts of 
judicial behavior in Parliamentary systems, where the key issue of judicial review is whether or 
not the legislature complies with court rulings (e.g. Vanberg 2005). It also departs from studies 
of judicial review exerted by the U.S. Supreme Court, in which the constraints on justices, if any, 
come from the possibility of Congress passing legislation overturning their decisions (e.g. Spiller 
and Gely 1992). The focus of this dissertation is rather on contexts in which courts face more 
serious constraints and are more likely to endure severe sanctions given the power exerted by 
strong presidents and the related institutional insecurity courts and justices typically have. 
In this dissertation I try to answer the question about the institutional and political 
conditions enabling constitutional courts to check the other branches of government by ruling on 
the constitutionality of legislation. In doing so, I formulate a theory of interbranch relations, 
 4 
particularly of the interplay between courts and justices, on the one hand, and executives and 
legislatures on the other. More concretely, it follows a flourishing body of literature adopting a 
formal theoretical perspective on the behavior of courts in the U.S. (Epstein and Knight 1998; 
Epstein, Knight, and Martin 2004; Ferejohn and Weingast 1992), Western and Eastern Europe 
(Vanberg 2005; Epstein, Knight, and Shvetsova 2001b) and even Latin America (Helmke 2005; 
Staton 2002), and develops a game-theoretic model of the strategic interplay of courts and 
justices with the other branches of government in abstract constitutional review cases.  
The model of strategic prudence involves a game between two players –a court and a 
government– as well as a stage in which this game takes place including a given institutional 
design and a particular political environment. It spells out the way in which the players‘ policy 
preferences over the cases under review by the court and their assessment of the personal and 
institutional risks involved in their decision making interact with the institutional setting and the 
political context. The analysis of this interaction and of the equilibria of the game derives 
parsimonious empirical implications regarding the conditions under which it is expected that 
court justices make decisions contrary to the executive‘s preferences. Based on these empirical 
implications this dissertation hypothesizes that when courts are institutionally insulated, justices 
are more likely to decide based on their own preferences, while an institutionally weak court 
makes them act strategically based on their assessment of how the political environment 
enhances or hinders the government‘s ability to build a coalition aimed at retaliating against the 
court. The theoretical model is rather simple, and perhaps it could include additional elements to 
account for details involved in the process of constitutional review. Simplicity, however 
responds to the fact that the formal theoretical approach is only a means towards the end of 
conducting an empirical investigation of the implications derived from it. 
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The theory is intended to be system-free and, therefore, is suitable to travel across 
countries and across time to include variation in institutional settings and political environments. 
The empirical predictions of the theoretical model are tested in the case of judicial review by the 
Colombian Constitutional Court (CCC). In order to do so, this dissertation combines qualitative 
evidence, obtained through an extensive review of the press as well as interviews with former 
justices and law clerks, with a systematic quantitative analysis of an original dataset of abstract 
review cases ruled upon by the CCC between 1992 and 2006.  
Colombian courts remain understudied in the growing literature on judicial politics in 
Latin America. In contrast to the attention paid to courts in Argentina (e.g. Chávez 2004b; 
Chávez, Ferejohn, and Weingast 2011; Helmke 2005; Iaryczower, Spiller, and Tommasi 2002), 
Brazil (e.g. Brinks 2011; Kapiszewski 2011; Taylor 2005), Chile (e.g. Couso and Hilbink 2011; 
Scribner 2003b), and Mexico (e.g. Domingo 2005; Sánchez, Magaloni, and Magar 2011; Staton 
2006), very little has been published on the CCC by political scientists (Nunes 2010; Rodríguez-
Raga 2011). 
To both academics and practitioners who are familiar with the Colombian case, however, 
the selection of the CCC as a case to test a theory of strategic judicial behavior may seem a bit 
odd. In fact, in the Latin American context, the Colombian court has a well-deserved reputation 
of autonomy and activism in the protection of citizen rights and in checking the other branches of 
government. Moreover, unlike other Latin American countries, including Argentina, Peru, 
Ecuador, and Venezuela, where judges potentially of actually face more severe sanctions such as 
impeachment and even physical aggression, a long tradition of judicial review and high levels of 
legitimacy seem to shield constitutional justices in Colombia. The CCC has become a key player 
in the Colombian political system, and on many occasions it has exerted its veto power to 
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prevent the violation of citizens‘ civil and political rights, to demand active policy-making on the 
part of the administration to provide goods and services to people whose social and economic 
rights are threatened, and to aggressively check the power of the legislature and the executive. I 
argue, however, that even in such a favorable environment there are institutional and political 
factors compelling justices to engage in strategic behavior. Therefore, the CCC allows the 
conduction of a ―crucial case‖ test of the strategic prudence theory (Eckstein 1975; Gerring 
2007). 
The second chapter of this dissertation specifies the game-theoretical model of strategic 
prudence. Using the language of formal theory, it describes the players, the sequence of moves in 
the game, the environment in which those players act and the uncertainties they face, and the 
payoffs each player receives according to the different paths of play. It also includes a section 
that includes the formal demonstration of the equilibrium analysis, and it concludes with the 
specification of the comparative statics derived from such analysis and the empirical implications 
of the game. 
Chapter 3 is devoted to presenting the Colombian case, including an account of the 
history and tradition of judicial review and of the process leading in 1991 to the drafting of a new 
constitution and the creation of the Constitutional Court. It also describes the organization and 
structure of the court including its jurisdiction and caseload, the mechanisms to select justices in 
the CCC and the determination of their tenure, as well as the types of decisions the court makes. 
Chapter 4 makes use of qualitative evidence to show that, despite a conspicuous activism 
of the Colombian Constitutional Court in protecting citizens‘ rights and checking the other 
branches of government, a strategic account of judicial behavior is still justified in this case.  By 
means of an extensive press review and the insights obtained from interviews to former justices, 
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justice assistants and law clerks, the chapter shows instances in which tension between the court 
and the executive rose, how those episodes were perceived by actors within the court and how 
the anticipation of the government‘s reaction helped shaping the court decisions on the cases 
involved.  
Chapter 5 proceeds to a systematic statistical test of the hypotheses derived from the 
theoretical model. It makes use of an original dataset of abstract review decisions made by the 
CCC between 1992 and 2006. This dataset, which records individual justice decisions, is 
supplemented with information regarding the characteristics of justices, the timing of the 
decision, and the political environment surrounding such decision. Alternative statistical models 
are specified to operationalize the parameters of the game and to check the robustness of the 
findings. 
Finally, Chapter 6 summarizes the argument and the main findings, spells out the 
implications of those findings both from a theoretic and a substantive perspectives, and proposes 
a research agenda on the behavior of courts and judges in presidential democracies. 
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2.0  A THEORY OF STRATEGIC JUDICIAL PRUDENCE 
I present in this chapter a simple but powerful theory of judicial decision making, with special 
application to Latin American presidential democracies. The theory is simple in that, in a 
nutshell, it involves the interaction between a justice in a constitutional court and a government 
operating in a given institutional and political environment, as I show below. It is, however, a 
powerful theory in the sense that it makes general statements on the interaction between such 
actors and those institutional and political factors which are in principle testable across countries 
and institutional settings. 
My theoretical model is suitable for presidential democracies in the sense that, unlike 
theoretical approaches developed for European courts, it does not assume a fusion between the 
executive and the legislature typical of parliamentary systems (e.g. the study on the German 
constitutional tribunal by Vanberg 2005). My theory rather states that the executive needs 
political strength and political support in the legislature to have its initiatives approved and, more 
concretely, to undertake any action in response to a court decision. 
The theory presented here also focuses on political systems with strong presidents typical 
of Latin America. Unlike studies on the United States where Congress is the central actor 
interacting with the Supreme Court (e.g. Ferejohn and Weingast 1992), the approach adopted 
here acknowledges that it is in the presidency where political power, and more specifically the 
initiative, tend to lie (Morgenstern and Nacif 2002). 
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In sum, my theoretical model posits that courts and judges operate in different 
institutional settings which determine the extent to which they are insulated from the pressure 
and influence of external actors, in particular, the government. The impact of the latter on the 
court decision making also depends on the former political strength which determines to what 
extent the executive is able to gather a coalition effective enough to act in response to court 
rulings. As I show below, the theory does not assume that the executive‘s strength is necessarily 
expressed in terms of the seat share its party holds in Congress. The model accounts for political 
configurations, typical of Latin American countries, whether not only multi-party systems are far 
from exceptional but also party loyalty is fluid and discipline and cohesion may be rather weak. 
In this sense, the theory goes beyond explanations of judicial autonomy as a function of whether 
the government is unified or divided (e.g. Chávez 2004b; Chávez, Ferejohn, and Weingast 2011; 
Domingo 2000; Scribner 2004). Moreover, although it endorses the view stating that the level of 
autonomy of a court is inversely proportional to how easy it is for other actors to coordinate 
against it, the theory presented here adopts a somewhat more dynamic approach relative to 
accounts of judicial behavior based on the level of fragmentation of political power (Ferejohn, 
Rosenbluth, and Shipan 2007). 
The approach based on positive political theory adopted here favors a transparent 
statement of the assumptions on which the theoretical argument lies and a clear exposition of the 
factors and actors involved in it. Using formal theory allows spelling out the relationship 
between actors‘ behavior and the constraints they face (Helmke 2005). The formal theoretical 
model presented in this chapter, however, is but the first step in the investigation I am interested 
in developing in this dissertation. It is just a means towards the end of deriving the empirical 
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implications from the analysis of the model‘s equilibria and putting them to systematic test, an 
endeavor I pursue in subsequent chapters. 
This theory adds up to the relatively short-lived but increasingly productive subfield of 
judicial politics in Latin America. Accordingly, the argument supports the view that institutions 
matter and that actors are strategic in the sense that their actions are a function of their 
anticipation of other actors‘ behavior. In this view, moreover, judges operate under varying 
levels of uncertainty and their decision making reflects a trade-off between policy seeking and 
institutional building and preserving (Helmke and Staton 2011). 
Endorsing a strategic account of judicial behavior does not entail making normative 
assumptions on the very nature of court decision making. I therefore conform to the view that 
―judges will act sincerely when they can, engaging in strategic behavior only to the extent it is 
necessary to achieve their desired mix of personal and policy goals‖ (Brinks 2004: 15). As I 
show below, moreover, regarding the debate on the suitability of the attitudinal and the strategic 
models, my theoretical argument acknowledges that this divide is an empirical question largely 
depending on the institutional framework within which courts and judges operate rather than a 
matter related to the essence of judicial behavior (Segal and Spaeth 2002: 150). In this sense, my 
theory endorses he view that ―[j]udges‘ decisions are a function of what they prefer to do, 
tempered by what they think they ought to do but constrained by what they perceive as feasible 
to do‖ (Gibson 1983: 32) 
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2.1 THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 
Two different broad views have been developed in the literature on courts‘ behavior vis-à-vis 
other political actors. A first view conceives of high courts as actors which act unconstrained by 
external political factors. According to this perspective, justices show a sincere behavior when 
ruling on a statutory or constitutional matter. This view, in turn, encompasses two different 
models of courts. On the one hand, a legal model posits that justices base their decisions 
exclusively on legal criteria.
2
 This model views justices as (legally) technical rather than political 
actors.
3
 
On the other hand, some authors state that judicial decisions, rather than being the result 
of applying legal rules, are indeed a reflection of individual justices‘ attitudes and political or 
policy preferences. This attitudinal model sustains that judges act sincerely and that the final 
decision on a specific case is the result of the interaction of the facts of the case and each 
justice‘s attitudes and preferences (Segal and Spaeth 1993, 2002). This is the model most often 
used to explain U.S. Supreme Court‘s decisions on the merits (Segal and Spaeth 2002). 
In contrast to this approach to courts as unconstrained actors, a second perspective views 
them as constrained by political factors. This view suggests that judges do not necessarily vote 
sincerely when addressing an issue but that they rather act strategically, based not only on their 
individual legal or ideological values but also taking into account institutional and political 
factors that lead them to consider how their decisions impact the reactions of other political 
                                                 
2 It may be argued that in this legal model justices are constrained by a (narrow) interpretation of statutes. 
Still, their behavior under this view is seen as sincere rather than strategic. 
3
 In fact, although political scientists rarely embrace this model, justices usually justify their decisions on 
strictly legal grounds. 
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actors. The anticipation of such reactions, in turn, influence the decisions they make in the first 
place.
4
 
Although studies of the decision-making process in the U.S. Supreme Court have mostly 
relied on the attitudinal model, some authors have advanced strategic accounts of justices‘ 
behavior in the final stage of judicial review, that is, the final decision on the merits. More 
concretely, these analyses use a Separation of Powers approach which, in a nutshell, suggests 
that the court‘s decision is shaped by its anticipation of the possible reaction Congress might 
have to such decision. Broadly speaking, the model predicts that a reaction by Congress 
overturning the court‘s decision is more likely under unified than under divided government. In 
anticipation to this reaction, the court will tend to avoid being overruled and therefore will tend 
to cave to legislative majorities and refrain from making that decision (Epstein and Knight 
1998). More specifically, the Separation-of-Powers model of judicial behavior posits that, when 
making policy through a decision, the court will take into account the location of pivotal actors 
in order to set policy ―as close to its ideal point as possible without getting overturned by 
Congress‖ (Segal 2008: 29).  
Although strategic models have been developed to approach other stages in the U.S. 
Supreme Court decision making such as certiorari or opinion assignment (e.g. Hammond, 
Bonneau, and Sheehan 2005; Maltzman, Spriggs II, and Wahlbeck 2000), the empirical record of 
the Separation of Powers model as an account to explain/predict Supreme Court‘s final decisions 
on the merits is not very impressive (see Segal and Spaeth 2002, Chapter 8 for a critical view; 
Spiller and Gely 2008). The prevalence of the attitudinal theory to model the U.S. Supreme 
                                                 
4 Overall, the way a game states the sequence of players‘ moves is implicitly related to whether the court is 
assumed to be constrained or unconstrained. A game in which the court moves last assumes that the court acts 
unconstrained, while a game in which there is a further move by another political actor reflects the setting for 
strategic judicial behavior (Ferejohn and Weingast 1992; Epstein, Knight, and Shvetsova 2001b).  
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Court, however, rather than reflecting an essential merit of the model itself or an intrinsic flaw in 
the strategic account, is better explained by the institutional framework in which the Supreme 
Court operates. As Segal, one of the key authors behind the attitudinal model, admits, Separation 
of Powers models have not been successful probably because they have been typically tested on 
―the court that is perhaps most insulated from external influence: the U.S. Supreme Court‖ 
(Segal 2008: 30). Institutional features, such as life tenure for justices, shield the court from 
external influences and, therefore, allow justices to make sincere decisions on the merits, based 
on a combination of case facts and personal preferences. 
The assumption of the court‘s institutional insulation, which is at the base of the study of 
the U.S. Supreme Court, becomes a variable in the field of comparative judicial politics. In 
countries other than the U.S. the level of institutional strength cannot be taken for granted. 
Analyses of judicial behavior even in countries with long histories of judicial review and 
regarding courts with high levels of legitimacy, such as Germany,
5
 describe judges who are, to 
varying extents, influenced by other actors in the political context in which they have to decide 
(e.g. Vanberg 2005). 
This view of courts as institutionally weak, or at least weaker than the U.S. Supreme 
Court, is characteristic of studies of judicial behavior in new democracies in post-communist 
Eastern European countries (Epstein, Knight, and Shvetsova 2001b) and Asia (e.g. Ginsburg 
2003). In most of these studies courts are analyzed as strategic actors, that is, as actors which are 
constrained by external influences and therefore strategically interact with other political actors 
and institutions.  
                                                 
5
 Germany, as I describe in Chapter 3, was one of the nations where the second wave of judicial review 
during the post-World War II era took place. 
 14 
The study of judicial behavior in Latin America, which can no longer be considered as an 
incipient field, has also been somewhat dominated by the strategic approach (Chávez 2004b; 
Chávez, Ferejohn, and Weingast 2011; Helmke 2005; Iaryczower, Spiller, and Tommasi 2002; 
Ríos-Figueroa 2007; Scribner 2004, 2011). This not only responds to a strategic revolution in the 
study of courts (Epstein and Knight 2000) but mainly to the fact that Latin American judges 
often act under high levels of pressure (Helmke and Ríos-Figueroa 2011a). In this region, 
characterized by strong presidential systems, the external influence on courts does not typically 
come from legislative majorities, as strategic models of judicial decision making have proposed 
in the case of the U.S. Supreme Court (e.g. Spiller and Gely 1992) or in the case of Germany 
(e.g. Vanberg 2005), but from Executives. In fact, high courts have been under sheer attack or 
continual harassment by Menem in Argentina, Fujimori in Peru, Morales in Bolivia, Gutiérrez 
and Correa in Ecuador, and Chávez in Venezuela, to mention only the most blatant instances of 
threats on courts. The theoretical model I develop in this chapter fits into this bourgeoning 
literature. 
The formal model I present below is by no means the first game-theoretical approach to 
judicial review. In fact, strategic accounts of court decision making are often based on the 
formalization of preferences, information, and payoffs of players in a game, although many of 
the studies do not explicitly model such elements. Neither it is the first formal model developed 
in the subdiscipline of judicial politics focused on Latin America. The strategic revolution in the 
study of judicial behavior (Epstein and Knight 2000) has led to the publication of some studies of 
Latin American courts based on formal models (e.g. Helmke 2005; Chávez, Ferejohn, and 
Weingast 2011). 
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These models are all based on the insight that courts and judges are more likely to exert 
an autonomous decision making whenever the institutional setting helps insulating them from 
external influence and the political context makes it difficult for other players to act against the 
court or its rulings. My own model shares this basic insight. The extent to which other authors 
explicitly model these factors and the precise way they do so varies. 
Some theories are based on pure spatial models in which the players are located on a one- 
or two-dimensional policy space based on their preferences and their behavior depends solely on 
those locations. One example of this approach is the study by Chávez, Ferejohn, and Weingast 
(2011) comparing the U.S. and the Argentine Supreme Courts. In this model, the court‘s level of 
autonomy depends on the extent to which the president‘s and congress‘s ideal points are close 
together (unified government) or apart from each other (divided government). The court‘s room 
of maneuver is larger in the latter case than in the former one. This approach assumes that the 
actors‘ preferences are common knowledge and that there not additional factors involved in the 
players‘ assessments of the other players‘ options and payoffs. 
An extension of the spatial model is used in Epstein, Knight, and Shvetsova (2001b), the 
application of which is tested on the Russian Constitutional Court. This approach shares the 
previous assumptions regarding the impact of the players‘ ideal points in policy space on their 
behavior, although other considerations and costs are modeled through what the authors call 
actors‘ tolerance intervals around those ideal points. The court decision making depends on how 
wide those intervals are and how they intersect with each other. This model also assumes that 
players ideal points and tolerance intervals are common knowledge, that is, as in the previous 
case, it assumes complete information. 
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Formal models of judicial behavior with incomplete information which go beyond the 
purely spatial approach have also been developed. An example of this is Helmke‘s theory of 
strategic defection (Helmke 2005). In her study of the Argentine Supreme Court she offers a 
model to explain under what circumstances judges rule against the elected officials who 
originally appointed the. In this account, judicial behavior is determined by the judges‘ 
assessments of the strength of the sitting president and of the preferences of an upcoming 
administration. Judges will strategically defect from the incumbent when they feel that its 
strength is declining and when they anticipate the election of a new president with preferences 
opposed to the current one‘s. The key insight in this type of models is that judges are not only 
concerned with the policy outcomes of the case under review but also they have stakes regarding 
the institutional stability of their posts. 
This insight is shared by models which include not only the court and the government 
and/or the legislature but also the public. An example of this approach is Vanberg‘s model of 
judicial review with application to the German Constitutional Tribunal (Vanberg 2005). 
Although the public is not explicitly a player of his game,
6
 it is represented in parameters related 
to the court‘s public support and the level of transparency of the environment surrounding the 
case. The intuition is that a court‘s decision is more likely to face evasion by the Parliament 
whenever the court‘s public support is low or when the matters involved in the case are too 
complicated for the public to monitor the legislature‘s compliance with the court ruling (i.e. 
when the environment is transparent). The players face uncertainty regarding the levels of public 
support and of transparency, as well as regarding the extent to which the court‘s preferences are 
                                                 
6
 More recently, Helmke and Staton have developed a model in which the public is explicitly modeled both 
in the form of litigants‘ decision to access the court and as the public‘s reaction itself to the court‘s ruling (Helmke 
and Staton 2011). 
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aligned with the Parliament‘s. The theory I present here shares some of the features of the 
theories described above and includes other features which have not been explicitly modeled in 
previous approaches. First, unlike other models, the game on which this dissertation is based 
explicitly models the institutional setting in which the court operates, that is, the extent to which 
this setting insulates the court from the influence of other actors. This element of the formal 
model is key to determining to what extent justices are free to act sincerely according to their 
preferences or are constrained and thus are inclined to behave strategically. Second, the theories 
models the preference alignment between the court and the Executive. Third, as in some of the 
model types described above, actors are assumed to have both policy preferences and 
institutional concerns which determine the options and payoffs they have. Fourth, akin to the 
view that judicial autonomy is a function of the level of fragmentation of the polity (Ferejohn, 
Rosenbluth, and Shipan 2007), my model posits that the court‘s room of maneuver depends on 
the government‘s strength, that is, on its ability to gather a coalition necessary to react against a 
court ruling. This parameter of the game expands the unified v. divided government factor 
included in other models (e.g. Chávez, Ferejohn, and Weingast 2011) and not only it provides a 
more continuous way to model such fragmentation but also it encompasses more general 
situations in which parties and party systems are more fluid and less institutionalized, which are 
not uncommon in Latin America. Moreover, my formal model assumes incomplete information: 
players are uncertain on how strong the government is and their behavior therefore depends on 
their subjective beliefs regarding such strength. 
In sum, since the aim of this project is to be able to empirically verify the its implications, 
the model I present below, is rather simple in the sense that it involves a one-shot game between 
a court and a government. However, it contributes at expanding the corpus of positive political 
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theories on strategic judicial review with special emphasis on Latin American presidential 
systems.
7
  
2.2 MODELING JUDICIAL REVIEW IN PRESIDENTIAL DEMOCRACIES 
Although this dissertation focuses its empirical analysis on constitutional review exerted by 
Constitutional Court justices in Colombia, the model presented in this chapter is intended to be a 
general theoretical account of judicial review in presidential democracies (using the case of the 
Colombian Constitutional Court I probe in Chapter 4, and systematically test in Chapter 5, the 
empirical implications of this theory). More specifically, it seeks to be applicable to cases of 
strong presidentialism, that is, to countries where the executive is the strongest political actor. 
The theory models the strategic interaction between a justice in a constitutional court (or 
a high court exerting constitutional review) and the government. The interaction is mediated by 
the motivations and preferences of the justice, the institutional setting of the court, and the 
political environment with special emphasis on the political strength of the executive. In a 
nutshell, the model purports that judicial behavior is determined by the justice‘s preferences, the 
level of institutional insulation of the court, and the justice‘s anticipation of the government‘s 
reaction to the court‘s rulings. Justices‘ assessment of the likelihood of such reaction depends on 
their perceptions of the political strength of the government, that is, on how difficult/easy it is for 
the latter either to gather a legislative coalition (or to act outside the legislature) in order to 
implement retaliatory action against the justice and/or the court. 
                                                 
7
 Although I do not explicitly model the public as a player of the game, its role is central and it is indirectly 
included in the players‘ payoffs through the government‘s strength parameter and also through the parameter 
capturing the cost for the government trying to sanction the court. 
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2.2.1 Specification of the game 
The game-theoretic approach I employ in this dissertation presents a constitutional review game 
in which there are three players: Nature (N), a justice in the constitutional court (J),
8
 and a 
government (G).
9
 The sequence of play is as follows: First, Nature makes a first move and 
selects the type of justice, namely, whether the justice is friendly or hostile. This selection 
reflects the level of alignment of the justice‘s preferences with those of the government. 
Naturally, this is substantively a matter of degree and examining the empirical implications of 
the model should reflect this continuous measure. However, for simplicity, I present it here as a 
dichotomous choice. 
Then, Nature makes a further move by selecting an institutional design for the court, 
whether this design helps insulating the court from external factors or it leads to exposing the 
court to pressures from other political actors. This results in two types of courts, namely, an 
insulated court and an exposed court. The level of insulation, which is also a matter of degree, 
depends on various features of the institutional setting of the court. There are in the literature 
several attempts at developing indices of judicial autonomy (e.g. Feld and Voigt 2003), most of 
which revolve around institutional factors such as the appointment procedure of justices, their 
length of tenure, and the procedure needed to remove a justice (Ríos-Figueroa 2011). All those 
factors determine to what extent courts are insulated from external pressure and, therefore, to 
                                                 
8
 Naturally, justices do not act alone; they play a collegial game (Maltzman, Spriggs II, and Wahlbeck 
2000) in which they receive influences from other justices in the court as well as from internal institutional 
constraints and norms which may shape their strategic behavior. One of these norms may be the search for 
consensus, as the qualitative evidence presented in Chapter 4 suggests for the case of the Colombian Constitutional 
Court, which explains in part why, in Chapter 5, I limit the quantitative analysis to justices‘ votes on non-unanimous 
decisions. I do not consider in this model these internal influences on each justice‘s decisions.  
9
 This model, including its notation scheme, draws inspiration from Vanberg‘s models of constitutional 
review (Vanberg 2001, 2005), though it presents substantial variations. 
 20 
what extent justices are able to vote sincerely on the merits of a case. Again, for simplicity, the 
institutional setting of the court is modeled as a dichotomy (insulated/exposed). 
Nature makes then its third and final move by choosing the political environment in 
which the court operates vis-à-vis other political actors, especially the government and its 
legislative support. This context may be one in which it is hard and costly for the government to 
build legislative coalitions, that is, when the number of parties is high, the internal cohesion of 
parties is low (i.e. party discipline is poor), and/or the government lacks a strong support in the 
legislature (weak president). Or it may be one in which there are few parties and the president 
enjoys a strong and disciplined legislative contingent (strong president). 
This parameter of the game is based on the idea that judicial autonomy is more likely 
when the political system is fragmented (Ferejohn, Rosenbluth, and Shipan 2007). The rationale 
behind this approach to the political context lies in the assumption that any rules aimed at 
promoting judicial independence ―are powerful in inverse proportion to the costs involved in 
coordinating against them‖ (Ferejohn, Rosenbluth, and Shipan 2007: 278). The particular 
specification presented here, as a parameter of incomplete information, provides an alternative 
continuous measure to the commonly used (dichotomous) notion of unified vs. divided 
government (e.g. Chávez, Ferejohn, and Weingast 2011). Modeling the political context in this 
manner covers a wider variety of situations including not only two-party systems where it might 
be easier to identify unified and divided governments but also multi-party systems where this 
dichotomy is much less clear. Moreover, it also encompasses various electoral rules and their 
impact on party cohesion and discipline, including party-centered electoral systems and those 
systems containing incentives to cultivate personal reputations (Carey and Shugart 1995). In 
addition, it captures the uncertainty faced by governments inherent to those situations in which 
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legislative support cannot be taken for granted and considerable resources must be allocated to 
gain that support for each executive-initiated bill.
10
 The prior belief, common to all players, that 
the political environment includes a strong president (i.e. coalition-building is easy or cheap) is 
captured by the parameter p (p[0,1]).11  
Next, the justice makes its move by either upholding a bill as constitutional (c), in which 
case the game ends, or overturning it (c).12 Finally, if the court made a decision to overturn the 
norm, the government must choose whether to attempt a retaliation (r) either in terms of policy 
(i.e. by overturning the decision) or by directly impacting the court‘s or the justice‘s institutional 
status, or to comply to the court‘s ruling (r).  
Justices are assumed to be policy-seekers, that is, their main concern relates to the policy 
outcome of the case under review. However, they are, to some extent, also concerned with their 
institutional status. This concern is motivated by how much they value their seats (i.e. the perks 
of the post, its prestige, the salary, and so on) and/or by how much they value the institutional 
stability of the court itself. In other words, a justice faces a tradeoff between the policy outcome 
and the institutional concern. To reflect this assumption, the game prescribes that justices‘ 
payoffs depend on two components concerning their preferences. First, justices have preferences 
over the issue under consideration. They pay a cost A (A > 0) when the game results in an 
outcome that diverges from their preferences regarding the specific bill under review. Friendly 
justices (F) pay the cost A whenever the court strikes down the norm under review. On the 
contrary, hostile justices (H) pay such cost whenever the norm is upheld.  
                                                 
10
 This, for instance, is the nature of the executive-legislative relationships in Brazil (see Ames 2001). 
11
 Notice than whenever the political context is that of divided government, p approaches 0. Conversely, as 
the government is consistently unified, p tends to 1. 
12
 This way of modeling the justice‘s move assumes that the court has no control over its docket, which is 
the case for most courts exerting abstract review. 
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Second, justices are also concerned about their institutional status or that of the court, and 
must pay a cost B (B > 0) whenever the government makes an attempt to retaliate in response to a 
court‘s decision. This is so because such a move by the government entails a challenge to the 
court‘s standing and legitimacy in the political system, or because it entails a direct sanction on 
the specific justice. This specification is particularly important in Latin America where judges 
usually face sanctions which tend to be more severe than the simple overriding of their decisions 
(Helmke and Ríos-Figueroa 2011a). 
As for the government, its most preferred outcome is to have its bill implemented as 
legislation either because the court upholds it or as a result of a successful retaliation. The 
government‘s utility function depends on two factors as well. The government pays a policy cost 
α (α > 0) when it complies with an adverse decision by the court (or when it does not succeed in 
sanctioning the court). In addition, it must pay a cost β (β > 0) whenever its attempted retaliation 
to a court‘s decision fails. Incumbents may suffer a public backlash and an electoral cost if they 
decide to unsuccessfully oppose the court or attack one or more justices. In fact, to the extent that 
the court enjoys a fair level of public diffuse support or legitimacy (Caldeira and Gibson 1995; 
Vanberg 2005), voters in the next election may punish incumbents daring to challenge court 
rulings. If elected actors attempt to overtly defy court decisions, then they may jeopardize their 
reelection chances. In this case, the electoral connection arguably acts as a mechanism promoting 
judicial independence (Vanberg 2001). Notice that an attempted retaliation is assumed to fail if 
the court is institutionally insulated (I) from external pressures. If the court is exposed (E), that 
is, if its institutional framework makes it prone to receive such pressures, it is assumed that a 
government‘s retaliation will also fail if the political context is such that building legislative 
coalitions is difficult, when the president is weak (i.e. when p is low). Figure 2.1, which depicts 
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the game tree, summarizes the sequence of the game and the players‘ payoffs. As I explain 
below, friendly justices, that is, those whose preferences are aligned with the government‘s, will 
always uphold the legislation under review (i.e. their dominant strategy is c). For simplicity, the 
game tree in Figure 2.1 does not include the first choice made by Nature and, therefore, it omits 
the branch corresponding to a friendly court.  
 
 
Figure 2.1. Game tree 
 
A strategy for the justice specifies how each type of justice will decide. For example, the 
strategy SJ = {c|FI; c|FE; c|HI; c|HE} indicates that a friendly (F) justice will uphold the norm, 
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regardless of whether the court is insulated (I) or exposed (E); a hostile justice (H) in an 
insulated court will strike down the norm, and a hostile justice in an exposed court will uphold it. 
As this example implies, a friendly justice will always declare the act constitutional. It also 
implies that a hostile justice in an insulated court will always strike down the norm, as the game 
tree suggests (the proof of this result is included in Section 2.3). A strategy for the government 
specifies whether or not it will react with a sanction on the court or the justice as a result of a 
court ruling. For example, the strategy SG = {r} means that the government reacts to the court‘s 
decision. 
2.2.2 Equilibria of the game 
The predictions of the game lie on the three factors described above, namely, the type of justice, 
the level of insulation of the court, and the strength of the government. Two cases are 
straightforward: First, as specified above, a friendly justice, that is, a justice whose preferences 
are aligned with those of the government, will always uphold the norm under review. Second, a 
hostile justice in a court with an institutional setting shielding justices from external pressure will 
always strike down the norm.  
The most interesting, and perhaps the most general, case occurs when a hostile justice 
operates in an institutionally exposed court. In this case, the behavior of actors depends on the 
third factor described above, that is, the political strength of the executive which determines to 
what extent it is easy or difficult for the government to gather the legislative support to impose 
sanctions on the court should it hand down a decision of unconstitutionality. In other words, the 
equilibria of the game in this case depend on p.  
Definition: Define the ―government‘s threshold‖ as: 
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This threshold determines the response of an executive confronted with a judicial 
decision striking down the norm under review. Whenever the strength of the government p is 
above this threshold p g, the government chooses to react against an adverse court decision.  
The model predicts that, when the government is more concerned by the policy outcome 
of the case relative to the possible public sanctions resulting from a failed retaliation against the 
court or one of its members, this threshold will be lower and therefore the government will be 
more willing to sanction the court or the justice. If, on the contrary, the cost of attempting an 
unsuccessful attack on the court is higher relative to the policy cost, the government will tend to 
comply with the judicial decision. 
Definition: Define the ―justice‘s threshold‖ as: 
   
   
 
 
This threshold, in turn, determines the action of a hostile justice in an exposed court when 
reviewing a legislative or executive act. Whenever the strength of the government is below this 
threshold p j, the justice opts for handing down a decision of unconstitutionality. 
The model, then, predicts that when justices are highly concerned with their institutional 
status relative to the intensity of her preferences over the issue, this threshold is lower and they 
are more willing to give up policy to preserve the legitimacy of their post or that of the court. If, 
on the contrary, the intensity of justices‘ preferences over the issue is high and their institutional 
concern is comparatively low, the threshold will be higher as well, and justices are willing to 
jeopardize the institutional stability to achieve their policy goals. 
This leads to the identification of three different equilibria or regimes (Figure 2.2): 
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Judicial Supremacy Equilibrium: In this equilibrium, the hostile justice in an exposed 
court overturns the norm under review, and the government refrains from sanctioning the court 
or the justice in anticipation of public backlash given the low level of government‘s strength. For 
p ≤ pg = /( +), the following strategy profile constitutes a Sub-Game Perfect Equilibrium 
(SGPE): 
Justice: SJ = {c|FI; c|FE; c|HI; c|HE} 
Government: SG = { r} 
 
Government Supremacy Equilibrium: In this equilibrium the justice will defer to the 
government in anticipation of its retribution. For p ≥ pj = (A-B)/A, the following strategy profile 
constitutes a SGPE: 
Justice: SJ = {c|FI; c|FE; c|HI; c|HE} 
Government: SG = {r} 
 
Interbranch Conflict Equilibrium: In this equilibrium, the justice will overturn the bill and 
the government will react against the justice/court. For /( +) =pg < p < pj = (A-B)/A, the 
following strategy profile constitutes a SGPE:
13
 
Justice: SJ = {c|FI; c|FE; c|HI; c|HE} 
Government: SG = {r} 
The three regimes which result from the game‘s equilibria are described in Figure 2.2. 
 
                                                 
13
 Notice that to clearly present these results of the model, I assume that pg < pj. If this is not the case, this 
regime/equilibrium simply disappears. 
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Figure 2.2. Equilibria of the game: Three regimes 
 
The equilibria of the constitutional review game described above can be summarized as follows: 
1. Friendly justices will always uphold the bill. 
2. If a justice is not aligned with the government over the issue and the court is institutionally 
insulated from external pressures, then the justice will overturn the bill, and the government 
will not be able to retaliate { c, r} 
3. If the justice is not aligned with the government over the issue under review, and the court is 
not institutionally insulated (i.e. it is exposed), then 
3.1. If p ≤ pg = β/(α + β), then the justice will overturn the bill and the government will 
comply with an adverse decision without reacting { c, r}, resulting in Judicial 
Supremacy (JS) 
3.2. If (A – B)/A = pj ≤ p, then the justice will uphold the bill in anticipation of a likely 
reaction by the government {c, r}, resulting in Government Supremacy (GS). 
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3.3. If β/(α + β) = pg < p < pj = (A – B)/A, then the justice will overturn the bill and the 
government will engage in retaliatory behavior against the court or the justice { c, r}, 
resulting in Interbranch Conflict (IBC). 
2.3 PROOF OF THE EQUILIBRIA 
Tie-Breaking Assumptions 
- If indifferent between retaliating and not retaliating, the government chooses to 
comply. 
- If indifferent between upholding and striking down the norm under review, the justice 
chooses to uphold. 
 
Result 1: In any equilibrium, the friendly justice will always choose to uphold the norm 
under review, regardless of whether the court is insulated or exposed. The justice‘s 
strategy can be stated as: 
                            
I. Consider the hostile justice in an insulated court. The expected utility of the 
government is given by: 
              
          
The government will always choose to comply with the decision. Therefore, the justice‘s 
expected utility is given by: 
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The hostile justice in an insulated court will always choose to strike the norm down. 
II. Consider the hostile justice in an exposed court. The government‘s expected utility is 
given by: 
                  
          
The government will choose to retaliate iff 
  
 
   
    
This is denoted the ―government‘s threshold‖. If the president‘s strength meets this 
condition, then the government chooses to retaliate. Otherwise, it complies. 
The expected utility for the justice is determined considering two cases: 
A. Consider the case when the government complies with the decision. The justice‘s 
expected utility is given by: 
          
         
The justice chooses to strike down the norm. 
B. Consider now the case when the government attempts retribution. The justice‘s 
expected utility is given by: 
          
             
The justice will choose to strike down iff 
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This is denoted the ―justice‘s threshold.‖ If the president‘s strength meets this 
condition, the justice chooses to annul the norm. Otherwise, the justice upholds it. 
QED 
2.4 COMPARATIVE STATICS AND EMPIRICAL IMPLICATIONS 
In order to derive empirical implications from the equilibria of the game, it is necessary to 
undertake comparative statics analyses. One way to do this is by specifying whether there should 
be shifts between the different regimes, and in which direction, as a result of varying one 
parameter of the game at a time (while leaving the other parameters unchanged). This 
comparative statics analysis is summarized in Table 2.1. Although I retake in detail the results of 
this analysis in Chapter 5, where I spell out the hypotheses that could be derived from the game 
and empirically test them, it is worth reviewing in this short section the observable implications 
stem from the game‘s equilibria and its comparative statics. 
 
Table 2.1. Comparative statics of the strategic prudence game 
Equilibrium Increase in A Increase in B Increase in α Increase in  Increase in p 
JS No change GS IBC, GS No change IBC, GS 
IBC No change GS No change JS GS 
GS IBC, JS No change No change JS No change 
 
First, it is clear that, as the government grows stronger, the ability of the court and its 
justices to rule against it is constrained and the likely outcome is government supremacy (GS). 
This result is rather intuitive. Less so is the prediction that increases in the executive‘s strength 
may also lead to clashes with the court. Given the uncertainty regarding the actual strength of the 
 31 
government, justices who have been able to autonomously behave may end up miscalculating 
such strength and being punished because of a daring ruling. This feature nicely illustrates how 
introducing uncertainty is central to predicting actual conflict which otherwise would be 
successfully avoided by rational actors anticipating their counterparts‘ responses. 
Second, as justices have more stakes or have stronger preferences regarding the case 
under review, they will be more willing to make a decision which may lead to conflict with the 
executive. Depending on the political strength of the latter, it may also lead to a situation in 
which the court prevails and the government decides not to retaliate. Conversely, as justices are 
more concerned with the institutional survival of the court and with their stability in office, they 
will tend to be more deferent, leading to government supremacy. 
Finally, as cases grow more salient for the incumbent administration the likelihood of 
confrontation with the court increases. Eventually, this situation may result in justices being 
deferent to avoid such confrontation. Likewise, an increasing perceived cost to the government 
resulting from the public backlash which may occur because of a failed retaliation against the 
court may lead to its refraining from undertaking such retribution, which in turn leads to the 
justices‘ preferences prevailing. 
This analysis leads to the formulation of hypotheses on the conditions under which 
justices will make decisions against the executive‘s preferences. These hypotheses are 
qualitatively explored in Chapter 4 and systematically tested in Chapter 5 of this dissertation. 
Moreover, as I will develop further in Chapter 5, the comparative statics analysis presented 
below may lead to consider hypotheses regarding how parameters A, B, α, and β may have an 
impact on shifting from one equilibrium to another (and ultimately on the likelihood of a judge 
striking down the norm under review) which is conditioned by the president‘s strength p. 
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Consider for instance the parameter related to the cost paid by justices if they uphold a 
norm they dislike (parameter A). A straightforward interpretation of the comparative statics 
suggests that when this cost is higher a justice will be more likely to strike down the norm. An 
interactive interpretation of the comparative statics, however, would lead to state that the effect 
of this cost on the probability that the justice will strike down the norm is higher when the 
president is stronger. This seemingly counterintuitive hypothesis derives from the fact that when 
the president is weaker, justices will tend to defy him more often regardless of how salient the 
case is for them. In other words, when the executive‘s strength is small it would be more difficult 
to detect the effect of parameter A on the justice‘s decision. In fact, according to this 
interpretation, only when the executive is stronger (and therefore a decision striking down the 
norm is less likely) a higher cost paid by justices for upholding the norm would have a visible 
(positive) effect on their likelihood of striking down the norm. In other words, only when p is 
large the Government Supremacy equilibrium might shift into the Interbranch Conflict 
equilibrium (or even a Justice Supremacy equilibrium) as a result of an increase in A. 
The same logic applies to the remaining parameters of the game. The effect of the cost 
paid by justices when the government attempts a retaliation on their likelihood of annulling the 
norm is hypothesized to be higher when the president is weaker. The same is expected regarding 
the effect of the cost paid by the government for complying with an adverse decision in court. 
Finally, the cost paid by the government for a failed retribution should have a stronger effect on 
the likelihood of a decision striking down the norm when the president is stronger.  
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3.0  CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW IN COLOMBIA AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
COURT 
After presenting the nuts and bolts of the theoretical argument in the previous chapter, I turn here 
to the case on which the empirical implications of this theory are to be tested. Although I provide 
a complete justification of the use of the Colombian Constitutional Court (CCC) for such test in 
the next chapter, let me emphasize here, first, that Colombian courts have been rather neglected 
and remain highly understudied in the flourishing literature on judicial politics in Latin America. 
A recent literature review on the subject (Kapiszewski and Taylor 2008) makes references to just 
a few works on Colombia, particularly on the CCC and its role in the protection of citizen rights. 
Moreover, all these papers and book chapters were authored by jurists from a legal-sociological 
perspective (Cepeda 2005; Rodríguez, Uprimny, and García-Villegas 2003; Uprimny 2003a, 
2006), not by political scientists. This contrasts with the attention paid by the subfield to courts 
in Argentina (Brinks 2004, 2005; Chávez 2003, 2004b, 2004a; Chávez, Ferejohn, and Weingast 
2011; Helmke 2002, 2003, 2005; Iaryczower, Spiller, and Tommasi 2002; Kapiszewski 2007; 
Scribner 2003a, 2004, 2011), Brazil (Brinks 2004, 2005, 2011; Kapiszewski 2007, 2011; Taylor 
2004, 2005, 2006, 2008), Chile (Couso 2002, 2004, 2005; Couso and Hilbink 2011; Hilbink 
2003, 2007, 1999; Scribner 2003b, 2003a, 2004, 2001, 2011), Mexico (Domingo 2000, 2005; 
Magaloni 2003; Sánchez, Magaloni, and Magar 2011; Staton 2004, 2003, 2006, 2002), and even 
Costa Rica (Wilson 2005; Wilson and Rodríguez Cordero 2006), Ecuador (Basabe 2008; 
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Grijalva 2010), and Peru (Dargent 2009). Only recently a few works on the CCC from a judicial 
politics perspective have been published (Nunes 2010; Rodríguez-Raga 2011). 
This seemingly lack of academic interest in Colombian courts may be the result of the 
international reputation of the CCC as an independent, activist court (Helmke and Ríos-Figueroa 
2011a; Kapiszewski and Taylor 2008), which may have make it look like a weak case to test the 
strategic accounts of judicial behavior prevailing in the region. However, as I show in detail in 
the following chapter, despite this well-founded reputation of autonomy, the CCC face strong 
constraints and its justices must often deal with the predicament of compromising policy 
outcomes related to specific cases in order to preserve the institutional stability of the court. In 
consequence, the CCC becomes a ‗crucial case‘ (Eckstein 1975) in which to test the strategic 
prudence theory presented in Chapter 2 in the sense that its seemingly independence makes it 
less likely to find empirical evidence of strategic behavior by court justices. 
The chapter proceeds as follows. The first section includes an account of the origins and 
evolution of constitutional review in Colombia since the early 20
th
 century until the introduction 
of the new Constitution in 1991. The second section describes the circumstances under which 
this constitution came to be drafted by a constituent assembly and the debates leading to the 
creation of the Constitutional Court. The third section contains a detailed description of the 
organization and structure of the court, including the specification of its jurisdiction and data on 
its caseload, the provisions ruling the selection and retention of justices, and the description of 
the court‘s decision-making procedure and of the type of decisions it hands down. All these 
institutional features are presented in comparative perspective. The final section concludes. 
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3.1 A LONG TRADITION OF CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW IN COLOMBIA 
Although rarely recognized in the comparative literature, constitutional review, that is, ―the 
power of courts to strike down incompatible legislation‖ (Ginsburg 2008: 81), has a rather long 
tradition in Colombia.
14
 The conventional wisdom states that constitutional review, originated in 
the United States, was rare before World War II outside Anglo-American federal polities ruled 
by common law. This same view locates a second wave of provisions for constitutional review in 
post-fascist West European countries like Austria, Germany, Italy, Portugal, and Spain 
(Ginsburg 2008; Ferejohn, Rosenbluth, and Shipan 2007).  
In Colombia, however, constitutional review dates back at least to 1910 when a 
constitutional amendment introduced a mechanism named Public Action of Unconstitutionality 
(PAU) through which any citizen could challenge a piece of legislation already in place, and the 
Supreme Court was bound to make an abstract, a posteriori review decision with effects for 
everybody (i.e. erga omnes). The 1886 conservative constitution in Colombia contained 
provisions for constitutional review by a judicial body, the Supreme Court, but its role was more 
that of an arbiter between the Executive and the legislature when the former vetoed a bill on 
grounds of unconstitutionality and the latter insisted in approving such bill. According to 
(Cepeda 2007: 18), the citizen-initiated procedure for constitutional review introduced in 1910 
was the first of its kind set in place in the world.
15
 The wide accessibility of this mechanism for 
                                                 
14
 As Cepeda (2007: 3) points out, one of the stereotypes about Colombia depicts it as a ―legalist‖ country, 
the other major stereotype being that a of a violent one.  
15
 In 1904, a statute was adopted creating PAUs only for executive emergency decrees. This was extended 
to other forms of legislation in the amendment approved in 1910. Also this year it was created what was known as 
the ―exception of unconstitutionality‖ by means of which any judge can refuse in a concrete situation to apply a law 
that he or she deems unconstitutional. This form of constitutional review has only inter partes effects, that is, applies 
to the specific case under review and does not eliminate the piece of legislation from the legal framework of the 
country. 
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constitutional review can be explained in part as a means of offering guarantees to the opposition 
party within the peace agreements between the traditional Liberal and Conservative political 
parties that put an end to the civil war known as the War of Thousand Days.
16
  
In 1936, the Liberal López Pumarejo administration introduced major constitutional 
changes aimed, among other purposes, at expanding individual and collective rights after more 
than three decades of conservative rule. Although these amendments left unchanged the norms of 
constitutional adjudication, by expanding civil liberties such as religious freedom, the right to 
strike for workers, freedom of association, and so on, the 1936 amendment gave justices and the 
Supreme Court more room of maneuver to interpret the constitution in order to enforce the 
protection of rights (Cepeda 2007: 20-21). 
In 1958, the National Front, yet another pact set in place between liberals and 
conservatives to mitigate the violent conflict between the two parties (the period known as La 
Violencia) and to put an end to a short period of military rule (1953-1957),
17
 introduced two new 
mechanisms aimed at insulating the Supreme Court from conflicts between the two political 
parties and from shifts in public opinion and electoral results. On the one hand, as was decided 
for all elected officials and the main government agencies, the Supreme Court had to include as 
many justices from the Liberal party as there were from the Conservative one. This parity was 
one of the key features of the National Front (1958-1974). On the other hand, new justices in the 
Supreme Court were to be selected by sitting justices without any involvement of the 
government or the legislature (Cepeda 2007: 23). 
                                                 
16
 This logic of extending guarantees to the opposition parties by expanding constitutional review, which 
has been documented by Ginsburg (2003) for Asian new democracies, is at the origin of the constitution introduced 
in 1991 and the creation of a constitutional court, as I show below. 
17
 Unlike other Latin American countries, this was a rather short and ―soft‖ dictatorship during which the 
Supreme Court and constitutional review were not suspended. 
 37 
Furthermore, in 1960 an amendment was approved to give Congress the ability to 
challenge the constitutionality of emergency decrees. Given that the legislature rarely used this 
prerogative, the Supreme Court was given in 1968 the power to review ex officio the 
compatibility of emergency decrees vis-à-vis the Constitution. The 1968 amendment also 
specified how long should take the Supreme Court to exert review on constitutionality cases, as a 
response to the view that the court tended to delay decisions on controversial topics, sometimes 
up to over ten years (Cepeda 2007: 26). The amendment also gave the Supreme Court the power 
to hear cases in which the challenge was based on possible flaws in the legislative procedure 
followed to approve legislation (Cepeda 2007: 27). Incidentally, the reform included a proposal 
to create a Constitutional Court; this proposal was defeated. 
By 1990, the Supreme Court‘s attributions regarding constitutional review included: (1) 
reviewing bills that were vetoed by the president on unconstitutionality grounds and insisted by 
Congress; (2) automatically reviewing emergency decrees; (3) deciding on Public Actions of 
Unconstitutionality (PAUs) filed by citizens against ordinary legislation and executive decrees 
(i.e. those issued by the Executive under special powers delegated by Congress); (4) deciding on 
PAUs filed by citizens against constitutional amendments approved by Congress, though only 
for procedural flaws; and (5) reviewing bills approving international treaties. 
Despite the long history of constitutional review described above, at the end of the 1980s 
the Supreme Court was perceived as deferent to the Executive, especially regarding the review of 
emergency decrees. For various reasons including, but not limited to, the difficulty in approving 
legislation in Congress during the National Front, the exceptional state of siege had become the 
normal state of affairs and most legislation was passed by means of emergency decrees. 
Colombia was under state of siege during around 30 years between 1949 and 1991 (Uprimny 
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2003a: 51), with increasingly problematic effects on civil liberties and political rights. During 
this period, the Supreme Court in many cases acted merely as a rubber stamp legitimizing those 
decrees. This was one of the reasons why, as I will show below, the Supreme Court was largely 
perceived as an ineffective institution in protecting individual rights, which eventually lead to the 
creation of the Constitutional Court (Cepeda 2007: 25). In the next section I will describe the 
process by which a constituent assembly was convened and a new constitution was drafted in 
1991 creating in Colombia a specialized tribunal in charge exclusively of constitutional review: 
the Constitutional Court. 
3.2 THE NATIONAL CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY AND THE CREATION OF THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 
The 1980s were perceived in Colombia as a decade of acute political crisis. This crisis is often 
characterized by two main features, both of which led to the election of convention in charge of 
drafting a new constitution for the country. 
One the one hand, the political regime was increasingly losing its legitimacy. The origin 
of this process is commonly placed in the bipartisan agreement called the National Front. This 
was a sort of consociational arrangement (see Lijphart 1969; Dávila Ladrón de Guevara 2002) 
between the traditional Liberal and Conservative parties agreed upon to put an end both to the 
outbreak of violence between these parties in the late 1940s and early 1950s, the period known 
as La Violencia, and to the subsequent short lapse of military rule (1953-1957). Among the 
clauses of the National Front arrangement was an even distribution between the two parties of all 
elected posts, most government positions and the composition of the Supreme Court. The 
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Executive was to be alternated between the two parties (e.g. in 1958 only liberal candidates 
could run for office, in 1962 only candidates from the Conservative party could do so, and so on 
until the election held in 1970). Although the pact succeeded in defusing bipartisan conflict, it 
closed the entry to the political arena for political movements other than the traditional parties. 
Also, given that the agreement adopted rules requiring super-majorities for the passage of most 
legislation (Archer 1990; Archer and Shugart 1997), the period was characterized by legislative 
gridlock which made the use of a state of emergency, the state of siege, by the Executive the rule 
rather than the exception. Although the application of most of the National Front‘s clauses 
reached an end in the mid 1970s, its logic of exclusion and deadlock survived until the late 
1980s. 
On the other hand, the period was marked by a growing violence with many faces (Dugas 
1997) including, though not limited to, the violence associated to the leftist guerrilla groups 
emerged in the 1960s, the right-wing paramilitary groups, and the drug cartels. The 1980s 
witnessed the assassination of tens of policemen, journalists, members of the judiciary, and 
salient political figures, as well as several terrorist attacks with a significant toll of civilian 
casualties perpetrated mostly by the Medellín cartel headed by Pablo Escobar. It was a time of 
growth for the rebel groups, especially the FARC and the ELN, and of the killing by paramilitary 
squads of hundreds of members of the UP, a political party created as a result of an attempted 
peace treaty with the FARC which eventually failed. On August 18, 1989, Luis Carlos Galán, a 
promising, charismatic figure in the Liberal party who was running for president in the 1990 
elections, was murdered during a campaign rally near Bogotá. Galan‘s program included a 
position of zero-tolerance with the drug gangs and was perceived, especially by the Medellín 
cartel as a credible threat for this millionaire illegal business. Pablo Escobar was the mastermind 
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behind this assassination which was the most open and defiant move ever made by the organized 
crime against the establishment. This event was followed by the murder of presidential 
candidates Bernardo Jaramillo from the UP (March, 1990), and Carlos Pizarro from AD-M19, a 
party created as a result of the successful demobilization of the M-19 guerrilla group (April, 
1990).  
These two factors, the regime‘s loss of legitimacy and the increasing levels of violence, 
reinforced each other (Dugas 1997) and created the perception that a major changes in the rules 
of the game was urgently needed. Attempts to amend the constitution were made since the 
1970s. The López administration (1974-1978) promoted the creation of a constituent assembly 
while the Turbay administration (1978-1982) tried to pass a major amendment through Congress, 
both attempts aimed, among other issues, at introducing reforms in the judiciary and the 
constitutional jurisdiction. Although in both cases the incumbent‘s majorities in the legislature 
approved their proposals, the Supreme Court struck down the amendments procedures (Dávila 
Ladrón de Guevara 2002). In fact, the proposal to convene an assembly to amend the constitution 
was in the agenda during the entire decade of 1980, but the truth of the matter was that the 
constitution valid at the time expressively forbade any amendment made outside the legislature. 
In 1988, the Barco administration (1986-1990), in conjunction with the leaders of the traditional 
parties, promoted yet another proposal to create a constituent convention emerged from Congress 
to undertake an amendment which would take into account proposals made by citizens and 
groups in society (Dávila Ladrón de Guevara 2002: 111). This time the Council of State, the 
judicial organ in charge of reviewing administrative acts, found the agreement between the 
administration and the political parties unconstitutional. As a way off the impasse, the 
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government resorted to Congress where, after a long debate, the proposal was defeated in 
December, 1989. 
The situation was therefore one of an Executive eager to make reforms, a legislature 
unable or unwilling to approve them, and a judiciary striking down any amendment proposal 
circumventing Congress (Ruiz and Dugas 1991; Archer and Shugart 1997). After this new failed 
attempt, and with increasing levels of violence including several car bombs in public places (at 
that time the media and political actors coined the term ―narcoterrorism‖), a movement of 
university students managed to introduce a special, informal ballot in the local and legislative 
elections held in March 11, 1990. The so-called ―seventh‖ ballot18 asked voters whether or not 
they would support electing a constituent convention. The proposal, although with no legal force, 
was supported by more than two million voters. Taking advantage of the political impact of these 
results, Barco issued an emergency decree introducing a now official ballot in the upcoming 
presidential election to be held in May. Unlike previous occasions and perhaps as a result of the 
public pressure, the Supreme Court made an issue upholding the decree. This decision was 
handed down just three days before the election date! 
On May 27, then, the presidential election and the plebiscite took place. The proposal to 
convene a National Constituent Assembly (NCA) was supported by 89 percent of the votes, 
although turnout was particularly low; in fact, the May election had 1.5 million less voters than 
the March election (Dávila Ladrón de Guevara 2002).
19
 Elections to select the 70 members of the 
NCA, in turn, were held on December 9, 1990, four months into the Gaviria administration. The 
                                                 
18
 The movement was called the initiative for the séptima papeleta or seventh ballot because it was to be 
held simultaneously with the election of city councilors and mayors, department deputies, senators, representatives, 
as well as the Liberal party primary election. 
19
 This low turnout has been explained by the fact that César Gaviria, the heir of assassinated Galán as a 
Liberal party candidate, was thought to have a landslide victory, which in fact he had. In any case, critics of the 1991 
constitution have always questioned the legitimacy of the NCA because these high levels of abstention (Dávila 
2002: 113-115).  
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results of this election showed a surprising distribution of the assembly‘s seats between the 
Liberal party (36 percent), AD-M19, the party created as a result of the peace agreement between 
the M-19 rebels and the Barco administration (27 percent), the MSN, a new party created and 
headed by Álvaro Gómez Hurtado, a historical figure in the Conservative party (16 percent), and 
the official Conservative party (7 percent). For the first time in recent Colombian history, the two 
traditional parties were not able to secure a majority of seats and had to compromise other 
political forces. This distribution of seats explains in part the outcome of the assembly which was 
convened between February 5 and July 4, 1991. Not only there was a significant participation of 
center-left deputies from AD-M19 but also the almost three-fold share of seats between this 
party, the Liberals, and the Conservatives introduced significant uncertainty to future elections 
regarding which faction would held power at the end of the Gaviria administration. This 
uncertainty was reflected in the provisions in the new constitution including a comprehensive bill 
of rights and more limits on executive power, especially regarding the use (and abuse) of states 
of emergency. The expansion of judicial review and the creation of a new constitutional court in 
charge of protecting the constitution are also partially explained by this uncertainty (Ferejohn, 
Rosenbluth, and Shipan 2007; Ginsburg 2003). 
The idea of taking constitutional review out of a panel within the Supreme Court also in 
charge of other jurisdictions (e.g. criminal, civil, labor) and into a specialized constitutional court 
was hardly new in Colombia. A failed reform in 1979 included this provision. Another attempt in 
the same direction was made in Congress in 1984 but received strong public criticism in the 
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media, especially from members of the judiciary and Supreme Court justices,
20
 and was 
eventually defeated. 
The Gaviria administration reintroduced in the National Constituent Assembly the 
proposal to create constitutional court. The proposal initially received moderate support by the 
assembly members and originated significant controversy between those who praised the job 
done by the Supreme Court and preferred keeping the task of constitutional adjudication in its 
hands, and those who favored the creation of a new, specialized tribunal (NCA 1991a, 1991b).
21
 
The latter was the position of president Gaviria and his government. Gaviria‘s second address to 
the assembly was devoted, among other issues, to defend the creation of a new constitutional 
court (Cepeda 1993a: 104 fn 1). In that address, he asked ―Which institution will have the 
mission to prevent that a powerful authority through laws, decrees, acts, orders, or any 
administrative action stops the great transformation your are promoting?‖ (speech of April 17, 
1991, quoted in Cepeda 1993a: 338). The government‘s endorsement was crucial to the final 
decision.
22
 The proposal was ultimately approved by the vote of 44 out of the 70 members of the 
assembly (Cepeda 2007: 37; NCA 1991c).
23
 
                                                 
20
 See op-ed article ―¿Corte Suprema o Corte Constitucional?‖ by the then Supreme Court justice Manuel 
Gaona Cruz (El Tiempo, 9/4/1984, p. 5A-8B). 
21
 See ―A debate, Corte Constitucional‖ (El Tiempo Online Archive 6/5/1991: 
http://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-95316) and ―Corte Constitucional divide a Constituyente‖, by 
Édgar Torres (El Tiempo Online Archive 6/5/1991: http://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-96486). 
22
 Later on, Gaviria sustained that his administration was the only actor originally in favor of creating a 
Constitutional Court (Gaviria in De la Calle 2004: 48). 
23
 In fact, the Constitutional Court was the only new institution approved in the NCA by a secret vote 
(Cepeda 1993b: xi) which makes it impossible to keep track of who or which parties were in favor or against its 
creation. 
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3.3 ORGANIZATION AND STRUCTURE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 
3.3.1 Jurisdiction and caseload 
As I show in the previous section, the discussion within the constituent assembly regarding 
constitutional review centered on a choice between two main options. On the one hand, some 
important sectors in the convention favored the status quo, namely, having a special panel with 
the existing Supreme Court adjudicating constitutional issues.
24
 On the other hand, another 
faction within the assembly, as well as the government, thought that the new constitution, 
including an expanded bill of rights, new mechanisms for the protection of those rights, and 
further limits on executive and legislative powers, required a separate, specialized legal body 
outside the hierarchy of ordinary courts to secure the enforcement of these provisions. 
This discussion did not take place in a theoretical void. It reflected the usual classification 
of constitutional adjudication into two ideal-typical models (Vanberg 2005; Epstein, Knight, and 
Shvetsova 2001b). On the one hand, in the American (or Anglo-American, see Ginsburg 2008) 
model, based on common law, any court within the judiciary is entitled to declare the 
unconstitutionality of a legislative or administrative act. At the top of the judicial hierarchy lies a 
supreme court operating as an organ of last resort of constitutional adjudication. Moreover, in 
this model review is typically activated as a result of a concrete controversy. The most 
representative instance of this model is obviously the United States Supreme Court (Vanberg 
2005). On the other hand, the European model based on civil law typically provides for a 
separate tribunal outside the judiciary with exclusive jurisdiction over constitutional 
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 This panel, the Sala Constitucional, was in fact created in 1968 as a response to the perceived need to 
have some level of specialization in public law within the Court. 
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adjudication. These constitutional courts, the origin of which is usually placed in Kelsen‘s draft 
of the 1920 Austrian constitution, exert abstract review, that is, they do not require an actual case 
to act. The German Bundesverfassungsgericht is perhaps the most prototypical example of this 
model (Vanberg 2005; Ginsburg 2008). 
The choice made by the constituent assembly in Colombia follows a worldwide trend, 
especially in new or less consolidated democracies, both to expand constitutional review and to 
create constitutional courts (Ferreres Comella 2004a; Ginsburg 2003; Horowitz 2006; Ferejohn 
and Pasquino 2004). In fact, the introduction of a constitutional court outside the judiciary has 
been argued to be a central factor in the expansion of constitutional review and, in particular, in 
the protection of individual and collective rights, for several reasons. Some authors sustain that 
having the court separate from the judicial hierarchy allows for the selection as judges of lawyers 
who are not embedded in the judicial career, or even professionals outside the legal practice, who 
might have a more proactive view of the constitutional defense of rights. According to this view, 
career judges tend to respond to an incentive structure and a legal culture that make them adopt a 
more traditional and formal approach to the role of courts (Couso and Hilbink 2011; Ríos-
Figueroa 2011; Guarnieri and Pederzoli 2002). Moreover, in countries experiencing transitions to 
democracy, the judicial hierarchy is likely to have been associated to the former authoritarian 
regime which would make transition framers reluctant to involve those career judges in the new 
model of constitutional adjudication (Horowitz 2006). 
Some others emphasize the political character of constitutional review and therefore point 
out to the fact that having judges of a constitutional court selected by political actors (the 
executive, the legislature) is more compatible with this character than choosing them from the 
traditional judicial hierarchy (Ferejohn and Pasquino 2003). On a different vein, it has been 
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argued that having a centralized court not only allows for the necessary specialization in public 
law matters but also enhances the creation of a clearer and more consistent jurisprudence (cf. 
Ferreres Comella 2004a, 2004b). 
This trend to have a tribunal centralizing constitutional adjudication has prevailed in post-
World War II Western Europe as well as in post-Communist Eastern Europe (Ginsburg 2008; 
Horowitz 2006). In Latin America, however, the most common model is that of a Supreme Court 
at the head of the judiciary exerting constitutional review (Horowitz 2006; Navia and Ríos-
Figueroa 2005). By mid-2010, only seven Latin American countries have created separate 
constitutional courts: Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, and Peru (Lara 
Borges, Castagnola, and Pérez-Liñán 2010; Ríos-Figueroa 2011).
25
 
3.3.1.1 Jurisdiction 
The two ideal types of judicial review described above are insufficient to encompass the 
diversity in constitutional adjudication around the world. Particularly in Latin America there 
exists an intricate ―mosaic‖ of instruments and institutions in charge of checking the 
constitutionality of acts issued by the different branches and levels of government (Navia and 
Ríos-Figueroa 2005). A related yet more fruitful approach is to distinguish three main factors 
that characterize the way in which constitutional review is exerted (Navia and Ríos-Figueroa 
2005; Ríos-Figueroa 2011). First, the type of adjudication refers to whether it is concrete, that is, 
when review can only take place as a result of a specific controversy, or abstract, in which 
adjudication occurs without an actual case. Second, the timing of review distinguishes a priori 
review (before the piece of legislation has been enacted) from a posteriori review (after the act 
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 The Dominican Republic has just adopted a new constitution which introduces a constitutional tribunal. 
At the moment this is written, however, this tribunal has not started its operation yet. 
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has been adopted). Finally, the jurisdiction refers to whether constitutional review is centralized, 
when it is concentrated in a single judicial organ, or decentralized, when adjudication is exerted 
along a hierarchy of judges, tribunals, and courts (Ríos-Figueroa 2011; Epstein, Knight, and 
Shvetsova 2001b).  
In principle, eight combinations of these three characteristics result, although only four of 
them are logically possible or empirically observed. These legal instruments for constitutional 
adjudication are (1) concrete, centralized, a posteriori; (2) concrete, decentralized, a posteriori, 
(3) abstract, centralized, a posteriori; and (4) abstract, centralized, a priori.
26
 Moreover, Ríos-
Figueroa (2011) considers two additional factors which are crucial to better assess the actual 
effectiveness of these legal instruments for constitutional review. First, it is important to consider 
the scope of a decision which may have, on the one hand, effects only applicable to the parties 
involved in the constitutional controversy (inter partes) or, on the other hand, effects for all 
members of the polity (erga omnes), in which case the act held unconstitutional is excluded from 
the legal framework of the country. A second factor involves the level of access to the legal 
instrument. Who can file a constitutional suit activating such instrument has an impact on how 
effective the role of constitutional adjudication is in checking the power of other political actors, 
in arbitrating conflict between branches and levels of government, and in enforcing the 
protection of citizens‘ rights. This access can be more or less open depending on whether any 
citizen can challenge the constitutionality of an act or whether this ability is restricted to certain 
actors in the political system and/or in society. 
                                                 
26
 For logical reasons, concrete review, whether centralized or decentralized, can only occur a posteriori. 
Similarly, given its character of constitutional consultation before the enactment of legislation, a priori review can 
only be centralized. Finally, although logically possible, abstract decentralized review may result in a chaotic state 
of legal uncertainty in which any judge could exclude an entire piece of legislation from the legal framework, and 
therefore it is not observed, at least in Latin America (Ríos-Figueroa 2011). 
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The theoretical framework described in the previous paragraphs sheds light on the legal 
instruments available to the Colombian Constitutional Court (CCC). Article 241 of the 
constitution approved in 1991 provides, first, that the court must exert abstract, centralized, a 
priori (ex officio) review (instrument #4) of the following acts: 
- Emergency decrees issued by the Executive: The new constitution replaced the 
infamous state of siege existing in the previous chart by three specific states of 
emergency:
27
 (a) state of external war, for international armed conflicts; (b) state of 
internal commotion, for sudden and severe perturbations of the internal order; and (c) 
state of social and economic emergency, for serious economic crises or natural 
disasters. By declaring any of these states of ermegency, the Executive can issue 
emergency decrees in order to address the situation. The CCC must automatically 
review the constitutionality of these decrees. Moreover, although not specified in the 
Constitution, the CCC in one of its first decisions (Decision C-004/1992)
28
 affirmed 
the competence of automatically reviewing the very presidential act declaring the 
state of exception not only for procedural or formal issues but also in its substance. 
The doctrine set by the court in that decision thus allows it to verify whether there 
were sufficiently strong reasons, supported in evidence, to declare the state of 
emergency in the first place (Uprimny 2003a: 55). The control of states of exception 
                                                 
27
 The Constitution also specifies time limits for these states of emergency, as well as some limits on the 
exercise of executive power during these situations. For a complete discussion on emergency powers and their 
review by the CCC, see (Uprimny 2003a). 
28
 For decisions issued by the CCC I use the official nomenclature used by the court itself. This 
nomenclature starts with a letter to distinguish abstract review decisions (marked with a ‗C‘) from concrete review 
decisions (marked with a ‗T‘, for tutela which is the name given to concrete constitutionality cases). This letter is 
followed by the number of the decision in chronological order within a year. Finally, the nomenclature ends with the 
year of the decision. In a few cases, the number is followed by a letter (e.g. Decision C-089A/1994). 
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and of legislation adopted during those states is clearly one of the major changes 
introduced by the constituent assembly to limit presidential power. 
- Statutory acts: These are special bills approved by Congress aimed at regulating 
citizen rights and the mechanisms for their protection, the administration of justice, 
the organization and functioning of political parties and elections, the exercise of 
popular participation (e.g. referenda, plebiscites, etc.), and states of exception. The 
CCC must automatically review the constitutionality of these acts for both procedural 
and substantive issues. 
- Legislative acts either calling for a referendum (on both legislative bills and 
constitutional amendments), a plebiscite, or a local or regional popular consultation, 
or convening a constituent assembly: The CCC can only review constitutionality of 
the procedure by which these acts were approved. 
- Legislative bills vetoed by the executive on grounds of unconstitutionality. If the 
president argues that a bill approved by Congress is unconstitutional, he can veto it 
and return it to the legislature for its amendment. If Congress insists on approving the 
bill, the CCC must automatically review it for both procedural and substantive issues. 
- International treaties and legislative acts approving them: The Executive must submit 
the approving act to the CCC within six days of its enactment, and the court must 
review both the procedure and the contents of the treaty and the act. Should the treaty 
be found unconstitutional by the court, it could not be ratified. 
All cases under this instrument have erga omnes effects. Moreover, access to this 
instrument is considered to be restricted since these cases are only generated by executive or 
legislative acts. 
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Article 241 of the constitution also determines that the CCC exerts abstract, centralized, a 
posteriori review (instrument #3) on the following acts: 
- Ordinary acts approved by Congress: The court must make a decision on the 
constitutionality of a legislative act as a result of a Public Action of 
Unconstitutionality (PAU) filed by any citizen.  
- Executive decrees: In some circumstances, Congress can delegate legislative powers 
to the executive which, under these powers, can issue decrees with legal effects on a 
variety of matters. Any citizen can file a PAU challenging the constitutionality of an 
executive decree and, provided that the suit is properly filed, the court must make a 
abstract review decision on the case. 
- Legislative acts aimed at amending the Constitution: Here again, any citizen can file a 
PAU challenging the constitutionality of the amending act. In this case, however, the 
Court must exert review only regarding procedural flaws in the approval of the 
amendment in Congress. 
Public Actions of Unconstitutionality (PAUs) as a mechanism for constitutional 
challenge of legislative acts exist in Colombia since 1910, as explained in a previous section of 
this chapter.
29
 This mechanism, unique in Latin America, makes abstract constitutional review 
exceptionally accessible.
30
 Because of these institutional features, Colombia ―has, perhaps, the 
most open system of judicial review‖ (Cepeda 2005: 74).  
In contrast with the U.S. Supreme Court, moreover, the CCC has no control over its 
docket for abstract review cases. Not only the court has to address ex-officio those cases subject 
                                                 
29
 These actions are also referred to in the legal milieu as Actio Popularis. 
30
 As a matter of fact, Decision C-003/1993 specified that PAUs can only be filed by individual citizens (or 
groups of citizens), but not by legal entities such as corporations. 
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to automatic review (mentioned above) but also it has to study and make decisions, with erga 
omnes effects, on the constitutionality of those legislative acts challenged by any citizen in a 
PAU, which is in fact a rather simple action filed in written and specifying only the challenged 
norm(s), the constitutional provisions which are allegedly violated by these norms, the reasons 
for those violations, and the reasons why the challenger thinks the court is competent to hear the 
case. This lack of agenda control not only makes the CCC‘s caseload extremely large, as I will 
discuss in more detail in a following section, but also prevents any strategic behavior by the 
court in the agenda-setting process, unlike what has been studied in the case of the U.S. Supreme 
Court (see Hammond, Bonneau, and Sheehan 2005).  
Finally, the CCC exerts concrete, decentralized, a posteriori review when it acts as a 
court of last resort in tutela actions. These actions can be filed, with little formal requirements, 
by citizens in search of protection of their rights when they feel that these rights are being 
violated or threatened by the action (or omission) of a public authority or even a private entity. 
This tutela writ is typically filed before any ordinary judge, and it eventually reaches the CCC. 
The court receives all concrete cases and selects only a few (around 2 percent) for its review and 
final decision which may uphold or reverse the decision made by a lower court or judge. In these 
cases, therefore, the CCC has some discretion in setting its own agenda.  
The vast majority of decisions in these cases have effects only for the parties involved in 
the controversy. However, there have been a few instances in which several tutela actions are 
filed regarding the same specific issue and the CCC has then decided to declare the existence of 
an ―unconstitutional state of affairs‖.31 An example of this occurred in 1998 when several jail 
inmates filed tutela cases looking for protection of their basic rights given the extremely 
                                                 
31
 Since its creation, the CCC has declared the unconstitutional state of affairs nine times. The first time 
was in 1997 and the last in 2004  (Rodríguez Garavito 2010: 441-442). 
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unhealthy conditions of Colombian prisons. The court considered that this situation deserved 
more than decisions made on a per-case basis and issued the general ―unconstitutional state of 
affairs‖ decision ordering the government to put an end to this situation.32 The court made a 
similar decision in 2004 after many people who had been forced to leave their homes because of 
the internal conflict have filed tutela actions seeking the protection of their basic rights, mainly 
the rights to human dignity and housing (Uprimny 2006).
33
 In these instances, the court has made 
decisions with effects for everybody (i.e. erga omnes). 
Based on Ríos-Figueroa (Ríos-Figueroa 2011: 49), Table 3.1, below, shows the use of the 
four instruments described above by Latin American constitutional courts. While abstract review 
decisions have always erga omnes effects, in the case of concrete review instruments the table 
shows whether the decisions have inter partes or erga omnes effects.  
 
Table 3.1. Legal instruments in Latin American constitutional courts 
Country 
Instrument 1 
Concrete 
Centralized 
A posteriori 
Instrument 2 
Concrete 
Decentralized 
A posteriori 
Instrument 3 
Abstract 
Centralized 
A priori 
Instrument 4 
Abstract 
Centralized 
A posteriori 
Bolivia 
Tribunal Constitucional 
Plurinacional 
Erga omnes Inter partes Yes Yes 
Brazil 
Supremo Tribunal 
Federal 
Inter partes Inter partes No Yes 
Chile 
Tribunal Constitucional 
Inter partes No Yes Yes 
Colombia 
Corte Constitucional 
No 
Inter partes, 
erga omnes
34
 
Yes Yes 
Ecuador 
Corte Constitucional 
No Inter partes Yes Yes 
Guatemala 
Corte de 
Constitucionalidad 
Inter partes Inter partes No Yes 
                                                 
32
 Decision T-153/1998. 
33
 Decision T-025/2004. 
34
 Though the vast majority of concrete, decentralized, a posteriori cases in Colombia (i.e. tutela actions) 
have inter partes effects, in a few instances these cases, once they have reached the CCC, have resulted in the court 
declaring the existence of an ―unconstitutional state of affairs‖ under which its decisions have erga omnes effects. 
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Peru 
Tribunal Constitucional 
Inter partes Inter partes No Yes 
 
The table shows that, unlike the American Supreme Court, all Latin American 
constitutional tribunals have the power of abstract review of actions of unconstitutionality filed 
by some actor against legislation already in place. In this sense, they can all be considered 
―Kelsenian‖ courts falling into the European model described above. The comparative view, 
however, shows that all countries have more than this instrument for constitutional review. More 
specifically, all these courts have some sort of concrete review, whether centralized, as in 
Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Guatemala, and Peru, or as an organ of last resort, as in all countries 
except Chile. Moreover, in countries such as Bolivia and (in the very special cases described 
above) Colombia, concrete review decisions may have effects beyond the specific parties 
involved in the case. The diversity of this mosaic of constitutional review (Navia and Ríos-
Figueroa 2005) makes it clear how difficult it is to classify a particular country in one specific 
mode, since in each country various instruments operate simultaneously.  
Table 3.2, in turn, specifies for all countries with constitutional courts which actors are 
entitled to file challenges against the constitutionality of an act which may result in an abstract 
review by these courts. The information for this table was obtained from each country‘s current 
constitution.  
As shown in the table, access is most open in Colombia and Ecuador, where any citizen 
can file actions for abstract review of legislation.
35
 This contrasts with the cases of Bolivia and 
Chile where only elected officials have the prerogative to challenge legislation before the court. 
                                                 
35
 The previous Ecuadoran constitution of 1998 stated that abstract review was accessible only for the 
President, a simple majority of Congress, the Supreme Court, provincial and local councils (for administrative acts 
only), and groups of 1,000 citizens, or an individual with the approval of the Ombdusman. See Ecuador, 
Constitution (1998): http://www.acnur.org/biblioteca/pdf/0061.pdf. 
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Close to these cases with a rather restricted access, Brazil and Peru have provisions by which 
both elected officials and organizations in society can gain access to abstract constitutional 
review.
36
 
 
Table 3.2. Access to abstract review in Latin American constitutional courts 
Country Who can gain access? 
Bolivia
37
 President, Congress, regional legislators and executives. 
Brazil
38
 President, Congress, state legislatures, state Governors, Attorney-General, bar 
association, political parties, confederation of labor unions, national professional 
associations. 
Chile
39
 25% of Congress. 
Colombia
40
 Any citizen (no legal entities). 
Ecuador
41
 Any citizen (individually or collectively). 
Guatemala
42
 ? 
Peru
43
 President, Attorney-General, Ombudsman, 25% of Congress,  5000 citizens, regional 
authorities, professional councils. 
 
3.3.1.2 Caseload 
The Colombian Constitutional Court has played an active role in the political system. 
Between its first case in 1992 and the end of the first Uribe administration in August 2006, the 
CCC issued 4,058 decisions on abstract constitutional review, roughly over 270 decisions per 
year (see Table 3.3, below). Moreover, Manuel José Cepeda Espinosa, one of president Gaviria‘s 
advisors during the debates at the 1991 constitutional convention where he actively promoted the 
creation of the Constitutional Court, and himself a court justice between 2001 and 2009, 
estimates that abstract review decisions represent just one third of the CCC‘s caseload, the other 
                                                 
36
 The Guatemalan constitution does not specify who can challenge the constitutionality of general norms. 
37
 Bolivia, Constitution (2009): http://bit.ly/f7hfD3, and Act 027/2010: http://bit.ly/h07ExY. 
38
 Brazil, Constitution (1988): http://bit.ly/flCely. 
39
 Chile, Constitution (1980, updated 2009): http://bit.ly/cXTTb9. 
40
 Art. 242 of the Constitution. 
41
 Ecuador, Constitution (2008): http://bit.ly/a2QD6U. 
42
 Guatemala, Constitution (1985, with reforms in 1993): http://bit.ly/f9zOLd. 
43
 Peru, Constitution (1993, with reforms until 2005): http://bit.ly/dKCNi3. 
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two thirds being concrete review cases, i.e. tutela decisions (Cepeda 2007: 58).
44
 This amounts to 
over 800 decisions handed down by the court every year since its creation, around eight times the 
yearly average delivered by the U.S. Supreme Court (Epstein, Segal, and Spaeth forthcoming), 
and also over eight times the average number of constitutional review decisions typically issued 
every year by the Colombian Supreme Court before the creation of the CCC in 1991 (Cepeda 
2007: 59). 
Table 3.3 shows the number of abstract review cases decided by the court between 1992 
and August 2006, at the end of the first Uribe‘s term (the time period covered by this 
dissertation). The data are disaggregated by case type grouped in the two abstract review 
instruments described above, that is, a posteriori cases triggered by Public Actions of 
Unconstitutionality (PAUs) filed by citizens (instrument #3), and a priori cases (instrument #4).  
 
Table 3.3. Colombian Constitutional Court: Abstract review caseload (1992-2006) 
 
A posteriori (Instrument #4) A priori, ex officio (Instrument #3) 
 
Year 
Ordinary 
Act 
Executive 
Decree 
Constit. 
Amend. 
Emergency 
Decree 
Interntl. 
Treaty 
Statutory 
Act 
President 
Veto 
Referend.
/Plebiscite 
Total 
1992 13 23 1 7 7 - - - 51 
1993 68 72 - 47 15 - 2 - 204 
1994 126 65 - 11 12 6 2 - 222 
1995 116 79 - 9 17 1 5 - 227 
1996 190 107 - 13 31 1 5 - 347 
1997 154 96 2 16 26 - 10 - 304 
1998 151 65 1 - 16 - 6 - 239 
1999 148 94 - 13 29 - 4 - 288 
2000 219 129 - - 35 3 10 - 396 
2001 239 79 - - 22 1 27 - 368 
2002 210 84 3 9 18 3 11 - 338 
2003 232 69 3 7 15 1 10 1 338 
2004 206 63 20 - 26 3 10 - 328 
                                                 
44
 The court only has a discretionary docket in concrete cases; it selects for review a mere 2% of the total 
tutela cases filed nationwide (Cepeda 2007: 107). 
 56 
 
A posteriori (Instrument #4) A priori, ex officio (Instrument #3) 
 
Year 
Ordinary 
Act 
Executive 
Decree 
Constit. 
Amend. 
Emergency 
Decree 
Interntl. 
Treaty 
Statutory 
Act 
President 
Veto 
Referend.
/Plebiscite 
Total 
2005 168 49 23 - 9 5 6 - 260 
2006 103 24 6 - 8 2 4 1 148 
Total 2,343 1,098 59 132 286 26 112 2 4,058 
% 57.7% 27.1% 1.5% 3.3% 7.0% 0.6% 2.8% 0.0% 
 
 
As I explained above, the court does not have discretionary docket over abstract review 
cases. Not only it studies ex officio emergency decrees, legislative acts international treaties, 
statutory acts, presidential vetoes, and calls for referenda, plebiscites, and constituent assemblies, 
but also it has to review challenges filed by citizens against already enacted legislation. Public 
Actions of Unconstitutionality can be filed by any citizen and must meet but a few formal 
requirements, including being filed in writing, specifying the norms that are challenged, the 
constitutional provisions that are allegedly violated by these norms, and the reasons argued for 
these alleged violations. This openness of access partly accounts for the comparatively large 
caseload of the court. The increasing number of cases shown in Table 3.3, above, especially 
between 1992 and 2000, also shows that it likely that the court‘s active behavior in safeguarding 
the constitution and especially protecting citizens‘ rights has created on plaintiffs incentives to 
increasingly resort to the court. 
As Table 3.3 reveals, over 85% of the court‘s caseload in abstract review results from 
citizen action, especially from PAUs against ordinary legislation (58%) and executive decrees 
(27%). At least in principle, these are the cases in which the preferences of the Executive and/or 
its legislative coalition are more clearly in favor of a court decision upholding the norm, and 
therefore make up the sample of cases on which the following empirical chapters will focus.  
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3.3.2 Selection and retention of justices 
Judicial independence is considered to be a necessary condition for an effective constitutional 
adjudication (Ríos-Figueroa 2011; Ríos-Figueroa and Staton 2009). Protecting citizens‘ rights 
and especially checking other branches of government require that constitutional judges enjoy a 
minimum level of insulation from internal and external political pressure so that they are ―able to 
act sincerely — that is, to act on the basis of their own, sincerely-held preferences (whatever 
those preferences may be and regardless of the preferences of other relevant political actors) — 
without fear of facing reprisals from the public or the political regime‖ (Epstein, Knight, and 
Shvetsova 2001a: 29).
45
 Institutions related to the appointment and retention of court members 
are central in providing such insulation (Feld and Voigt 2003; Ríos-Figueroa 2011; Ríos-
Figueroa and Staton 2009; Epstein, Knight, and Shvetsova 2001a; Horowitz 2006). This section 
briefly discusses the theoretical implications of these institutions for the level of independence of 
courts, and describes them, in comparative perspective, for the case of the Colombian 
Constitutional Court. 
3.3.2.1 Court size 
A first institutional feature, rarely considered in the literature, concerns whether the size 
of the court is determined in the constitution or has been specified in ordinary legislation (Ríos-
Figueroa 2011; Lara Borges, Castagnola, and Pérez-Liñán 2010). To the extent that rules 
governing the level of insulation of the court are ―powerful in inverse proportion to the costs 
involved in coordinating against them‖ (Ferejohn, Rosenbluth, and Shipan 2007: 728), this 
                                                 
45
 Some authors refer to this level of insulation as judicial autonomy (Ríos-Figueroa and Staton 2009). 
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distinction is important given that it determines how difficult it is for external political actors, 
typically the executive and the legislature, to modify the size and composition of the court. Since 
constitutional amendments often require qualified majorities or more complex approval 
procedures than ordinary legislation, courts tend to be more insulated from external pressure 
when the number of its justices is established in the constitution (Ríos-Figueroa 2011; Lara 
Borges, Castagnola, and Pérez-Liñán 2010). 
 The Colombian Constitution approved in 1991 does not specify the number of justices 
that should seat in the CCC; it merely states that the court should have an odd number of 
justices.
46
 Moreover, a transitory article in the Constitution provided that a provisional court of 
seven should operate during a year awaiting legislative action by Congress to specify the definite 
court size. It was only in mid-1992 that the legislature, within the bill establishing the rules of 
operation of the Senate and the House, included a clause setting the number of CCC justices at 
nine.
47
 In 1996, a statutory act regulating the administration of justice confirmed this provision.
48
 
This institutional feature, also present in the Bolivian Tribunal Constitucional Plurinacional, 
might expose the CCC to pressures from the other branches of government which, at least in 
principle, could (make credible threats to) increase or decrease the court size (court-packing) 
without special majorities or intricate approval procedures. This weakness notwithstanding, no 
serious proposal to change the number of the CCC‘s justices has been introduced since its 
                                                 
46
 Colombian Constitution, Art. 239. 
47
 Act 5, 1992.  
48
 Act 270, 1996, of ―Administration of Justice‖. A statutory act is a special piece of legislation approved 
by Congress to regulate very specific matters including citizens‘ rights and their protection, the administration of 
justice, and the organization of political parties and elections, among others. The requirements for its enactment are 
more demanding than those for ordinary legislation since it must be approved by an absolute majority of Congress 
members in each chamber (not only by those attending at the moment of approval) and must be reviewed ex-officio 
by the Constitutional Court (Colombian Constitution Arts. 152 and 153).  
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creation in 1991. The second column in Table 3.4 shows the number of justices for all Latin 
American constitutional courts. 
3.3.2.2 Appointment 
According to some authors who have developed indices to measure de jure judicial 
independence, courts are more autonomous when its members are selected either by the judiciary 
itself or by at least two different actors in the political system or in civil society. In the latter 
case, the more actors are involved in the selection process, the more independent the court. In 
contrast, courts are less insulated from external pressure when justices are appointed by a single 
political actor outside the judiciary (Lara Borges, Castagnola, and Pérez-Liñán 2010; Feld and 
Voigt 2003; Ríos-Figueroa 2011).  
When more than one actor or organ are in charge of appointing judges in a court, the 
procedure may be by parity, when each of these actors appoints part of the seats, or by 
coordination, when there must be some sort of agreement among the organs involved in the 
selection process. In the first case, the pool of candidates to the bench widens and it is likely that 
the court ends up having justices of different types and with different perspectives beyond 
traditional judges who have pursued a career in the judiciary, a feature that, as I described above, 
has been considered important for constitutional review (Ríos-Figueroa 2011; Ferejohn and 
Pasquino 2004; Guarnieri and Pederzoli 2002). When appointing actors must coordinate to select 
judges, in contrast, the pool of candidates tend to shrink (Ríos-Figueroa 2011). 
 In general, the wide variety of procedures to select judges for high courts around the 
world involve variations around one of the following methods: (a) appointment by parity among 
a set of actors (e.g. executive, legislature, judiciary, civil society organizations); (b) appointment 
by coordination among a set of actors; (b) nomination by (parity or coordination of) a set of 
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actors and confirmation by another actor (typically the legislature); (c) appointment by the 
judiciary itself; (d) popular election (Ríos-Figueroa 2011; Epstein, Knight, and Shvetsova 2002). 
The third column in Table 3.4 shows that Latin American constitutional courts use combinations 
of these basic procedures to select their members.   
 
Table 3.4. Selection and retention of justices in Latin American constitutional courts 
Country 
Number of 
justices 
Appointment 
Length of tenure & Re-
election 
Bolivia 
7 (of which 2 
must be indigen-
ous)
49
 
Popular vote out of candidates selected by Congress 
6 years, no immediate re-
election 
Brazil 11 
The president nominates, the Senate confirms 
(absolute majority) 
Life tenure 
Chile 10 
Parity: president (3), 2/3 of Congress (4), Supreme 
Court (3) 
9 years (partially renewed every 
3 years), no re-election 
Colombia 9
50
 
Parity + confirmation: Senate selects from three-
candidate lists nominated by President (3), Supreme 
Court (3), Council of State (3) 
8 years, no re-election 
Ecuador 9 
Coordination: selection by a board with six 
designees by the president  (2), Congress (2), 
Transparency and the Social Control branch (2) 
9 years (partially renewed every 
3 years), no immediate re-
election 
Guatemala 5 
Parity: Supreme Court (1), Congress (1), President 
(1), University council (1), Bar association (1) 
5 years (no explicit prohibition 
of re-election) 
Peru 7 Coordination: 2/3 of Congress 
5 years, no immediate re-
election 
 
Prior to the 1991 Colombian constitution, new justices for the Supreme Court were 
selected by sitting members of the same court, a procedure called co-optation.
51
 The 
constitutional convention, consistent with the decision of creating a constitutional court outside 
the judiciary, made a shift in the selection process and sought to provide a more political origin 
for its justices.
52
 Article 239 of the Constitution provides that the CCC justices are nominated by 
                                                 
49
 The number is not specified in the Constitution but in Act 027, 2010 ―of the Plurinational Constitutional 
Tribunal‖. 
50
 The Constitution requires an odd number of justices and provides for a provisional seven-member court. 
Act 5, 1992 and Statutory Act 270, 1996 set the number of justices at nine. 
51
 The Colombian Supreme Court still uses co-optation to select its members. 
52
 In fact, one of the criticisms made to the appointment process approved for the Constitutional Court was 
that it would politicize the exercise of constitutional adjudication (Cepeda 1993a). 
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parity between the president, the Supreme Court, and the Council of State (nominating three 
justices each), and confirmed by the Senate. More specifically, for each of the court seats, the 
president, the Supreme Court, or the Council of State submit a three-candidate list from which 
the Senate makes the selection. The institution which has originally nominated a retiring justice 
or a justice who has finished the term in court is in charge of submitting to the Senate a new 
three-candidate list from which the latter must select the replacement. This procedure guarantees 
that at each time the court is ―balanced‖, that is, it has three justices appointed by the president, 
three by the Supreme Court and three by the Council of State. 
As I explained above, the constitution included transitory provisions for the selection of a 
seven-member provisional court awaiting legislative regulation on the ultimate number of 
justices. Of the seven justices of this provisional court, which operated between February 1992 
and January 1993, two were directly appointed by the president, one by the Supreme Court, one 
by the Council of State, and one by the Inspector General. These five justices, once they took 
their seats on the bench, selected the remaining two members of the court from two lists of three 
candidates submitted by the president. Table 3.5 lists all the justices appointed to the CCC 
between 1992 and 2006, along with information on which actors nominated them and the time 
periods they served in the court. 
 
Table 3.5. Justices of the Colombian Constitutional Court: Nominations and tenure (1992-2006) 
Justice Nomination
53
 Began Ended 
Ciro Angarita B.
54
  1992 1993 
                                                 
53
 Since the nomination procedure for the provisional court operating between 1992 and 1993 was atypical 
and was made according to transitory provisions in the Constitution, I do not include in this column nomination 
information for justices appointed to this provisional court. 
54
 Justice Ciro Angarita Barón was nominated by the president and selected as a member of the provisional 
court by the five directly appointed justices. In 1993 he was included of one of the lists nominated by president 
Gaviria, but he was defeated in the Senate by another member of that list, Hernando Herrera Vergara. 
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Justice Nomination
53
 Began Ended 
Simón Rodríguez R.
55
  1992 1993 
Jaime Sanín G.
56
  1992 1993 
Eduardo Cifuentes M.
57
 President 1992 2000 
Alejandro Martínez C.
58
 President 1992 2001 
José G. Hernández
59
 Supreme Court 1992 2001 
Fabio Morón D.
60
 Supreme Court 1992 2001 
Jorge Arango M. Supreme Court 1993 1998 
Hernando Herrera V. President 1993 1999 
Vladimiro Naranjo Council of State 1993 2000 
Antonio Barrera C. Council of State 1993 2001 
Carlos Gaviria D. Council of State 1993 2001 
Alfredo Beltrán S. Supreme Court 1998 2006 
Álvaro Tafur G. President 1999  
Rodrigo Escobar G. Council of State 2000  
Eduardo Montealegre Council of State 2001 2004 
Jaime Araújo R. Council of State 2001  
Manuel J. Cepeda President 2001  
Marco G. Monroy President 2001  
Jaime Córdoba T. Supreme Court 2001  
Clara Inés Vargas Supreme Court 2001  
Humberto Sierra P. Council of State 2004  
Nilson Pinilla P. Supreme Court 2006  
 
                                                 
55
 Justice Simón Rodríguez Rodríguez was appointed by the Council of State as a member of the 
provisional court. He was later a member of one of the lists nominated by president Gaviria in 1993, but he was 
defeated in the Senate by another member of that list, Alejandro Martínez Caballero. 
56
 Justice Jaime Sanín Greiffenstein was one of the two members of the CCC directly appointed by 
president Gaviria to the provisional court. 
57
 Justice Eduardo Cifuentes Muñoz was directly appointed by Inspector General Arrieta to the provisional 
court. One year after, he was included in one of the lists nominated by president Gaviria in 1993 and selected by the 
Senate as a member of the first court. 
58
 Justice Alejandro Martínez Caballero was directly appointed by president Gaviria to the provisional 
court. One year later he was included in one of the president‘s lists and selected by the Senate as a member of the 
first court. 
59
 Justice José Gregorio Hernández was nominated by the president and selected as a member of the 
provisional court by the five directly appointed justices. In 1993 he was included of one of the lists nominated by the 
Supreme Court, and he was selected by the Senate as a member of the first court. 
60
 Justice Fabio Morón Díaz was directly appointed by president Gaviria to the provisional court. One year 
later he was included in one of the lists nominated by the Supreme Court, and selected by the Senate as a member of 
the first court. 
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3.3.2.3 Length of tenure and re-election 
Courts independence is not determined by the appointment procedure alone but by its 
combination with judges‘ length of tenure (Ríos-Figueroa and Staton 2009).61 In fact, as the 
length of tenure increases, courts obtain more autonomy (Horowitz 2006) and the appointment 
procedure becomes irrelevant. Ríos-Figueroa (2011) sustains that, in general, judges are more 
independent when their length of tenure is longer than that of their appointers. 
Life-tenured justices, as those in the U.S. Supreme Court, given that they are not involved 
in ordinary politics and have no progressive ambition, are considered to be more autonomous 
(Segal and Spaeth 2002; Epstein, Knight, and Shvetsova 2002).
62
 However, in the context of the 
recent trend of constitutional review, especially in those cases in which it is exerted by separate, 
specialized bodies, granting judges life tenure is rather the exception than the norm;  most 
constitutional courts around the world have justices appointed for fixed terms (Epstein, Knight, 
and Shvetsova 2002; Ferejohn and Pasquino 2004). In fact, of the seven constitutional courts in 
Latin America, only the Brazilian Supremo Tribunal Federal has justices appointed for life (until 
their mandatory retirement age), as shown in the fourth column of Table 3.4, above. 
Judicial autonomy also depends on whether justices can be re-elected —either 
immediately or after a term— or not. Renewable terms create re-election incentives in judges 
which may induce them to act strategically. These incentives may we somewhat weaker if 
justices can be re-elected only after a term has elapsed, Fixed, non-renewable terms may provide 
more independence, although the incentive to pursue a public career after leaving the bench may 
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 Some indices of de jure judicial independence include whether the constitution guarantees the length of 
tenure of judges (see Keith 2002). 
62
 Epstein, Knight, and Shvetsova (2001a) have argued, however, that life-tenured justices who originally 
may have shared the views of the regime under which they were appointed, can eventually fall out of line of 
subsequent regimes‘ preferences. In this case, they might see their decisions overturned and therefore may be 
induced to act strategically. 
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also induce justices to act strategically, especially when tenures are shorter (Epstein, Knight, and 
Shvetsova 2001a) or when justices reach the court at a short age.  
Justices are appointed to the Colombian Constitutional Court for eight-year, non-
renewable terms, a tenure which is longer than that of courts in Bolivia, Guatemala, and Peru, 
but shorter than in the cases of Chile, Ecuador, and of course Brazil.
63
 Given that the president 
and Congress in Colombia have four-year terms, this institutional setting provides in principle a 
significant level of autonomy for justices, according to the criteria suggested by Ríos-Figueroa 
(2011). 
Nevertheless, a constitutional amendment promoted by the executive and approved by 
Congress in 2004 lifted the ban that the 1991 constitution had placed on presidential re-election. 
This change, which allowed president Uribe to be re-elected, has altered the system of checks 
and balances and may have weakened judicial independence and constitutional review since it 
opened the possibility for the same executive-legislative coalition to influence the selection of a 
greater proportion of court justices. Even though the president still can appoint only one third of 
the court members, given that he may stay longer in office he can exert, through his legislative 
coalition, a stronger and wider influence on the Senate‘s selection of candidates nominated by 
the Supreme Court and the Council of State. In fact, had Uribe not been re-elected in 2006, he 
would have not been able to nominate a single CCC justice and only two of them would have 
been appointed during his first administration, between 2002 and 2006 (see Table 3.5, above). In 
contrast, by the end of Uribe‘s second term in 2010 all justices had been selected under his rule 
(Rubiano 2009). Moreover, the president‘s coalition in Congress approved in 2009 a bill calling 
for a referendum aiming at allowing a second presidential re-election. The Constitutional Court 
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 Prior to the 1991 constitution, justices of the Colombian Supreme Court were appointed for life. The new 
constitution stated an eight-year non-renewable term. 
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had to review this bill ex officio and found a series of flaws in its legislative approval procedure. 
The CCC also argued that a third presidential term would create a further unbalance in the 
political system and would concentrate excessive power in the hands of the executive. The 
referendum was struck down in February 2010 by a 7-2 court decision, and Uribe could not run 
for office again.
64
 
3.3.3 Decision making and decisions 
Procedures for decision making in the Colombian Constitutional Court differ depending on 
whether the controversy to be decided is a tutela (concrete review) or a case for abstract 
adjudication. These procedures are regulated by Executive Decrees 2067 and 2591, 1991 and by 
the internal regulations adopted by the court itself.
65
 
3.3.3.1 Concrete review: the tutela action 
One of the major innovations introduced by the constituent assembly in 1991 was the 
creation of the tutela action. Under the new constitution, citizens who feel that their rights are 
being threatened or violated can file one of such actions asking a judge to review their cases. The 
judge must then issue a decision within ten days, which makes the tutela action an extremely 
powerful tool for the protection of individual rights. These cases are eventually forwarded to the 
Constitutional Court by lower level judges and tribunals around the country.  
Between 1992 and 2010, the number of such cases received by the court every year has 
been estimated between 70,000 and 400,000 (Jaramillo and Barreto 2010) out of which the court 
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 See ―La Corte constitucional le dijo ‗no‘ al referendo reeleccionista: Era Uribe terminará el 7 de agosto‖ 
(El Tiempo Online Archive 2/26/2010: http://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/CMS-7304227) 
65
 Internal regulations are adopted through Court Agreements. 
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has the discretion to select those that will be reviewed. A two-justice panel (called a ―selection 
chamber‖), appointed by the CCC plenum every month,66 makes this initial decision, for which it 
has a 30-day term from the moment the case has been reported as officially received by the court. 
Although the CCC selects for review just around 2 percent of the total amount of tutela cases, 
they represent two-thirds of the court‘s caseload (Cepeda 2007: 107).67 Those selected cases are 
reviewed by three-justice panels (called a ―review chambers‖), appointed by the plenum. Each 
court justice acts as the president of one of those chambers which also includes the two following 
justices in alphabetical order. In total there are nine selection chambers (each one ruled by each 
court justice) which make a final decision by a two-third majority. The court can decide for or 
against the plaintiff, and can uphold or reverse the ruling made by a lower level judge.
68
 In a few 
instances, when the case leads to a decision aimed at changing or unifying the court precedent, 
such decision is made by a majority of the entire court. 
As I mentioned above, the introduction of this mechanism has proven to be a powerful 
instrument for the protection of individual rights and has been widely used by ordinary citizens 
who have found, perhaps for the first time in Colombian history, that the constitution can help 
them solve their everyday problems. Moreover, in times of economic recession, tutela actions 
have been resorted to by citizens in order to preserve their social rights, including healthcare, 
pension funds, and salaries (Cepeda 2007; Uprimny 2006). The court has made highly salient 
concrete review decisions, including, among many others, the protection of unionized workers 
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 Initially, every month two justices were appointed to the selection chamber in alphabetical order, but 
since 2007 the selection is made by drawing lots (Court Agreement 1, 2007). 
67
 There are few analyses of the court‘s agenda-setting process on concrete review (see Jaramillo and 
Barreto 2010). Moreover, the systematic study of the factors influencing the court‘s decision to select certain tutela 
cases over others is still a pending task for national and international scholars. 
68
 The court rules in favor of the plaintiff in around 60% of the cases (Cepeda 2007: 59).  
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against discriminatory practices by their employers,
69
 the requirement to public and private 
healthcare institutions to provide patients with treatments that may have not been included in 
their healthcare plans if those treatments are deemed to be crucial to preserve their fundamental 
rights (including but not limited to HIV patients),
70
 and the order to the national government to 
address the well-being of people displaced by the armed conflict.
71
 Some of these decisions have 
had effects beyond the parties involved in the specific controversy. These salient cases 
notwithstanding, most concrete review decisions do not entail a clear political confrontation with 
other branches of government. In general, the more politically charged cases occur in abstract 
review, which partly explains why I focus the empirical analysis of this dissertation on the latter. 
3.3.3.2 Abstract review of legislation 
As I mentioned before, the court does not have a discretionary docket regarding abstract 
review cases. This is obvious for those cases which require a priori, ex officio review by the 
court, namely emergency decrees, bills approving international treaties, statutory acts, bills 
calling referenda, plebiscites, and constituent assemblies, and presidential vetoes on grounds of 
unconstitutionality (see Table 3.3, above). On the other hand, public actions of 
unconstitutionality filed by citizens against ordinary legislation, executive decrees, and 
constitutional amendments (abstract a posteriori cases), as long as they meet some basic formal 
requirements, must also be addressed by the court. 
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 Decision SU-342/1995. 
70
 Decisions T-534/1992 and SU-480/1997. 
71
 Decisions SU-1150/2000 and T-025/2004. 
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Once they arrive to the court, the Chief Justice distributes the cases among justices in 
alphabetical order, aiming at keeping the workload balanced based on the number of legislative 
acts being challenged, their complexity, the requirements of evidence, and so on. The justice 
assigned to a case, called rapporteur (sustanciador), or opinion writer has ten days to decide on 
whether the case meets the filing requirements and can be admitted for review. If the case is 
admitted, the rapporteur can request the collection of pieces of evidence relevant to the case (e.g. 
the transcripts and proceedings of the bill approval process in Congress). 
Once the case is admitted, it is forwarded to the Inspector General (IG) who has 30 days 
to submit his suggestion on how the court should rule.
72
 All abstract review cases require the 
Inspector General to suggest a ruling to the court. This suggestion becomes an important piece of 
information regarding the constitutional merits of the case. The IG can also play a more political 
role in signaling the court whether the latter can count on the IG as a strategic ally for the final 
decision. In any case, between 1992 and 2006 the CCC reached a decision which was consistent 
with the IG‘s suggestion in around 70 percent of the cases. Chapter 5 includes the empirical 
analysis of the impact of the IG on the court decision making. 
The opinion writer can request the Executive and Congress to submit in writing their 
arguments supporting the constitutionality of the challenged norm. A majority of the court, on 
demand by any justice, may also call a public hearing in which the Executive and Congress can 
orally present these arguments. In addition, the rapporteur can ask public agencies, private 
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 The Procuraduría General de la Nación (Office of the Inspector General) is an independent, 
administrative institution overseeing the behavior of public officials and the proper operation of government 
institutions and agencies. It is also charged with the safeguarding of people‘s constitutional rights, guaranteeing 
Human Rights protection, and intervening in the name of the people in the defense of the public interest. It is not to 
be confused with the Fiscalía General de la Nación (Attorney General or Prosecutor General) which in other 
countries such as Mexico is also named Procuraduría. 
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organizations, and/or experts to submit amici curiae briefs regarding the matters of the case. 
Amici can also be summoned by a majority of the court to expose their views in public hearing.
73
 
Following the advisory opinion rendered by the IG, the rapporteur has another 30 days to 
draft an opinion which is then submitted to the court to be discussed in secret conference, and 
eventually to be voted. If the original opinion draft does not reach at least five votes, the 
president of the court can request a justice among those who voted against it to draft a new 
opinion to reflect the new majority decision. Unlike most European constitutional courts (see 
Vanberg 2005), it is possible to keep record of individual votes in CCC decisions. Those justices 
who agree with the final decision but do not fully agree with the majority opinion can write an 
individual or collective concurring opinion. Likewise, those who disagree with the majority 
decision write individual or collective dissenting opinions.  
Court decisions may vary according to the extent to which they uphold or strike down the 
challenged statute or specific provisions within it. First, the court may make a decision of 
inhibition, that is, a decision not to decide on the constitutional merits of the case. This may 
happen when a majority of the court finds that, despite its initial admission by the rapporteur, a 
citizen Public Action of Unconstitutionality was not properly submitted (e.g. when the 
constitutional charges are not well argued). In some salient cases, a decision of this type can be 
(and has been) interpreted as a signal that the case is not closed and as an invitation for litigants 
to file a new controversy. This was clearly the case in 2005 when the court made no decision (a 
decision of inhibition) in a challenge filed against the norm that criminalizes abortion. The suit 
argued that women choosing to have an abortion should not be prosecuted in three specific cases: 
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 For an analysis of the impact of amici curiae briefs on the CCC decisions, see Arteaga-Iriarte and 
Rodríguez-Raga (2010). 
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when pregnancy was a result of rape, non-consensual sex, or unauthorized artificial 
insemination, when there was evidence of fetus malformation, and when pregnancy entailed 
serious threats for the woman‘s health.74 The press release issued by the court announcing this 
(no) decision described the alleged flaws in the suit and even instructed litigants on how to file a 
new, improved one.
75
 A new PAU was indeed presented in 2006 and the challenged norm was 
found conditionally constitutional by the court, that is, criminalization of abortion was 
considered constitutional except in the three cases mentioned above.
76
 
Second, the court may find that the controversy has already been settled in a previous 
decision, and may therefore make a decision of stare decisis. In these cases, the CCC confirms 
its own precedent and includes in the final decision the reference to those previous decisions on 
which the review of the case should be based. This generally occurs when multiple suits are filed 
against a particular statute after the court has already ruled on the same particular constitutional 
charges against such norm. In most cases of stare decisis, the precedent had been recently set by 
the court, typically within the previous year.  
Besides these two types of decisions in which the merits of the case are not explicitly 
addressed or in which the case is referred to a previous decision, the court may find the statute 
constitutional in its entirety. The court can also rule that the norm is partially constitutional, that 
is it may find that some of the challenged articles or sections of a statute are constitutional 
whereas some others are incompatible with the constitution and must be therefore excluded. The 
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 Decisions C-1299/2005 and C-1300/2005. 
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 The Court usually announces its decisions in salient cases through press releases before the official, 
written decision is handed down. For this case, see the court‘s press release of 12/07/2005: ―Comunicado de prensa 
sobre las sentencias relativas al aborto‖ (http://www.elabedul.net/Documentos/Temas/Aborto/Comunicado.pdf, last 
checked 11/13/2010). See also Jaramillo and Alfonso (2008: 61) 
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 Decision C-355/2006. 
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court may also modulate its decision by specifying that a norm can only be considered 
constitutional if it is interpreted in a particular way, that is, the court may rule that the norm is 
conditionally constitutional. This was the case in the 2006 decision on abortion in which the 
court upheld the norm that criminalizes abortion as long as exceptions were made in the three 
cases mentioned above. Finally, the court may struck down the entire statute as unconstitutional, 
in which case such statute is considered void and excluded from the nation‘s legal framework. 
Table 3.6 shows that in half of the cases reviewed between its origin in 1992 and the end 
of the first Uribe administration (August 2006) the court upheld the challenged norms, and only 
in 12 percent of the cases it struck down the norms entirely. In almost two of every ten cases the 
court found unconstitutional some of the challenged sections of the statute or conditioned their 
constitutionality to a specific interpretation. 
 
Table 3.6. Colombian Constitutional Court - Abstract review by decision type (1992-2006) 
Year Inhibition Stare decisis Constitutional 
Partially/ 
Conditionally 
constitutional 
Unconstitu-
tional 
Total 
1992 2 - 32 10 8 52 
1993 6 13 119 38 28 204 
1994 8 28 114 46 26 222 
1995 9 16 128 36 38 227 
1996 10 32 200 63 42 347 
1997 12 39 158 44 51 304 
1998 13 18 132 56 21 240 
1999 24 40 135 42 47 288 
2000 25 55 195 77 42 394 
2001 30 45 186 76 31 368 
2002 27 37 166 82 27 339 
2003 23 42 148 99 26 338 
2004 31 47 145 53 50 326 
2005 40 33 109 41 38 261 
2006 26 16 73 20 13 148 
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Year Inhibition Stare decisis Constitutional 
Partially/ 
Conditionally 
constitutional 
Unconstitu-
tional 
Total 
Total 286 461 2,040 783 488 4,058 
% 7.0% 11.4% 50.3% 19.3% 12.0% 
 
 
3.4 CONCLUSION 
This chapter presents a brief account of the history of constitutional review in Colombia and of 
the political circumstances under which the Constitutional Court was established in 1991. It also 
describes the institutional structure of the court in a comparative perspective and provides 
descriptive data regarding the court‘s composition, its caseload, and the decisions it has handed 
down between 1992 and 2006, the time period on which this dissertation is focused. 
Following the trend of expansion of constitutional adjudication in the world and, more 
specifically, in Latin America, the CCC was created as a specialized body outside the traditional 
judiciary. As such, it has managed to emerge as a key institution in the protection individual and 
collective rights and in the task of checking the other branches of government. As president 
Gaviria, its first and most enthusiastic sponsor, intended, the court has become the ―soul of the 
constitution‖77 and one of the most powerful yet understudied courts in Latin America (Helmke 
and Ríos-Figueroa 2011b: 22).  
The normative importance of the court‘s duty as the guardian of the constitutional 
supremacy does not make of the court an institution acting above the political fray. On the 
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 Those were the words used by Gaviria in his speech addressed during the ceremony in which the first 
CCC justices took oath on November 29, 1991 (cited in Cepeda 1993a: 377-379). 
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contrary, as I will show in the following chapter, the court has been at the very center of several 
political controversies from the moment it started exerting concrete and abstract constitutional 
review. The court‘s activism has not been exempt from harsh criticisms made by political 
observers and scholars in the fields of law, politics, and economics. Moreover, it has received 
direct, public attacks by government officials, members of the legislature, and even judges from 
other high courts in response to its rulings. This contentious interaction with other players in the 
political scene is precisely what motivates the theory presented in Chapter 2. The court does not 
act in a vacuum and its decisions are conditioned by the political environment in which they are 
made. This chapter thus provides the institutional context for the empirical assessment of such 
theory included in subsequent chapters of this dissertation. 
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4.0  MAKING THE CASE FOR THE APPLICATION OF THE STRATEGIC 
PRUDENCE THEORY IN THE COLOMBIAN CASE 
After having set the theoretical model (Chapter 2) and having described the origin and 
institutional characteristics of the Colombian Constitutional Court – CCC (Chapter 3), this 
chapter answers the following questions: Is it worth using the CCC to test the theory of judicial 
strategic prudence? What kind of test would that be?  
In other words, the goal of this chapter is to assess to what extent the CCC fits the 
strategic account of judicial behavior sketched above and whether or not a systematic test of that 
theory is justified in the Colombian case. The answers to these questions are not obvious. It 
could be argued that, in many respects, the CCC does not fit the stereotypical model of weak 
Latin American courts. In fact, the court has a well-deserved reputation for its activism, its 
progressive and liberal positions, and its independence. Many examples regarding the CCC‘s 
active protection of civil liberties and of economic and social rights support that view.  
Moreover, the court has successfully checked the power of the Executive and the 
legislature on several occasions. On February 26, 2010, for instance, the court struck down a bill 
calling a referendum which would have asked Colombian citizens whether or not then president 
Uribe could run for a third term. Despite the enormous approval rates enjoyed by Uribe at the 
time, the CCC, in a 7-2 decision, not only found several procedural flaws in the approval of the 
bill in Congress but also claimed that the approval of a second presidential re-election would 
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entail a substitution of the constitution, something that, according to the court‘s interpretation 
and precedent, could only be achieved through a constituent convention.
78
 In contrast to what 
happened in the case of the Peruvian Constitutional Tribunal‘s decision against Fujimori‘s bid 
for a third term in 2000, president Uribe complied with the court‘s decision and on May, 2010, a 
presidential election was held under normal conditions. 
Is this court, despite its ostensible independence, willing or compelled to engage in 
strategic behavior? If so, does justices‘ behavior follow the rationale outlined in Chapter 2? This 
chapter addresses this question. After a short methodological note on the evidence used in the 
chapter, the second section illustrates the activist and autonomous record of the CCC by 
describing several instances in which the court made bold decisions protecting civil liberties and 
economic and social rights, with profound policy implications, as well as instances in which the 
court checked the powers of the legislature and especially of the president in strongly 
controversial cases. The third section shows that, although many of the constraints imposed on 
other Latin American courts, such as threats or actual instances of shutting down or packing the 
court, or of impeaching and dismissing individual justices, are not present and are not even 
conceivable in Colombia, there are factors in the political environment which might influence 
justices‘ behavior and make them weight their policy preferences against the political costs of 
making decisions against the Executive. In the conclusion I argue that, although the test I 
propose in the next chapter is based on a quantitative analysis of all individual justices‘ decisions 
made in the CCC between 1992 and 2006, and in this sense it is not a case study analysis, 
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Court Decision C-141/2010. For a video clip showing Chief Justice Mauricio González (who was in the 
minority) announcing the decision to the media and the public, see http://www.wradio.com.co/nota.aspx?id=959651; 
http://www.caracol.com.co/nota.aspx?id=959651. 
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assessing the theory of strategic prudence in Colombia fits the logic of the crucial case method 
proposed by Eckstein (Eckstein 1975; see also Gerring 2007). 
4.1 METHODOLOGICAL NOTE ON THE EVIDENCE USED IN THIS CHAPTER 
In this chapter, especially in section 4.3, I make use of qualitative evidence from two different 
sources. On the one hand, a review of the press coverage on the court and on its relationship with 
its political context from 1992 to 2006 highlights the most prominent cases put under the court 
review and their repercussions with regards to the relationship of the court with its political 
environment. On the other hand, I use information from semi-structured interviews with former 
court justices, assistant justices and law clerks which uncovers the views held from inside the 
court on its interaction with the other branches of government. This evidence is not a systematic 
empirical test of the theory, among other things because both the press reports and the former 
court members‘ recollections are likely to be biased towards the most critical moments of the 
court‘s operation and to refer to a sample which is hardly representative of the court‘s caseload. 
It is my contention, however, that the implications of the information obtained from these 
sources deserves further investigation and makes it worthwhile to undertake a quantitative 
empirical analysis of the conditions under which justices are more likely to strike down 
legislative acts and executive decrees, that is, to perform a systematic empirical test of the formal 
theoretic model developed in Chapter 2. 
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In order to gather the press coverage on the court, I checked the online archive of El 
Tiempo, the main national newspaper,
79
 and, to a lesser extent, of Semana, the main weekly 
magazine focusing on current events, political news, and so on.
80
 Figure 4.1, which shows the 
number of annual matches to the keywords ―Corte Constitucional‖ in the El Tiempo online 
archive between 1990 and 2008, illustrates the somewhat increasing relevance of the 
Constitutional Court in the nation‘s political arena.81  
 
 
Figure 4.1. Press coverage on the Constitutional Court (1990-2008) 
 
The most fruitful searches, however, were obtained when keywords related to legislation 
aimed at amending the court‘s competences (―reforma judicial‖), to clashes with the Executive 
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 The El Tiempo Online Archive‘s web page is http://www.eltiempo.com/seccion_archivo/index.php. 
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 Semana is perhaps the Colombian equivalent of the American Time or Newsweek magazines. Its website 
is http://www.semana.com/Home.aspx. 
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 The trend shows a decrease in coverage in electoral years 1998 and 2002. 
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(―choque de poderes‖ or ―choque de trenes‖), or to specific topics such as abortion (―aborto‖), 
housing (e.g. ―UPAC‖), or states of emergency (―conmoción interior‖ or ―emergencia 
económica‖) were added to the keywords mentioned above.82 The review of the press articles 
obtained through those searches was used to illustrate the events described in this chapter and to 
draft some of the questions of the questionnaire used in the interviews. 
During the first quarter of 2011, I conducted interviews with seven former justices and 
five former assistant justices and law clerks who served in the court in different moments 
between 1992 and 2006.
83
 The general purpose of the interviews was to obtain the views, 
perceptions, and interpretations of the actors involved in the CCC during the period covered by 
my study.  
In order to be able to obtain the respondents‘ candid recollections of their experiences 
and perceptions while they worked at the court, I let them know that the interviews were 
confidential and that I would include no information allowing the identification of the authors of 
the quotations and paraphrases included here. After each quotation I employ a conventional 
notation including letters and numbers, as follows: Justices are assigned ids J1 through J7, and 
assistant justices and law clerks are assigned the ids LC1 through LC5. This notation will allow 
the reader to follow respondents‘ answers related to different issues. Given that ‗male‘ is the 
modal gender of my interviewees, I use the male pronouns regardless of respondents‘ actual 
gender (see Vanberg 2005). Assigning a letter and a number to each respondent would not be 
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 Ana María Montoya and Camila Osorio were extremely helpful in conducting this review of the press 
coverage. 
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 Of the former justices interviewed, three belonged to the ‗first‘ court (roughly between 1993 and 2001), 
and four belonged to the ‗second‘ court (roughly between 2001 and 2009). Assistant justices and law clerks typically 
served during both terms, working for more than one justice. 
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enough protection for such confidentiality if I included a list with their names in an appendix. I 
therefore omit such list. 
Although some authors advice not to tape elite interviews, I preferred using a tape 
recorder to be able to achieve a better rapport with each interviewee; taking notes during the 
interview would have made it difficult for me to keep eye contact with the respondent and to pay 
full attention to his answers. Also, I did not trust my memory enough to wait for the interview to 
end to make notes; I would risk missing important points and verbatim expressions which I 
wanted to capture. All respondents found no problem in using a tape recorder and, although a 
few of them were initially too aware of being recorded, as the interview went on they felt more at 
ease and ended up providing several candid remarks which, regardless of the presence of the tape 
recorder, were possible because of the confidentiality guaranteed at the beginning of each 
interview (Zuckerman 1972).  
I include in Appendix A the English translation of the questionnaire based on which the 
interviews were conducted. The questionnaire contains thirty-three questions dealing mainly 
with (a) respondents‘ general descriptions of the relationship between the court and the 
Executive; (b) respondents‘ recollections, perceptions, and interpretation of specific events of 
tension and confrontation between the court and the executive that I had previously identified 
from the press review; (c) respondents‘ interpretations of the findings I obtained from the 
quantitative analysis of abstract review decisions.I did not ask all questions to all respondents 
because in some cases the conversation on some issues took longer than expected and the 
interviewee ran out of time. In other cases, answers to some questions would have made asking 
others redundant. Moreover, since some questions referred to specific events, they were only 
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asked to those respondents who were in the court at the time those events occurred.
84
 Also, not 
all interviews were conducted in the same order specified in the base questionnaire; the course of 
the interview determined whether or not I jumped to some issues which were supposed to be 
asked later on. In those cases, I usually was able to go back to the skipped questions.  
Overall, despite the fact that these were elite interviews and that, in general, these were 
rather busy persons, obtaining the appointments for interviews was relatively easy (usually less 
than a week elapsed between the moment I asked for an interview and the moment I got the 
appointment). Also, respondents were rather generous with their time.
85
 
4.2 A WELL DESERVED REPUTATION OF ACTIVISM AND INDEPENDENCE 
Colombia has been considered one of the success stories of judicial activism and autonomy in 
Latin America. Some analysts include it among those countries ―in which, to different degrees, 
constitutional judges have been willing and able both to enforce rights and to arbitrate 
interbranch relations‖ (Helmke and Ríos-Figueroa 2011b: 23). In a continent where strong 
presidents have been able to sanction judges and courts as a result of judicial decisions that they 
have disliked, and where those sanctions have been ―far more daunting than simply having their 
decisions overturned‖ (Helmke and Ríos-Figueroa 2011b: 18), the CCC has been able not only to 
protect the so-called negative liberties by limiting state action against individual civil and 
political rights, but also to enforce positive rights which require state provision of services for 
their protection. Moreover, it has been able to vigorously check the other branches of 
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 Interviews lasted between 38 and 98 minutes, with an average of over an hour (63 minutes). 
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government, not only by reviewing Congress legislation and even constitutional amendments but 
also Executive use of emergency powers. 
4.2.1 An active court protecting citizen rights 
The writ of tutela, introduced in the constitution in 1991 (and described in Chapter 3), played a 
key role in the protection of citizen rights. Not only it was created as a mechanism by which the 
judicial system must act promptly in concrete cases of alleged violations of those rights (the 
judge or court to which the action is filed must make a decision within ten days), which in itself 
is a significant improvement in the provision of justice given that regular cases in Colombia can 
take months and often years to be decided, but the tutela has also meant a major step in opening 
access to the system of justice given that very little formalities are required from citizens who see 
their rights at risk to file such a writ (Gargarella, Domingo, and Roux 2006). This mechanism of 
concrete review have been accompanied by the exercise of abstract review which, as described in 
Chapter 3, has a long tradition in Colombia.  
These legal instruments act upon an extensive bill of rights entrenched in the 1991 
constitution, which was ―deliberately intended to transform Colombian society‖ (Uprimny 2006: 
128). Furthermore, international treaties signed by the Colombian state regarding the protection 
of rights are incorporated into what is called the ―block of constitutionality‖, that is, they have 
constitutional rank and therefore are legally binding (Uprimny 2006).  
The availability of these legal instruments, however, is a necessary yet not sufficient 
condition for judicial activism. In Colombia, the court has been able and willing to use them 
thoroughly for the protection of individual and collective rights; in fact, it ―has been both 
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creative and forceful in advancing pro-poor court action‖ (Domingo 2006: 5), which has entailed 
a true rights revolution in Colombia (Wilson 2009; Ansolabehere 2010: 80; Epp 1998). 
Regarding the protection of negative liberties, the court has dealt with somewhat classical 
issues such as the protection of worker rights. In several concrete review decisions, the CCC has 
protected the right of workers to join labor unions by ruling against employers that favored non-
unionized employees (T-230/1994) or by ordering them to re-hire workers who had been laid-off 
allegedly because of their union affiliation (T-436/2000) or in violation of International Labor 
Organization‘s (ILO) principles (T-568/1999).86 
The court has also adopted views which could be considered more libertarian in the 
protection of civil liberties. In a very controversial abstract review decision of 1994, the CCC 
declared unconstitutional portions of the National Narcotics Act that criminalized the possession 
and consumption of minimum dosages of narcotic drugs (C-221/1994). According to the court, 
individuals are constitutionally entitled to freely develop their own personality and therefore the 
criminalization of such behavior violated that right (Pahl 1995).
87
 In a 1997 abstract review 
decision, the court also decriminalized euthanasia when terminally ill patients had freely given 
their consent (C-239/1997). In fact, ―Colombia is the only country in which active euthanasia 
was, to some extent, decriminalized by a Constitutional Court decision, based on human rights 
arguments‖ (Michlowski 2009: 183).88 Moreover, in 2006 the court updated a fairly conservative 
legislation by decriminalizing abortion in three specific circumstances: when the pregnancy is 
the result of rape, non-consensual sex of non-consensual artificial insemination, when there is 
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 See Uprimny (2006). 
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 See more on this case and its repercussions below. 
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 The original challenge filed against Article 329 of the Criminal Code asked the court to protect the rights 
of terminally ill patients by declaring unconstitutional the attenuating circumstances and the reduced jail time 
previewed for the offense of mercy killing. The court not only found those arguments unwarranted but it went 
further to state that physicians committing mercy killing with the free consent of the patient should not be criminally 
prosecuted (see Michlowski 2009). 
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certified evidence of severe fetal malformation, and when there is certified evidence that the 
woman‘s life or health are at risk (Jaramillo and Alfonso 2008; Ordolis 2008). In the latter two 
cases mentioned above, the decisions made by the court met harsh criticism from conservative 
sectors in society and, especially, from the rather influential Catholic Church. 
The court progressive activism has not been limited to the protection of civil and political 
liberties. Quite the contrary; according to one former justice, in Colombia, as in Latin America, 
rather than issues related to civil rights, which are more common in the U.S., the relevant issues 
for the people are those problems of proper nutrition, decent housing, education, health, etc. 
(Cifuentes 1995).Although the constitution states that tutela actions only apply to fundamental 
rights, the court has developed and affirmed the so called ‗connection‘ doctrine by which 
economic, social, and cultural rights are judicially enforceable when not doing so risks violating 
fundamental rights which are connected to them. 
The protection of those positive rights does not (only) limit the action of the state but, on 
the contrary, typically entails the active involvement of the government in the provision of 
services to those citizens for whom the court enforces those rights. Court decisions in this regard 
have meant large public expenditures in the provision of those services. 
For instance, as a result of a concrete review case of 1998 regarding the extremely bad 
conditions in which prison inmates were kept, the court declared an ―unconstitutional state of 
affairs‖ (explained in Chapter 3), and ordered the government to invest in improving those 
conditions (T-153/1998). In the same vein, the court found in 2004 that there was also an 
unconstitutional state of affairs regarding the living conditions of thousands of internally 
displaced people, that is, people who had been forced to flee their homes by the pressure of the 
internal conflict and of illegal armed groups. The CCC ordered the government to design and 
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implement comprehensive policies for the protection of these refugees and the improvement of 
their living conditions (T-025/2004). Uprimny estimates that these two cases may have involved 
public expenditures of around $240 million and $425 million, respectively (Uprimny 2006: 149, 
fn. 27 ; Rodríguez and Rodríguez 2010); see also (Rodríguez and Rodríguez 2010; Cepeda 
2007). 
In reviewing hundreds of cases related to health issues, the court not only has protected 
the rights of patients to receive proper medication and treatment for several conditions within 
their healthcare plans, but it has also restructured the entire health system in the nation (Cepeda 
2007; Yamin and Parra-Vera 2009, 2010; Nunes 2010; Uprimny 2006). Also, a comprehensive 
restructuring of the housing credit and mortgage system was the result of several abstract review 
decisions aimed at alleviating the critical situation of mostly middle-class mortgage debtors in 
1999 (Uprimny 2006; Cepeda 2007).
89
 
Court decisions on economic issues such as those described here have met strong 
reactions not only from the incumbent administrations, a subject I deal with in the following 
sections, but also from representatives of trade unions and business groups, as well as from 
scholars mainly in the area of economics (e.g. Clavijo 2001; Kalmanovitz 2000). Some of these 
critics argue that the court has acted in a populist way, that these decisions have had serious 
fiscal consequences, and that the court has overstepped with these decisions the role of the 
legislature.
90
 In any case, because of these decisions, the court has been considered ―one of the 
most progressive judicial bodies in the [Latin American] region in defending, advancing, and 
protecting economic and social rights‖ (Kaufman 2009: 654). Not only its jurisprudence has 
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 For a summary of the criticisms made at these court decisions, see (Uprimny 2006). 
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served as precedent for other high courts in the region (Rodríguez and Rodríguez 2010: 14) but it 
has also been capitalized by the court to build its legitimacy (Uprimny 2006, 2003b). 
4.2.2 An autonomous court checking the other branches of government 
In addition to actively protecting citizen rights on many occasions, the court has also a 
significant record in checking the other branches of government. Besides its power, included in 
the constitution, to exert abstract review on legislation of different sorts, as I explained in 
Chapter 3, which in itself gives the court a role as a veto player regarding policymaking by the 
legislature and the Executive, the court has increasingly become an active check on the other 
branches particularly in three different areas: first, it controls that decisions made by the other 
high courts do not violate individuals‘ fundamental rights; second, it limits Congress‘ power to 
amend the constitution; and third, it checks the Executive‘s use of states of emergency. 
The first of these checks on other branches has put the CCC in strong disagreement with 
the other high courts. Given some ambiguities in the constitution which states that the Supreme 
Court (SC) and the Council of State (CoS) are organs of last resort in the ordinary and 
administrative jurisdictions, respectively, while at the same time it states that the tutela writ can 
be filed to seek immediate protection citizen rights against the action or omission of any public 
authority, since 1992, when the CCC started to operate, it has had to deal with tutela actions filed 
against judicial decisions. Despite some initial hesitations,
91
 the CCC has increasingly developed 
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 Decision C-543/1992 seemed to state that tutela actions did not apply to judicial decisions, although it 
also specified some exceptions when the judicial decision was considered a de facto action outside the legal 
framework (Botero and Jaramillo 2006). 
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constitutional precedent regarding the applicability of tutela writs against judicial decisions and 
regarding the competences the CCC has to review those cases.  
This has resulted in sustained and on occasions hard clashes between the CCC, on the one 
hand, and the other high courts, namely the SC and the CoS, on the other. In terms of their 
functions, the conflict has been apparent when the SC and the CoS have stated that tutela actions 
do not apply to judicial decisions, when specific panels within the SC have refused to review 
tutela writs filed against decisions made by other panels within the same court, and when the SC 
and the CoS have been reluctant to make a new decision once the CCC has annulled their 
original one, in which case the CCC has issued the final decision itself (Botero and Jaramillo 
2006). These incidents have resulted in public confrontation in the media between 
representatives of the different courts,
92
 in proposals of constitutional amendment to suppress 
tutela actions against judicial decisions (see below), and even in some unresolved cases being 
filed at, and admitted by, the Inter-American human rights system (Botero and Jaramillo 2006). 
However, the CCC has been able on several occasions to successfully check decisions made by 
the other high courts. 
The second major check on other branches relates to the power Congress has to amend 
the constitution. The 1991 constitution states that Actos Legislativos (i.e. constitutional 
amendments going through the legislature) are not automatically reviewed by the court. When 
some citizen files a constitutional challenge against one of these acts, the constitution states that 
the CCC must limit its review to procedural issues in the passage of the amendment.
93
 In recent 
years, however, the court has started to develop a doctrine according to which the power of 
                                                 
92
 See, for instance, ―Pugna entre cortes por reforma a la tutela‖ (El Tiempo Online Archive 8/21/1997: 
http://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-634477). 
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 See below for an explanation of the procedure required to approve these amendments in Congress. 
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amending the constitution through Congress is not absolute.
94
 The doctrine introduces a 
distinction between the reform of the constitution and the substitution of the constitution. While 
the former can be undertaken through the legislature, the latter can only be achieved by the 
‗primary constituent‘, i.e. the people, through a constituent assembly.  
This doctrine was a rather quiet response to what, in the early 2000s, was perceived by 
the court as a massive attack by the Uribe administration against the constitution itself. 
According to one of my interviewees, ―[in 2003] eight out of nine justices were really afraid of 
what the Uribismo was doing […] Given that amendments are so easy here, they needed to close 
[the amendment power] down […] through the doctrine of substitution‖ (LC4). In consequence, 
since 2003 the CCC has steadily affirmed the power to review constitutional amendments not 
only regarding procedural flaws but also regarding what has been called ‗competence flaws.‘ In 
this sense, the CCC claims the ability to review whether the amendment affects the central values 
of the constitution (i.e. whether or not it entails a substitution of the constitution) in which case, 
according to this doctrine, the legislature lacks the competence to approve it.  
The first full development of the ‗substitution‘ doctrine was stated in the decision 
regarding the constitutionality of the amendment allowing the (first) reelection of president Uribe 
(C-1040/2005). Although the court upheld the amendment (and Uribe ran for office and was 
reelected in 2006), the decision affirmed the court‘s competence to go beyond the procedural 
review of amendments in the terms described here. In fact, a few years later, on top of pointing 
out at serious flaws in the legislative procedure to approve an act calling for a referendum to 
allow Uribe‘s running for a third term in 2010, the court also referred to the first reelection 
precedent of 2005 to strike such act down (C-141/2010). 
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A third check on other branches which illustrates the level of autonomy acquired by the 
court relates to the control of the Executive‘s use of emergency powers. As I described in 
Chapter 3, prior to the 1991 Constitution, the Supreme Court, in charge of reviewing decrees 
declaring a state of emergency did so only by checking whether or not a rather simple procedure, 
including the signature of all ministers, had been met to issue the decree. As a result, the 
exception had become the norm and the nation lived over eighty percent of the time in a state of 
emergency between 1970 and 1991 (García-Villegas and Uprimny 2005). 
In order to fix this situation, from the very first time that the Gaviria administration 
issued a decree of this kind in 1992, the CCC has increasingly claimed and affirmed the 
competence to review not only the procedural aspects of those decrees declaring states of 
emergency (internal commotion and economic/social emergency), but also the substantive 
motivations included in such decrees, even though the Constitution does not explicitly provide 
for this level of review (Uprimny 2003a). This doctrine orders that, in the decree declaring the 
state of emergency, the incumbent must make a convincing case arguing that the events requiring 
exceptional measures are in fact new and cannot be handled by ordinary means. As I show 
below, Executives have been highly reluctant to accept judicial review of what they consider 
should be their prerogative. However, in 20 years of constitutional review by the CCC, the 
Executive has issued 25 decrees declaring a state of emergency (including five extensions), and 
the court annulled these decrees in seven occasions (Uprimny 2011, 2004). Moreover, unlike the 
protection of economic and social rights and the issue on tutela actions against judicial decisions, 
according to one former assistant justice (LC4), the question of whether or not the court has the 
competence to substantively review decrees declaring states of emergency, though still 
controversial, seems to have been increasingly settled in favor of the court.  
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4.2.3 Accounts of the activism and autonomy of the Colombian Constitutional Court 
The institutional settings of the court and of the judiciary seem to be at best a partial explanation 
of the level of autonomy of the Colombian Constitutional Court. Empirically measuring judicial 
independence from an institutional standpoint has been an elusive task in comparative politics. 
Feld and Voigt (2003), for instance, develop an index of de jure judicial independence in which, 
based on an expert survey, they code several institutional factors including the constitutional 
status of the highest court; the procedures to amend the constitution; the features related to 
appointment, tenure, retirement, removal, reelection, and salaries of judges; and features related 
to access, jurisdiction, and transparency of the court. In their sample of 71 countries over which 
the average is .654 in a 0-to-1 scale, Colombia occupies the top rank with .939 (Feld and Voigt 
2003). The validity of this indicator, however, may be somewhat questionable if we consider, for 
instance, that the U.S. ranks #30 (.685), and Ecuador ranks #9 (.835).
95
  
Some authors claim that indices such as this tend to blend together two different 
concepts, namely, judicial autonomy and judicial power (Ríos-Figueroa and Staton 2009). More 
recently, focusing specifically on constitutional review in Latin America, Ríos-Figueroa (2011) 
proposes a separate index of de jure judicial independence based on the appointment procedure 
for justices, the length of their tenure, justices‘ removal procedure, and whether or not the 
number of justices in the high court is stated in the constitution. According to this index, which 
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Colombia ranks #32 with .571 (Feld and Voigt 2003). 
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goes from 0 to 6, the CCC scores 4, behind Guatemala, which receives 6 points, and Argentina, 
Brazil, and Mexico, all with 5 points (Ríos-Figueroa 2011).
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In sum, the relationship between the institutional status of the court and its level of 
autonomy and activism is far from clear. Other explanations, mainly developed by local authors 
and voiced in my interviews, are worth briefly reporting.  
On the one hand, there are long-term, cultural accounts which purport, first, that the CCC 
capitalized on a long tradition of constitutional review in Colombia. As I explained in Chapter 3, 
constitutional review of legislation dates from at least 1910 when a constitutional amendment 
introduced Public Actions of Unconstitutionality (PAUs) through which any citizen could 
challenge a piece of legislation and the Supreme Court had to made a decision on the 
constitutionality of such piece (Uprimny 2006; Cepeda 2007). This tradition is clearly illustrated 
in the words of one of my respondents: 
In my classes I like to discuss the counter-majoritarian dilemma [involved in the legal 
instrument of constitutional review], but my students just don‘t get it. I use to spend half of 
the class session trying to convince them that there is indeed a problem; they can‘t imagine 
that a court could not review the constitutionality of legislative acts. That is an element of 
tradition and legal culture. (LC4) 
In addition to this, second, there is also a long tradition of judicial independence. Some 
authors locate its origin in the transition to democracy after the short period of military rule in 
the 1950s. In order to avoid being prosecuted, the outgoing military government was able to 
include in the constitutional plebiscite of 1957 a clause ordering that high court justices should 
be selected by themselves, a mechanism known as co-optation, and that the military were to 
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select the first court. Up to that point, Supreme Court justices used to have strong links with 
political parties and with the Executive. Co-optation helped breaking that link (Uprimny, 
Rodríguez, and García-Villegas nd). As a result, there is now a widely accepted view that law is 
separated from politics. In the words of one former justice, ―We do not accept that a justice has a 
personal relationship with someone from the executive. Scalia can go playing golf with the U.S. 
vice-president, and there may be some people complaining, but in general they don‘t care. That 
is unthinkable in Colombia‖ (J1). One former assistant justice describes it like this: 
It is a court which emerges in a country with a tradition of judicial independence: court 
decisions are honored, a president never says publicly ‗I won‘t comply,‘ while in other Latin 
American countries they do. That tradition says that judges are respected. (LC4) 
Into this long-term, path-dependence approach, an account involving the critical-juncture 
of 1991 fits rather well (Collier and Collier 1991; Mahoney 2000). Many observers point to the 
first temporary court in order to explain the level of activism of the CCC. Capitalizing on the 
traditions of judicial review and independence described above, justices in the first court did not 
have to spend the time and resources that new courts in other countries typically need to build 
their legitimacy (Ginsburg 2003; Epstein, Knight, and Shvetsova 2001b). The first court, then, 
could start developing the new chart of rights and the new legal instruments, especially the tutela 
action, included in the 1991 constitution. 
Moreover, despite some confrontations, the CCC did not have to face a hostile executive 
during the first few years of its existence. As one former assistant justice put it, ―The fact that the 
Court started its operation under president Gaviria, who was a key promoter of the new 
constitution and of the very creation of the Constitutional Court, was crucial for the Court to start 
gaining prestige without having to engage in harsh disputes with the Executive‖ (LC2). Also, 
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those liberal justices in the first court played a central role in advancing the values and principles 
of the new progressive constitution. The temporary provisions for that court, including a one-
year term (see Chapter 3), had important effects on the character adopted by the CCC, according 
to one former justice: 
I think that [the first] court was somewhat suicidal in the sense that, given that it was a one-
year court, then the odds to have this court‘s justices reelected were slim and remote, and 
that possibility was not a dominant argument among justices. We, for instance, understood 
that we had only one year and that what we would not say in one year we would not be able 
to say it ever. So the court was more daring. (J6) 
Recalling those first steps, a former assistant justice even goes to say that ―Those were 
fascinating years, the first two. And there was an impression in the court of being sort of a 
universal legislator; a high court leading the nation, which, of course, was overreaching‖ (LC3).  
Since those first years, then, the distinctive trait of CCC justices was that of having sort 
of a mission, the mission to develop and protect the values embedded in the constitution (Nunes 
2010). And with that sense of having a mission came the prestige of being a member of the court. 
Those traits were transmitted to subsequent courts, as one former assistant justice sustains: 
The prestige of the Constitutional Court is a result of the quality of those justices and of 
those assistant justices who were in the first court, during just one year. One year was 
enough. The new ones discovered the prestige entailed […] in a progressive defense of the 
constitution. And […] they have preserved their legal teams, which know the way the court 
reasons, regardless of how good they are. They have built it. There are still today people 
[working at the court] who were there from the beginning; they work with one or another 
justice. Those first justices brought a character to the court which represented political 
payoffs and social recognition […]. This inertia is still there. The precedent prevails. The 
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advisors have still a great influence. I‘d think that half of the current court staff comes from 
the previous one. (LC5) 
In sum, the critical juncture in the early 1990s gave place to a new path of judicial 
activism in Colombia which, although with variations, still prevails. Two contextual factors seem 
to have played a role as well. On the one hand, according to some authors, the active role played 
by the court was also stimulated by the weakness of political parties and of social movements. 
This weakness left a vacuum in the representation of vulnerable sectors in the population, a 
vacuum that was filled by the CCC (Uprimny 2006). Moreover, another account points to the 
violent context in Colombia and to how respecting the judiciary and honoring its decisions have 
been mechanisms to alleviate the uncertainties created by this violent context (Cepeda 2004). 
All these explanations of the Constitutional Court character and behavior in Colombia 
suggest interesting hypotheses that deserve a more detailed, comparative examination than what 
this dissertation can offer. In any case, it seems to be a fact that the CCC stands out for its 
autonomy and progressive activism in the region. Not only the literature mentioned attests to that 
but also the perceptions of the actors involved in the short history of the court echo that view, 
which could be summarized as follows: 
The Colombian Constitutional Court is a model for all other courts in Latin America and the 
Caribbean. They look at the court‘s precedent as a guide for their decisions on specific 
topics. And not only in Latin America; nowadays, also in Spain they are looking at the court 
for guidance. The Inter American Human Rights Court is always mentioning the court. Its 
international legitimacy makes it unique. It has a lot of prestige. (J2) 
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4.3 CONSTRAINTS IMPOSED UPON THE COURT 
Does the picture drawn in the previous section mean that justices in the Colombian 
Constitutional Court act unconstrained by other political actors and by the environment in which 
they make decisions? The answer is no. Despite the activism and autonomy described above, or 
perhaps because of them, several court decisions have met strong resistance particularly from the 
Executive, which has reacted in different ways to many of those decisions. Precisely the 
existence of court decisions which are adverse to the Executive, the occurrence of potential or 
actual reactions by the Executive to those decisions, and the perceptions and anticipation of those 
reactions by court justices underline the constraints imposed upon the court and are central to the 
theory of strategic prudence introduced in Chapter 2.  
Some authors emphasize the fact that rational choice explanations of individual or 
collective actors‘ behavior are based on the subjective perceptions of these actors; in this sense, 
actors‘ anticipatory reactions are central to these explanations (Vanberg 2005). Players‘ 
perceptions and anticipatory reactions may be related to actual instances of other actors‘ actions 
or to unrealized counterfactuals on these actions located in the players‘ minds. In this sense, they 
technically belong to the off-equilibrium path behavior which is ―significant to sustaining 
equilibrium path actions‖ (Vanberg 2005: 117). In consequence, this section provides qualitative 
evidence of salient events in which tensions and even clashes occurred between the court and the 
incumbent administration, and of justices‘ thoughts, perceptions, and responses related these 
events. As specified in the first section of this chapter, the evidence comes from a comprehensive 
press review and especially from semi-structured interviews with former justices and former 
assistant justices and law clerks in the court.  
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From this section we may infer, first, that justices in the CCC are policy-seekers, that is, 
they are mainly concerned with the outcomes of the specific case under review. Second, this 
section shows that court decisions which are contrary to the preferences of the Executive entail a 
cost for the latter which in some cases trigger government reactions against the specific decision 
and/or against the court. Third, it makes clear that those reactions are costly for the court; justices 
resent them and, in some occasions, anticipating these reactions, justices weight the policy 
implications of a particular case against the potential damage those reactions might have on the 
medium-to-long term institutional status of the court. As a whole, this qualitative evidence 
provides insights on the constraints imposed upon the court and on the subjective perceptions 
actors have of these constraints. Together, constraints and perceptions on those constraints refer 
to the parameters of the game-theoretic model introduced in Chapter 2. The next chapter 
systematically addresses these insights and presents a quantitative test of the empirical 
implications of such model. 
4.3.1 Episodes of tension between the Court and the Executive 
Since the CCC was created in 1991 and started operating in 1992, there have been moments of 
great tension with the Executive. In fact, during all administrations between 1992 and 2006 the 
court made decisions which triggered public responses and reactions by the government. As one 
former justice put it: 
I could say that tensions emerge from the fact that presidents do not like to be controlled. 
And when the court has responsibly exerted control it is almost inevitable that those hostile 
relationships emerge. (J5) 
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Even though president Gaviria (1990-1994) was the central promoter of the new 
constitution and of the creation of the Constitutional Court (see Chapter 3), his administration 
was not exempt from confrontations with it. In May, 1994, the CCC declared unconstitutional 
two articles of the National Narcotics Act that criminalized the possession and consumption of 
minimal quantities of narcotic drugs. The court, in a 5-4 decision (C-221/1994), defended liberal 
values of self-determination and considered that such articles violated citizens‘ right to develop 
their own personality.
97
  
This decision was criticized not only by the government but also by several interest 
groups, political actors, and members of civil society, including trade unions, the Catholic 
Church, presidential candidates running for the 1994 election, and even the U.S. State 
Department.
98
 However, as I show below, the reaction of the Gaviria administration was 
particularly strong, to the point of initiating a constitutional amendment aimed at overturning the 
court decision.  
One former assistant justice recalled that event. When he started working in the court, 
―there was almost an immediate tension regarding the decision on the personal consumption of 
drugs. That was a decision to which the administration had a strong reaction. And there was at 
the moment a time of strong confrontation. Although that was almost at the end of the Gaviria 
administration, those were very tense weeks.‖ (LC4). Moreover, one of the former justices I 
interviewed remembered that event in these terms: 
[A moment of great tension was] during the Gaviria administration, when the court made the 
decision in 1994 by which the criminalization of the personal consumption of drugs was 
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struck down. At the moment, president Gaviria (who has now changed his mind and, along 
with other former Latin American presidents, is proposing the legalization of drugs) said that 
the decision created chaos. I wrote a dissent, but I have to acknowledge that the president‘s 
attack on the court was unfair. The result was that even those of us who were in the minority 
supported the court against the government‘s attack which was hard and furious. It was a 
serious confrontation between president Gaviria and his Minister of Interior (Villegas), on 
the one hand, and the then Chief Justice Arango […] We had to support the court even 
though some of us disagreed with the decision. That was a hard moment. (J3) 
More acute confrontations between the Executive and the court emerged during the 
Samper administration (1994-1998). First and foremost, there was a period in 1995 when the 
tension escalated and harsh public statements from both sides were reported in the press. In 
August, the government issued a decree declaring the state of internal commotion with the 
alleged purpose of getting adequate instruments to deal with security and public order problems 
which, in the Executive‘s view, were the result of upcoming, unforeseen events and therefore 
required exceptional tools. In October, 1995, the court struck down that decree in a 7-2 decision 
(C-466/1995) on the grounds that there were no sufficient reasons for a state of emergency and 
that the security situation could and should be handled with ordinary legislative mechanisms.  
In fact, when the Samper‘s decree was struck down in October, 1995, the 
administration‘s reaction was extremely hard: 
The world fell upon the court. The government was the first to state that the court did not 
allow it to rule, that the court was obstructing the task of preserving public order. President 
Samper went public on TV to say that the court was making an illegitimate decision because 
in his opinion the decree declaring the emergency was not to be reviewed […] So that led to 
a hard confrontation with the government. [At that moment] I received [anonymous] death 
threats. (J3) 
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The Chief Justice at the time, José Gregorio Hernández, accused the government of 
creating an atmosphere of fear and panic resulting from public statements made by its officials
99
 
and refused to attend a summons from Congress to explain the court‘s decision.100  
In November, 1995, however, Álvaro Gómez Hurtado, a former presidential candidate, 
co-chair of the National Constituent Assembly, and son of one of the most prominent and 
controversial conservative presidents in Colombian history, was assassinated in Bogotá. ―Mr. 
Samper went publicly on TV to regret Gómez‘s murder, [and] he referred to the court in an 
inappropriate way uttering that he would call again for a state of emergency, almost defying the 
court, almost to see whether the court was capable of strike it down again. That was in my 
opinion an inappropriate move.‖ (J5). Moreover, ―many political leaders publicly stated that the 
court was to blame for the murder. That the court had tied the government‘s hands preventing it 
to handle the internal security situation and that that was the reason why Gómez had been 
murdered.‖ (J3).  
Under this level of pressure, in a situation in which there was ―an atmosphere making it 
very difficult for the court to analyze the case in an independent way‖ (J5), the court eventually 
upheld that second decree in a 6-3 decision (C-027/1996). A former assistant justice even 
remembers that ―some discussions took place in the court‘s halls regarding how difficult it would 
[have been] for the court to say no again.‖ (LC5). 
Later, in January, 1997, the Samper administration issued a new decree, this time to 
declare the state of economic emergency to deal with an extreme budget deficit and with a 
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massive in-flow of foreign currency.
101
 In a 6-3 decision (C-122/1997), the court overturned this 
decree arguing, again, that the facts on which the emergency was called were neither new nor 
unforeseeable.
102
 As a result, the government announced a constitutional amendment aimed at 
limiting the court‘s competence to review decrees declaring states of emergency.103 Chief Justice 
Hernández responded by accusing Samper of being a dictator and made explicit references to 
retaliations by the Executive which, in the court‘s view, were unacceptable.104 
Although most justices I interviewed agree that president Pastrana‘s (1998-2002) 
relationship with the court was somewhat more civil, there were some significant cases reviewed 
by the CCC which created a high level of tension with the government. Early in 1999, the court 
had to review a decree issued by the administration declaring the economic emergency to deal 
with a crisis of the financial system. During these months, there were rumors that there were 
seven votes in the court against the decree,
105
 and these speculations, apparently resulting from 
leaks to the press, created an atmosphere of distress in which there were public statements by the 
minister of Economy and by private corporations implying that such a decision would create 
chaos in the financial markets and accusing court justices of those leaks, accusations which were 
strongly rejected by the court.
106
 Eventually, the rumors were proved wrong and the court upheld 
the decree in a 7-2 decision (C-122/1999).  
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The late-nineties was a time in which many mortgage debtors were in a very difficult 
situation because of the regime ruling interest rates according to the so called UPAC system, 
which regulated housing loans and mortgages. In fact, there were estimates that up to 200,000 
families were on the verge of losing their homes (Uprimny 2006). In the middle of the crisis, 
some norms related to the UPAC system were challenged and the court had to review them. The 
months during which the court studied the case were really stressful. One former justice recalled 
that ―El Tiempo published a front page headline saying ‗The fate of the nation depends on the 
court‘s decision.‘ That was almost a threat.‖ (J5). That perception might be particularly relevant 
considering that: 
Governments are often able to ‗use‘ most media. You can [see] how the Executive expresses 
itself not only directly but also through the media which are controlled by it. That creates an 
atmosphere of opinion which has an effect on the court and creates tensions within the court. 
(J6) 
In a 6-3 decision (C-700/1999) the court overturned those norms and ordered the 
Executive to formulate a new system linking interest rates to inflation and to recalculate 
mortgages to alleviate debtors‘ burdens. It allowed, however, a seven-month period for the 
government to introduce new legislation to regulate the housing market. 
The first term of president Uribe (2002-2006) was also characterized by episodes which 
entailed severe tension between the government and the court. Less than a week after Uribe‘s 
inauguration, as a result of a terrorist attack perpetrated by the FARC guerrilla group in Bogotá, 
the government issued a decree declaring the state of internal commotion. However, Minister of 
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Interior, Fernando Londoño, initially refused to send the decree to the CCC for its review.
107
 One 
former justice recalls the event in these terms:  
One [moment] that I remember of tension and differences between the government and the 
court was when, after Uribe‘s inauguration, his first act was to declare the state of 
emergency because the disturbances in the internal security. At that moment, the decree 
declaring the emergency had to be reviewed by the court. However, the then minister 
thought that that decree should not be reviewed […] So there was a great deal of tension 
since the court thought its competences were jeopardized. From that time comes [Minister of 
Interior] Londoño‘s infamous statement that he [eventually] sent the decree to the court only 
as a mere courtesy. That was a difficult moment. (J4)
108
 
The decree was eventually upheld by the court in an 8-1 decision (C-802/2002). 
In 2004, the administration introduced a constitutional amendment, the Anti-Terrorism 
Act, which allowed the military to conduct arrests, home searches, and wiretaps without a 
warrant issued by a judge or a prosecutor. This was a very controversial issue, with problematic 
implications for civil liberties protected by the constitution and by international law, although the 
high popularity enjoyed by president Uribe was precisely based on his hard-line agenda against 
guerrilla movements and terror. The case created a lot of pressure on the court during its 
analysis. At the end, the court struck down the amendment because, in the view of the 5-4 
majority, its approval in Congress had had procedural flaws (Decision C-816/2004).
109
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In the decision of the Anti-Terrorism Act we expected a strong reaction from the Uribe 
administration, but there was no such a strong response, which was somewhat surprising. 
[…] There was strong pressure in the media. There were a lot of leaks, really annoying. The 
other justices said that that was the most stressful case there have been up to that point in the 
court […] So the following days we expected a strong reaction, and it didn‘t happen. (J7) 
The reaction did come a few months later when the Uribe administration announced a 
constitutional amendment which included provisions to limit the court power to review 
constitutional amendments.
110
 
One final, paradigmatic, episode of tension between the court and the executive occurred 
when the court had to review the amendment approved in Congress to suppress from the 
constitution the prohibition of presidential reelection. The amendment, approved by the 
government‘s strong coalition in the legislature, aimed at allowing president Uribe to run for 
office in the 2006 election. For a long time, the nation anxiously awaited the court decision. And 
justices within the court felt the pressure: 
The moment of greatest tension during my tenure was the first reelection. It was so tense that 
for more than one and a half months I could not go out of my house because people 
approached me and put pressure on me. Friends, acquaintances, and people I didn‘t know 
and that I ran into when I was having a cup of coffee at Juan Valdez, everybody tended to 
approach me to tell me to vote in one way or another. And the entire nation, the media, were 
asking for a quick decision. That was the moment of greatest tension, I think, within the 
court. (J4) 
Asked about those moments, another former justice said: 
                                                                                                                                                             
could not agree on how to apply it to the case, they opted to limit the decision‘s arguments to the procedural flaws in 
the legislative passage of the Anti-Terrorism Act. 
110
 I discuss this amendment later in this chapter. 
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[During the discussion of the first reelection the pressure] was inescapable no matter where 
you were. So what I did was not going out where I could be exposed to that kind of remarks. 
Those were critical moments, no doubt about that, which were public. And the most critical 
moment was when we made the decision disavowing Minister Sabas Pretelt as a valid 
interlocutor.
111
 We made public a letter as a result of an interview he gave. The letter 
resulted in a communication from the president. And that was a difficult moment; it had 
never occurred before. (J1) 
In sum, all administrations have had clashes with the CCC which have resulted in public 
statements and mutual accusations. What this rather anecdotal evidence suggests is, first, that 
court decisions are relevant for executives; although they use to comply with, or at least tend not 
to openly defy these decisions even when they are adverse to their preferences, they do react by 
using the mass media to complain about what they consider are court moves overstepping its 
competences. These episodes also show, second, that these public reactions by the Executive 
entail costs to the court which has often felt compelled to use the same channels to issue public 
statements aimed at controlling the damage Executive reactions might have produced on the 
court‘s image and legitimacy. Even though these instances of posturing are not innocuous, they 
are probably not enough justification for a theory of judicial strategic behavior. The following 
two sub-sections show that Executive reactions have not been limited to public statements in the 
media. They have also included instances in which the Executive promoted constitutional 
amendments aimed at overturning court decisions (sub-section 4.3.2) and constitutional 
amendments and legislation intended to limit the court‘s competences and to curtail its power 
(sub-section 4.3.3). Naturally, to be effective constraints on the court, these responses do not 
need to be successful; they simply need to be perceived as credible threats by justices in the 
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court. In consequence, the following sub-sections also provide evidence of how those moves by 
the Executive were perceived from inside the court.  
4.3.2 Overturning court decisions 
According to Ginsburg (2003), constraints on courts emerge as a function of the responses of 
strong actors in the political system to court decisions. Those responses include what Ginsburg 
calls ―formally constitutional challenges‖, that is, attempts to overrule the court through normal, 
constitutional channels (Ginsburg 2003: 77-81). Regarding constitutional review, the most 
typical response in this category is the announcement, promotion, and/or achievement of an 
amendment aimed at changing the constitution in the specific policy area addressed by the court 
decision, overturning it. 
Although more difficult than in the case of ordinary legislation, constitutional 
amendments in Colombia are comparatively easy to achieve in Congress. Unlike other countries 
where supermajorities in one or two chambers are required to pass such amendments, the 1991 
Constitution made constitutional reforms more difficult only by delaying their approval, not by 
establishing a more demanding proportion of legislative seats behind the proposal. In fact, in 
order to be approved, in Colombia amendments must undergo eight debates and votes (i.e. votes 
in committee and in the floor, both in the Upper and the Lower houses, in two consecutive 
legislative years). In the first ―round‖, the proposal must be approved by a simple majority of 
those legislators in attendance to the specific chamber committee or floor session (provided, 
naturally, that a minimum quorum is reached). In the second round, the proposal must pass the 
four votes by the simple majority of all members of the specific committee or chamber.  
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The rationale behind this amending procedure is to protect the constitution by delaying 
those decisions so that they are not made precipitously, in principle allowing different views to 
be heard and have the chance to make their cases in Congress, and letting the specific 
circumstances that had originally triggered the proposal to cool off. Given that the presidential 
and congressional terms are four years long, there are costs in engaging in a two-year process of 
amending the constitution.  
Other procedures to introduce changes to the constitution include a referendum which can 
be initiated by the Executive, by a group of at least thirty percent of the nation‘s municipal 
councilors or departmental deputies, or by the signatures of at least five percent of the population 
included in the electoral census. Once initiated, a simple majority of members Congress must 
approve the legislative act calling the referendum. Amendments can also be accomplished by a 
Constituent Assembly. Congress must approve a legislative act to call citizens to decide whether 
or not they want a constituent assembly to convene. In such case, members of the assembly must 
be popularly elected. 
All in all, although having an amendment approved in Colombia is not an easy task 
(many amendment proposals introduced in Congress reach the sixth or seventh debates before 
they get ―killed‖), this mechanism is not as stringent as those existing in countries where 
supermajorities (typically two-thirds) are required to pass constitutional changes. In 
consequence, the possibility of an Executive response to a court decision in the form of a 
constitutional amendment is real. Moreover, there have been some examples in which proposals 
of constitutional amendments to override court decisions were actually made.  
The first instance occurred in 1994, as a result of the decision to de-criminalize the 
personal consumption of drugs described above. Despite having actively promoted the creation 
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of the CCC three years earlier, the Gaviria administration strongly disagreed with the court on 
this issue and announced a popular referendum to amend the constitution in order to explicitly 
state that the possession and consumption of drugs, even in minimal doses, should be considered 
a crime. The two top candidates running for the presidential office that year publicly stated their 
support for the initiative.
112
  
President Gaviria later argued that the administration did not mean to circumvent the 
court‘s decision and that resorting to a referendum should not be interpreted as a threat to judicial 
independence.
113
 The announcement, however, was received by the court as a subterfuge to 
override the court. Chief Justice Jorge Arango Mejía recalled the importance of the principle of 
checks and balances and stated that government officials questioning court decisions created an 
interference with that principle.
114
 
Those were the last weeks of the Gaviria administration, though. Incoming president 
Samper, inaugurated on August 7, 1994, changed his mind on the referendum and announced 
instead a constitutional amendment in Congress.
115
 Although the amendment was discussed and 
approved in the first rounds in the legislature,
116
 it eventually died. The issue was rather 
forgotten for many years until, after several attempts, president Uribe was successful in having 
the amendment approved in Congress in December, 2009.
117
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One former assistant justice, regarding the proposal made by the Gaviria administration 
in 1994, argues that such a proposal was ―not seen as an attempt to circumvent the decision, but 
as a legitimate step in the system of checks and balances‖ (LC2). One of the justices involved in 
the case was even clearer on that: 
I cannot tell about other justices‘ views because those were things that were not formally 
discussed. In general, I can tell that many justices looked at that as something rather normal. 
We thought that precisely, given that the role of a court is a countermajoritarian one, that is, 
to slow down a bit the democratic principle, the only way for the democratic principle to 
express itself is through a constitutional amendment. (J6) 
However, that feeling was not unanimous. Even though the proposal eventually failed in 
Congress, one justice considers that it was indeed a way of evading the court decision: ―Those 
are reactions against the court‘s jurisdiction and aim at blocking its decisions‖ (J3). Moreover, 
another justice described the issue as one of the moments of greatest tension with the Executive: 
―That was something unheard of, never before a president had done that‖ (J5). An assistant 
justice recalled that president Gaviria‘s proposal was thought of as an attempt to mock the court: 
―The progressive wing in the court did see in that decision a liberal accomplishment and the 
government‘s reaction was seen as an attempt to sabotage the court‖ (LC3). 
During the Samper administration a somewhat harsher episode occurred. The court had to 
review norms regulating the operation of the military justice, in particular its jurisdiction and the 
composition of the military tribunals. Those have been traditionally sensitive issues in Colombia 
characterized by a confrontation between a view committed to the defense of human rights and 
concerned by the impunity that might result from members of the armed forces accused of 
human rights violations being judged within the military jurisdiction, on the one hand, and the 
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position in defense of the military autonomy in the prosecution and trial of their own members, 
on the other.  
In March, 1995, the court made a 5-4 decision (C-141/1995) ordering that only retired 
members of the armed forces could be part of military tribunals. The rationale behind this 
decision was to enhance military justice‘s impartiality by preventing that indicted officers could 
be prosecuted and tried by lower-rank officers who would formally be their subordinates.
118
 The 
decision met strong resistance from the government and public statements were exchanged 
between the Minister of Defense, Fernando Botero, asking the court to reconsider its decision,
119
 
and Chief Justice José Gregorio Hernández affirming the court‘s autonomy and rejecting external 
interferences.
120
 
The decision received even stronger criticism from members of the military who felt it as 
a way to undermine their special jurisdiction.
121
 The association of retired officers even issued a 
statement announcing that they refused to be part of military tribunals, in a clear attempt to 
challenge the court.
122
 
A few weeks later a constitutional amendment was introduced in Congress to revert the 
court decision. The proposal received strong support from legislators and was promoted by then 
Senator Germán Vargas Lleras and by the Samper administration.
123
 The debates on the 
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amendment in Congress were attended by ministers of Defense and Justice and by high-rank 
officers of the Army,
124
 and its approval was rather expeditious.
125
 
Regarding this case, a former justice described the amendment as ―an instauration of a 
political view which was very different from the one decided by the court. And therefore, those 
moves implied a criticism to the court. And [we could say that] Congress had a more rightist 
position while the court was more leftist. And Congress supported a view which traditionally 
prevailed in Colombia which was that of including active officers in military tribunals‖ (J5). In 
comparison to the debate on the personal consumption of drugs, a former assistant justice said 
that the case of the military tribunals ―was a more sensitive issue in the Court. Most justices were 
aligned to international law and saw with the upmost suspicion any move in this sense. In fact, 
there was a clear intention among several justices to stop any attempt to go backwards regarding 
military justice‖ (LC2). 
In sum, the qualitative evidence presented here shows that having a constitutional 
amendment aimed at overturning a court‘s decision is not only a credible possibility but also one 
that actually occurred. On the other hand, regarding whether these proposed or actual 
amendments were perceived as attempts to evade or mock the court, that is to say, as moves 
which were costly for the court, the evidence is mixed, although there are indications that those 
costs were perceived at least by some of the justices. In fact, while ―some justices did have [that] 
feeling, [I think] that is part of the institutional architecture in Colombia. Why in Colombia the 
court has the power it has? Because, unlike in the U.S., the CCC does not have the last word. The 
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political process can overrule the court,
126
 as Americans say, but they must do so through 
constitutional amendments‖ (J1). Another witness of the time put it this way. 
Some [justices] did say ‗this is a mockery because, given that here amending the constitution 
is so easy, then our decisions are being reverted through amendments.‘ Others felt: ‗Well, 
that‘s the game, we can strike down and they have the power to amend.‘ So there were both. 
[These moves] were not appreciated, but some of them were received as part of the game, in 
a cool way. And there were issues on which justices almost wanted an amendment, [as if 
they thought] ‗if you want that, you need to amend.‘ I think the more confrontational ones 
were the threat regarding the personal consumption of drugs, which really pissed those in the 
majority off, and the one on military criminal justice. But others were seen as part of the 
game. (LC4) 
4.3.3 Threatening the institutional status of the court 
The previous sub-section dealt with confrontations between the Executive and the court 
revolving mainly around policy outcomes. However, there are also what Ginsburg calls 
‗unconstitutional challenges‘ on the court which often entail attacks on its very institutional 
status (Ginsburg 2003: 77-81). These attacks, at least in the Colombian case, are not technically 
unconstitutional, though. They take typically the form of constitutional amendments aimed at 
limiting the court‘s competences or jurisdiction. 
In fact, unlike other countries in Latin America, sanctions to the Constitutional Court and 
its justices in Colombia do not no include shutting down the court, as in Peru, Ecuador, Bolivia, 
and Venezuela, packing the court with cronies, as Menem did in Argentina, or impeaching 
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individual justices, as in Ecuador under Gutiérrez. Reactions of this kind simply seem 
unthinkable in Colombia. Moreover, no court-curbing proposal of amendment has succeeded in 
Colombia since the CCC was created in 1991. This does not mean, however, that these 
amendments have not been announced in the media and, in some cases, introduced in Congress. 
The most notorious instances have occurred as a result of court decisions annulling a decree of 
declaration of a state of emergency. As I mentioned above, the substantive review of those 
decrees has been one of the most controversial competences affirmed by the court. In fact, 
although the constitution does not include an explicit provision for it, the court has been able to 
seize the competence and has actively exerted it on several occasions. 
One of these occasions came when president Samper issued his first decree declaring the 
internal commotion in 1995. The court struck down such decree triggering an immediate reaction 
by the incumbent, which I describe above.
127
 Moreover, there were not only public statements 
from both sides, but also the administration announced an amendment aimed at restricting the 
court review of decrees declaring the state of emergency to a check of the procedural aspects of 
the decree emission.
128
 The proposal was discussed in both chambers during the second half of 
1996 but it ultimately did not have enough support in the legislature and was rejected.  
A couple of years later, in 1997, after the court struck down a new decree, this time 
declaring the state of economic emergency (see above), another proposal was introduced in 
Congress by the then Minister of Interior, Horacio Serpa, who, ironically, was one of the three 
chairmen of the National Constituent Assembly which created the CCC in 1991. One more time 
the proposed amendment addressed the prohibition of substantively reviewing decrees declaring 
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states of emergency.
129
 Once again, in the middle of corruption scandals related to the links 
between the drug cartels and the electoral campaign of Samper, the proposal did not carry 
enough support in Congress and was dropped. 
Besides these two proposals initiated by the Samper administration, during this term there 
were others including provisions which were more severe attacks against the court. One of them 
sought to eliminate the court itself. Another one was a court-packing amendment proposing to 
increase the number of CCC justices from nine to fifteen.  
Were these proposed amendments taken seriously by the court? Were they credible 
threats against the institutional status of the court? One of the justices at the time recalls these 
proposals as follows: 
When Horacio Serpa was Minister of Interior, they proposed limiting the court‘s 
competences. We did not accept them. That was an important debate […] After that, in 
Congress, there were also confrontations. […] I had to [publicly] face a proposal made by 
Senators Roberto Gerlein and Luis Guillermo Giraldo, who initially proposed to shut down 
the court. We defused that. After that, they presented a proposal stating that the CCC should 
have 15 justices.
130
 That was in 1995. On top of that, [the proposal stated that] decisions 
should be made by super majorities, something like two thirds, I don‘t remember well. We 
did not accept that either […] In sum, those attacks occurred several times. [However] at 
those moments the Court received a strong support from the people, from the nation, from 
the pueblo […] In my time (I don‘t know what current justices think), in my time I was not 
concerned at all [by these proposals], because we said ‗if they suppress the court, so be it, 
                                                 
129
 See ―Ofensiva legislativa contra la Corte‖ El Tiempo Online Archive 3/19/1997: 
http://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-561006). 
130
 See ―15 magistrados tendrá Corte Constitucional‖ (El Tiempo Online Archive 2/6/1995: 
http://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-337302) and ―Propuesta para acabar con la Corte 
Constitucional‖ by John Gutiérrez (El Tiempo Online Archive 4/5/1995: 
http://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-309208) 
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but we will defend the court‘s independence until the last minute. And we were united, even 
those who had dissenting opinions. (J3) 
This feeling of being shielded by the people‘s support is also present in another statement 
made by one of the former justices I interviewed: 
[These proposals] created no concern at all […] Justices thought of themselves to be the 
guardians of the new constitution. At the same time they perceived a growing popular 
support for their decisions […] Justices became also to a certain extent […] very close to the 
needs of vulnerable individuals, of marginalized populations, which are not necessarily 
properly represented in the political circuit or the demands of whom are not properly 
addressed. […] We knew that that meant support for the court. As a consequence, [these 
threats] were laughable. (J6) 
Assistant justices and law clerks tended to have a slightly more moderate view. One of 
them stated that, despite the fact that ―the court started to receive support from people who spoke 
publicly,‖ the government‘s reactions and the proposals to curb the court‘s competences on these 
issues ―were perceived as credible threats and generated concern; some more so than others, but 
always as credible threats‖ (LC4). Moreover, the situation was better described by another law 
clerk at the time: ―[A proposal to curb the court‘s competences] was disturbing. It was not 
disturbing when presidents had low approval rates; it was clear that the court defended itself, and 
that, from the beginning, people identified the court with the tutela. When presidents had high 
approval rates, the concern was greater‖ (LC5). The Samper administration and his legislative 
coalition were not terribly strong in this respect. In fact, during the discussion of the last 
amendment proposed by Samper to limit the court‘s competences, members of congress at that 
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time publicly admitted that they were doubtful about legislators daring to go against a popular 
court when elections were approaching.
131
 
That was not the case during the Uribe administration. Permanently above 70 points of 
approval, Uribe enjoyed both popular and legislative support. That posed a considerable threat. 
In fact, the government proposed several amendments regarding the competences of the CCC 
during the first Uribe administration (2002-2006). These amendments addressed several aspects 
of the court‘s power which, as I described in a previous section of this chapter, had been 
controversial since its creation in 1991.
132
  
First, the court has always claimed the competence to review tutela writs against judicial 
decisions when these decisions may have violated individuals‘ fundamental rights. This 
competence has created for years considerable tensions between the CCC and the other high 
courts, i.e. the Supreme Court and the Council of State (Botero and Jaramillo 2006). The Uribe 
administration initially sided with the Supreme Court and announced limits to this competence in 
its proposed amendments.
133
 
Second, as a result of some salient CCC decisions protecting economic, social, and 
cultural rights, including those related to the health system and the attention to forcibly displaced 
people, the proposal included provisions to forbid judicial decisions involving expenditures not 
previously included and approved in budget plans. In fact, the court has been often criticized for 
not taking into account the financial and economic consequences of its decisions and for 
overstepping the legislative function of allocating public funds (Uprimny 2006). 
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 See ―Reservas sobre poda en poderes de la Corte‖ (El Tiempo Online Archive 3/27/1997: 
http://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-552560). 
132
 See ―La Corte se extralimitó‖ (El Tiempo Online Archive 9/5/2004: 
http://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-1538059). 
133
 The ‗alliance‘ of the government with the Supreme Court did not last long and was ostensibly broken 
after the latter started the prosecution of several politicians close to the Uribe administration accused of having 
conducted electoral campaigns in association with illegal paramilitary groups. 
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Third, in the same vein of previous attempts of reform (described above), the 
amendments included restrictions to the constitutional review of decrees declaring states of 
emergency, limiting such review to procedural matters exclusively. This provision echoed a 
permanent complaint of executives arguing that such decrees were the epitome of a political act 
and that only the government should have the ability of assessing the situation and of 
determining the conditions of exception in that particular situation. 
Fourth, the proposed amendment restricted the court review of constitutional 
amendments to strictly procedural matters. In fact, as I explained above, the court had made the 
first steps to develop a doctrine by which Congress was entitled to change the constitution but 
not to substitute it. Although at that time the doctrine had neither been fully developed nor 
effectively used by the court, the government was reacting to the first decisions increasingly 
affirming that competence. 
Finally, the various amendments included restrictions to the overturning of legislation in 
the court. Particularly, it stated that decisions of unconstitutionality needed to be reached by a 
two-thirds supermajority. This provision naturally would have made it harder for the court to 
strike down legislative and executive acts and would allow a minority in the court to block 
decisions against the administration. 
Asked about how these amendments were taken in the court, one former justice referred 
to the proposal imposing supermajorities to strike down legislation in court: 
That was the first constitutional amendment [of that administration], the hardest amendment 
there have been against the court. [These amendment proposals] were very badly taken […] 
and that was really a difficult moment, a moment of great tension […] What actually 
happened was that members of Congress and party leaders supported the Court. They did not 
support the amendment, which ultimately was not even introduced in Congress. (J1) 
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Another justice expressed his concern not only for the court‘s institutional status but also 
for the protection of the constitution: 
Those attempts to limit the competences of the court were badly taken because those were 
attempts to limit the CCC. And to limit the CCC is to limit constitutional review, and that is 
not something that goes against the court but against citizen rights. [With those amendments] 
the supremacy of the constitution gets weaker, too. So that proposal, which was made by 
Minister Londoño […] also included a prohibition to make dissents public. That shows that 
they wanted to limit the court and to restrict its competences, which undermines the 
protection of rights. (J2) 
Were these threats credible? There is variation in the perception of those amendment 
proposals. One justice, for instance, said that ―In principle, that amendment could have been 
approved since the president was so popular and had a strong coalition in Congress‖ (J2). In 
contrast, another, although he acknowledges that ―justices did not like those proposals‖, the 
benefit of hindsight allows him to state that those proposals ―did not lead to a strong 
confrontation, among other things because nothing went beyond proposals, they were never 
successful. They did not even become bills. The Court was rather unconcerned because of its 
great popular support. In all cases of court curbing proposals, society‘s support has been strong. 
That helped surrounding the court with a quiet atmosphere‖ (J4).   
In fact, surprisingly enough, despite Uribe‘s strong support, these amendments were not 
successful and some of them did not even reach the legislature. Does this mean that the potential 
for reaction by the different administrations does not amount to effective constraints on the 
court? The following testimonials show that, in controversial cases, justices weighted the 
specifics related to policy outcomes of the case against considerations on the institutional status 
of the court. 
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One of my respondents (J5) reports that a justice told him once that, while he thought that 
the decision on the decriminalization of the personal consumption of drugs was excellent from a 
legal point of view, he was certain that it was an opinion he himself would have never written 
because, in his view, the first duty of a constitutional court was to survive. 
One assistant justice, commenting on the different views within the first court, referred to 
specific justices as follows: 
The difference between Cifuentes and Angarita was that the latter did not care, he fought no 
matter what. He was sort of a representative of the ethics of conviction. In contrast, 
Cifuentes was more akin to an ethics of responsibility and weighted how far the court could 
go. If a fight was too costly, he didn‘t engage in it. So that was a consideration. [However] 
the relationship between them was very good. There were allies in trying to defeat the old 
guard coming from the Supreme Court. (LC3) 
In the same vein, one former justice sustained that ―a very important factor is the justice‘s 
view on the sustainability of the active defense of a progressive constitution. [There are justices 
who] sometimes make decisions which, in my opinion, are too extreme and which jeopardize the 
sustainability of a process of active defense of a progressive constitution‖ (J1).  
How were those considerations materialized in the court? One former justice makes a 
really rich explanation: 
[The anticipation of strong executive reaction] did emerge in the [discussion of the] Anti-
Terrorism Act. Not in a very explicit way because that is not something that a justice would 
not state upfront in a debate of which there are public proceedings, but it did emerge with an 
argument based on the importance of building a sustainable doctrine […] So the argument 
was ‗either we handle this right or the court gets too vulnerable in legal and political terms.‘ 
But when the idea is made explicit, then the politically correct discourse is to say ‗we don‘t 
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care.‘ So that type of considerations are more often made in the chambers, in private 
discussions, than in public debates because at the moment someone brings it up, the answer 
of another one would be to say ‗we must decide based on the legal facts, we should not be 
considering the consequences, etc.‘ But that obviously played a role. (J7) 
Perhaps the most paradigmatic case of a threat which was never realized but which had 
an unequivocal impact on justices‘ behavior was the discussion of the first reelection of president 
Uribe. As I explained above, the government‘s majorities in Congress approved a constitutional 
amendment eliminating the prohibition of presidential reelection. The aim of the amendment was 
clearly to favor Uribe‘s will to run for office again in 2006. Justices breathed a really stressful 
atmosphere while they studied the case, as I document above. In fact, although one of those 
justices thinks that, should the court had struck down the amendment, ―president Uribe would 
have also complied with the decision, accepted it,‖ he acknowledges that it was likely that, given 
the high level of approval enjoyed by Uribe, ―it may have triggered a movement looking for a 
referendum or a constituent assembly, though […] In that perspective, it would have been too 
risky‖ (J1). 
One assistant justice working at the court at the time confirms this view: ―[In the 
reelection case] there was a well-founded fear that, given the high presidential approval, should 
the Court strike down such reelection, it was very likely that, first thing next morning, the 
president would call for a referendum or a constituent assembly. That was a real fear, at least in 
the mind of some Justices‖ (LC2). Another assistant justice does not hesitate in sustaining that 
the decision on the first reelection ―was definitely strategic; there were justices who knew it was 
unconstitutional but thought that the court would be shut down so they voted for, not against it‖ 
(LC5). 
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These examples illustrate that the anticipation of the executive‘s reaction to a court 
decision does play a role in shaping the way justices make decisions. This happens at least in 
some cases and for some justices. One former assistant justice nicely argues that there are in fact 
different considerations justices make when making a decision: 
One was the legal-political view of the justice on a particular case; the other was the thought 
‗Will this decision be accepted?‘ or ‗What would be the impact? Will the court suffer?‘ 
Some justices were really sensitive to this. [The justices I served with] had a sense of 
protecting the court; the one who had this clearest and who played that role the most, among 
those I knew, was Cepeda. [For some justices] the idea of protecting the institutional status 
of the court was strongly related to looking for consensus. [There were others] who looked 
for decisions to advance a constitutional agenda for the court which sometimes put the court 
at the edge, but taking into account the reaction, assessing whether such a decision would be 
well digested […] And there were some ones who didn‘t care that much […] So yes, the 
balance was not easy […] I don‘t think there was a unique style. (LC4) 
4.4 CONCLUSION 
This chapter shows that the CCC has been exceptionally autonomous, activist and progressive in 
protecting citizens‘ rights and in checking the other branches of government. Although a detailed 
discussion regarding the factors explaining such autonomy and activism lies beyond the scope of 
this dissertation, I summarized some of the accounts that have been advanced regarding the 
exceptionality of the CCC. 
This chapter also provides, however, some evidence, albeit impressionistic, of the impact 
of the political environment on justices‘ behavior. This evidence suggests that there are indeed 
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constraints imposed upon the court. Moreover, it suggests that justices not only are aware of such 
constraints but also they take them into account when making a decision, especially in 
controversial cases. In other words, external factors surrounding the justices‘ endeavor are 
included their utility functions. Despite the fact that Colombia is one of the success stories of 
judicial activism and autonomy in Latin America, the qualitative evidence presented here 
suggests that it is worth undertaking a systematic test of the empirical implications of the theory 
of strategic prudence on the CCC. In this sense, the CCC can be considered a crucial-case test for 
the theory (Gerring 2007; Eckstein 1975; Ragin 1992)  
 
 121 
5.0  TESTING THE THEORY OF STRATEGIC PRUDENCE 
I sketched in Chapter 2 a game theoretical model to specify the strategic interaction between a 
High Court and its justices, on the one hand, and the Executive and its legislative coalition, on 
the other. The model emphasizes the importance of the political environment surrounding the 
court on judicial decision making. More specifically, the theory states that judicial behavior is a 
function of the court members‘ anticipation of the government‘s reaction to a decision regarding 
the constitutionality of a statute. 
Chapter 3 includes an account of the process by which a Constitutional Court was created 
in Colombia in 1991, and described, in comparative perspective, the institutional setting in which 
that court operates, including its jurisdiction and caseload, the procedure to select its members, 
and the decision making process within the court. Chapter 4, in turn, provided qualitative 
evidence of the several instances in which the Colombian government reacted against Court‘s 
decisions. Such reactions included not only strong statements against the court and its justices 
made by members of the executive or the government‘s legislative coalition but also public 
announcements of bills aimed at overturning court decisions that the government strongly 
disliked or constitutional amendments to curb the court‘s jurisdiction.  
The aim of this chapter, then, is to systematically test the empirical implications derived 
from the game theoretic model of strategic prudence on the Colombian Constitutional Court. It 
makes use of an original dataset of individual justices‘ decisions on the merits for cases of 
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abstract review of legislation between 1992 and 2006. The chapter proceeds as follows. The first 
section shows a general description of the dataset of court decisions which is, to my knowledge, 
the first attempt at systematically recording the Colombian Constitutional Court‘s caseload and 
decision making. The second section proposes a first approach to the hypotheses derived from 
the theoretical model‘s comparative statics analysis, operationalizes these hypotheses and shows 
the results of the multivariate statistical analysis conducted to test them. The third section 
presents a more complex and comprehensive set of statistical model specifications directly 
derived from a more specific understanding of the theory‘s predictions. The fourth section 
discusses the findings related to the impact of ideological locations of justices. The final section 
concludes. 
5.1 THE ORIGINAL DATASET OF THE COLOMBIAN CONSTITUTIONAL 
COURT DECISIONS 
During the first half of 2007, with the assistance of eleven undergraduate students of Political 
Science and Law, I gathered an original dataset containing all decisions made by the Colombian 
Constitutional Court in abstract constitutional review between 1992 and 2006. The information 
was extracted and coded from the text of the decision issued by the Court in each case, which 
includes the facts of the case, the court composition at the time of the decision, as well as the 
majority opinion, the concurring and dissenting opinions, whenever there were such opinions.
134
 
                                                 
134 I had very fruitful discussions with Sebastián Ocampo, Mireya Camacho, and Santiago Arteaga on the 
best ways of coding certain items of the Court‘s decisions. Along with María José Alzate, María Alejandra Baquero, 
Paula Betancourt, Nicolás Castillo, Marta Castro, Natalia Cortina, Pablo Devis, Alejandra Fernández, Natalia 
 123 
A comprehensive set of variables were coded for each case under review by the Court. 
Those variables can be grouped in ten broad categories: 
1. Variables identifying the case according to the nomenclature system used by the Court. 
This nomenclature starts with a letter ‗C‘ which indicates abstract review decisions (as 
opposed to concrete review decisions marked with a ‗T‘, which are not included in this 
dataset). This letter is followed by the number of the decision in chronological order within 
a year. Finally, the nomenclature ends with the year of the decision. In a few cases, the 
number is followed by a letter (e.g. Decision C-089A/1994).  
2. Information on how the case was originated, whether it is a case for automatic review by 
the Court or resulting from a citizen‘s challenge (Public Action of Unconstitutionality, or 
PAU), in which case the name(s) of the challenger(s) is (are) recorded. 
3. Case types allowing the identification of what kind of legislation is being reviewed by the 
court (e.g. ordinary legislation, executive decrees, constitutional amendments, emergency 
decrees, bills approving international treaties, statutory acts, bills calling referenda, 
plebiscites, and constituent assemblies, or presidential vetoes on grounds of 
unconstitutionality).  
4. A series of dates including the date in which the challenged act was originally created, the 
date when it was challenged, as well as the admission and decision dates. 
5. The policy area to which the case is related. 
6. Interventions by the Executive and each of its ministries. 
7. The opinion of the Inspector General – IG (whose opinion is required for each case under 
review) regarding the issue. 
8. Whether amici of the Court —including other government agencies, judicial or legislative 
bodies, the police and the armed forces, or civil society organizations— participated in the 
case and what their opinion was.  
9. Information on the identities of the Chief Justice acting in each case, of the justice to whom 
the opinion-writing was originally assigned, and of the justice who wrote the final opinion. 
                                                                                                                                                             
García, Natalia Guerrero, and Emmanuel Vargas, they provided valuable research assistance in the construction of 
the dataset. I include the Spanish version of codebook for this dataset in Appendix B.  
 124 
10. The decision made by each individual justice and the Court‘s majority. 
 
Of 4,169 cases included in the dataset, for the empirical analysis I employ those cases in 
which either ordinary bills approved by Congress or executive decrees were studied by the court 
between March, 1993 —when the provisional court ended its term and the first Court appointed 
following the standard procedure (described in Chapter 3) started to operate— and August 2006, 
when the first Uribe administration came to an end.
135
 As I explained in Chapter 3, these types of 
cases reach the Court as a result of Public Actions of Unconstitutionality (PAUs) filed by 
citizens. Moreover, ordinary legislation and executive decrees represent those cases in which the 
preferences of the Executive and/or its legislative coalition are more clearly in favor of a 
decision upholding the challenged act. Therefore, this set of cases suits well an empirical test of 
the strategic prudence theory sketched above. 
Such a theory proposes an explanation of judicial decision making based on the interplay 
of factors related to the case under review, individual justices‘ characteristics, and the political 
circumstances under which the case is reviewed by the justices. In other words, the theory 
models individuals acting in the face of specific cases in a given political context. Therefore, the 
court‘s case dataset described above must be further expanded in two ways. First, I transformed 
it into a dataset in which the individual justice is the unit of analysis.
136
 In addition to including 
all the case information described above, I added data related to the justices‘ appointment —
including whether they were appointed by the president, the Supreme Court or the Council of 
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 The timeframe covers the portion of the Gaviria administration after the end of the provisional court‘s 
term (1993-94), as well as the Samper (1994-98), Pastrana (1998-2002), and first Uribe (2002-06) administrations. 
136
 In Rodríguez-Raga (2011) I developed a test of the theory presented in this dissertation using overall 
court decisions as the unit of analysis. That test empirically supports the game-theoretic model‘s predictions. 
 125 
State—, their date of selection and of retirement, as well as their ideological position.137 Second, 
I added information related to the political environment, concretely regarding the political 
strength of the government, at the time the decision was handed down by the court.
138
 
Most studies of individual justice behavior focus on non unanimous decisions. This is 
particularly true for models testing the attitudinal model, that is, models explaining judicial 
decision making on individual justices‘ attitudes and preferences (Segal and Spaeth 2002, 1993; 
Songer and Johnson 2007; Bonneau and Rice 2009). Although some authors point out that even 
unanimous cases may reveal the ideological make up of the court (Baum 1997; Segal and Spaeth 
1989), I conduct the analysis on those cases on which non unanimous decisions were handed 
down by the court, not only because these cases better reflect the impact of individual level 
factors on justices‘ decisions but also because non unanimous decisions are likely to be made on 
the most controversial cases, leaving out trivial matters on which no strategic behavior is 
expected.
139
 The resulting sample includes 561 cases, of which 407 (73%) are ordinary acts and 
154 (27%) are executive decrees, which amount to 4,573 individual justice decisions.
140
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 Later in this chapter I describe the procedure I followed to code each justice‘s ideological position. 
138
 I discuss different measures of the political strength of the government in the following section. 
139
 I report in Appendix D the results of the analysis when all decisions (unanimous and non unanimous) 
are included in the models. These results are substantively identical to the ones shown in this chapter for most 
independent variables. 
140
 The legal matters involved in a case under review may have an impact on the justices themselves (e.g. 
when an act regulating the salaries of the judiciary has been challenged). In these instances, the sitting justices 
abstain from studying the case, which is taken by an ad-hoc court of conjueces (i.e. special judges who are not 
permanently employed by the court but who have been previously selected to step in when necessary). I exclude 
these cases of the sample. I also exclude individual decisions made by substitute justices, that is, those who 
temporarily replace justices who are ill or absent for any other reason (these substitutes typically work as high level 
legal clerks for the absent justices). Finally, I also exclude those observations in which a Justice‘s opinion suggests 
that the Court should either inhibit itself or abstain to make a decision on the merits by referring to a previous 
decision (stare decisis); see Chapter 3 for a description of all the possible abstract review decisions in the 
Colombian Court. 
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5.2 A SIMPLE, STRAIGHTFORWARD EMPIRICAL TEST 
5.2.1 Hypotheses 
The analysis of comparative statics derived from the game theoretical model described in 
Chapter 2 is summarized in Table 2.1, which I reproduce here as Table 5.1.  
 
Table 5.1. Comparative statics of the game 
Equilibrium Increase in A Increase in B Increase in α Increase in  Increase in p 
JS No change GS IBC, GS No change IBC, GS 
IBC No change GS No change JS GS 
GS IBC, JS No change No change JS No change 
 
The table shows how the game equilibria might change as a result of an increase in each 
of its parameters, ceteris paribus. This analysis leads to the following empirically testable 
hypotheses: 
 
H1: The more justices dislike a norm under review (A), the more likely it is that they 
will vote to strike such a norm down. 
H2: The higher the cost paid by justices as a result of government retribution (B), the 
less likely it is that they will vote to strike the norm down.  
H3: The higher the cost paid by the government if the Court strikes down legislation it 
favors (α), the less likely it is that justices will vote to strike the norm down.  
H4: The higher the cost paid by the government for a failed retaliation against the 
Court or a specific justice (β), the more likely it is that justices will vote to strike 
down the norm under review.  
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H5: The stronger the government (p), the less likely it is that justices will vote to strike 
the norm down. 
5.2.2 Operationalization and estimation 
The dependent variable in this analysis is a dummy, UNCONSTITUTIONALITY, coded 1 if the 
Justice does not uphold entirely the piece of legislation, that is, if such Justice makes a decision 
considering the act totally or partially unconstitutional, or if the decision conditions its 
implementation or its enforcement. The variable is coded 0 only if the Justice finds the norm 
constitutional in its entirety and with no conditions. In other words, I model here the probability 
that a Justice decides against the legal norm, and therefore against the Executive, even by merely 
considering small portions of the norm unconstitutional or conditionally constitutional. This 
means that, under this coding scheme, deference only occurs when the Justice votes for leaving 
the norm untouched,
141
 which happens in 35 percent of the observations. 
I operationalize A, the cost for justices if they upholds legislation (H1), by means of a variable 
(DIVERGENCE) coded 1 when the Justice was appointed during an administration prior to the 
incumbent at the moment of the Court‘s decision, and 0 when the Justice was appointed during 
the incumbent administration.
142
 DIVERGENCE measures whether or not the Justice is aligned with 
the currently ruling coalition, including the president. A value of zero for this variable indicates a 
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 Using an alternative coding of 1 when the Justice votes for striking the norm down in its entirety, and 0 
otherwise, does not yield substantively different results, though it would show deference more often.  
142
 An alternative way to measure divergence would be to include a dummy variable coded 1 for Justices 
nominated by the president, and 0 for Justices nominated by the Supreme Court or the Council of State (see the 
description of the appointing procedure in Chapter 3). However, since regardless of the nominating actor all 
appointments are ultimately made by the Senate, the influence of the ruling coalition is arguably strong no matter the 
origin of the three-candidate list. Moreover, Rubiano (2009) has provided qualitative evidence to make the case that 
a politically strong president is often able to impose on the Senate his preferred candidate from each of those three-
candidate lists. 
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lower cost (A) for the Justice to uphold legislation favored by the Executive. In the sample 
analyzed here, 1,120 individual votes were made by justices appointed during the incumbent 
administration (24 percent), while 3,453 votes (76 percent) were handed down by justices 
appointed during a previous administration. 
In order to test H2, it is worth noting that justices are assumed to be both policy-seekers and 
institution-builders and preserving. In other words, justices are not only concerned with the 
outcome of the case under review but also they tend to have in mind the survival and legitimacy 
of the institutional status of the court and/or their own individual professional prestige. These 
motivations conform to Helmke‘s classification of judges into three ideal-typical categories: 
policy-seekers, careerists and professionals (Helmke 2005: 30-34). These distinctions 
notwithstanding, as this author acknowledges, justices pay significant costs whenever they face 
sanctions by the government and their permanence in the court is jeopardized. These costs, 
however, vary according to the discount rates justices hold on their future which, in turn, depend 
on their time horizon, ceteris paribus. I therefore operationalize B by means of a variable, 
JUDICIAL CYCLE, which measures the number of months left before the term of the Justice at the 
time of the decision. This indicator ranges from 0 to 96, with a mean of 55.
143
 Newly appointed 
justices are likely to have a higher concern for the institutional status of the Court than justices 
who are about to step down. Therefore, the former would have to pay a higher cost should the 
                                                 
143
 I always count the number of months left before a Justice‘s legal term ends, even if such Justice actually 
ended up leaving the bench earlier; even if that was the case, it would be impossible to estimate the exact moment 
when she made the decision of stepping down. In a few cases, this measure may therefore overestimate the Justice‘s 
subjective time horizon on which the rationale of this hypothesis is based. 
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Executive attempt retribution as a result of a Court‘s decision. As this variable decreases (i.e. 
when the time left before the end of the Justice‘s term is shorter), so does this cost (B).144 
To test H3, we may think of the policy cost paid by the incumbent administration α as a 
parameter indicating the salience of the case for the government. In general, the government‘s 
stakes are higher when an executive decree is being reviewed by the Court than in the case of 
ordinary legislation. Therefore, I operationalize this game parameter by means of a dummy 
variable coded 1 when the act under review is an EXECUTIVE DECREE, and 0 otherwise. 
I test H4 by operationalizing β through the opinion written by the Inspector General (IG) 
regarding the case under review. As I explained in a previous chapter, the Colombian 
constitution orders that every case under abstract review by the Court must be previously studied 
by the IG, an official in charge of protecting citizen rights and of supervising the behavior of 
public officials.
145
 The IG must write an opinion on the merits of the case stating whether he 
considers that the piece of legislation should be upheld or struck down. Although this opinion is 
not mandatory for the Court, it may act as a signal of the level of support the Court has should it 
decide to oppose the Executive. Variable IG STRIKES DOWN is coded 1 if this opinion suggests 
that the Court should (totally or partially) strike down legislation, and 0 otherwise.
146
  
Finally, in order to test H5 I need an indicator of the Executive‘s political strength (p), that is, 
the ability of the government to gather a coalition to adopt court-curbing measures. Naturally, to 
build such a coalition the president needs enough support in Congress. Measuring legislative 
                                                 
144
 It is worth reminding here the view of one the CCC former justices interviewed (discussed in Chapter 4) 
who explained the boldness of justices in the temporary court of 1992 by the fact that they had been appointed for 
just one year. 
145
 The IG is appointed in a similar way as Court‘s justices (i.e. selected by the Senate out of a list of three 
candidates nominated by the President, the Council of State, and the Supreme Court). 
146
 An alternative specification could have the IG‘s opinion as an indicator of the legal merits of a case, and 
include opinions made by civil society organizations, as amici curiae briefs, favoring the unconstitutionality of the 
act under review as an indicator of parameter . This alternative specification yields substantively similar results, as 
shown in Appendix D. 
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support in Colombia, however, is quite problematic. Since roll call votes are extremely rare in 
the Colombian legislature,
147
 it is not possible to determine how many members of Congress 
actually support Executive-sponsored bills. The use of Executive success in Congress (i.e. the 
rate of bills sponsored by the government that are actually approved) is also problematic since 
this measure may be biased by the strategic behavior of a weak executive who may publicly 
sponsor only those bills for which legislative success is reasonably expectable, avoiding the 
political costs of rejection in Congress (Cárdenas, Junguito, and Pachón 2006; Pachón 2006). 
Using simply the raw size of the government‘s coalition measured as the proportion of 
congressional seats held by members of parties who supported the electoral campaign of the 
president leaves us with an indicator with little variation in time (in fact, it would remain 
constant for the entire presidential term) and, thus, with little empirical usefulness to test my 
hypotheses. 
An alternative measure of the level of legislative support enjoyed by the president can be 
estimated by looking at the behavior of members of Congress at the initial session of each 
legislative year. During this session, held on July 20
th
 of each year, votes are taken to select 
chairs of each committee and presidents of both the Upper and Lower Houses. A proxy of the 
Executive‘s legislative support could be the percentage of lawmakers supporting the candidates 
for these positions who are also supported by the administration. This measure, however, 
presents at least two potential problems. On the one hand, although it varies more than indicators 
based on electoral data, it remains constant for each year; for the timeframe analyzed here, this 
variable would be measured only fourteen times. On the other hand, these figures may reflect 
specific agreements among parties to select the holders of these congressional posts, where 
                                                 
147
 Recent reforms to the way Congress operates have made roll-call votes a much more frequent practice in 
Colombia. 
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logrolling is a common practice, and may not be reliable measure of the actual level of 
legislative support that the Executive will enjoy during a particular legislative year. 
An alternative operational strategy is the use of presidential public approval rates as a proxy 
for the political strength of the government. Given the typically dominant position of executives 
in Latin America, popular presidents tend also to have strong legislative support. This is both 
because voting preferences are likely reflected in electoral results in both presidential and 
legislative elections and, more importantly, because, especially in countries where party 
discipline is poor and party boundaries are fluid, legislative behavior may be strongly influenced 
by the incentive to support a popular administration. In other words, legislators know that 
opposing a president with high levels of public approval may be electorally costly.
148
 Such a 
president, therefore, is in a strong position to get his initiatives passed in Congress, particularly 
those aimed at curbing the Court.  
In the empirical analysis included below, I specify alternate models using both presidential 
approval rates and the executive‘s legislative support as proxies of the government‘s strength. To 
measure presidential approval, on the one hand, I use Gallup polls conducted periodically from 
1992 to 2006 (Gallup 2009). For each individual Justice decision, I record the level of 
PRESIDENTIAL APPROVAL at the time that decision was made. This variable ranges from 17 to 78, 
with a mean of 46.3. To measure legislative support, on the other hand, I use the proportion of 
members of the Lower House who supported candidates for the legislature‘s chairpersonships 
who were favored by the president (obtained from Saavedra 2006). This variable ranges from 
0.31 to 0.97, with a mean of 0.62. 
                                                 
148
 The high levels of approval enjoyed by president Uribe explain at least in part the collapse of the Liberal 
party, once the most powerful one in Colombia. In fact, when liberal leaders stated the party‘s official opposition to 
the administration, many of its legislators defected and created or joined new political movements that supported 
Uribe in Congress. 
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Given the operationalization of the parameters, the hypotheses above can be reformulated as 
follows: 
 
H1: A Justice who was appointed during an administration prior to the incumbent 
(DIVERGENCE=1) is more likely to vote for the unconstitutionality of the 
challenged statute than a Justice appointed by the current ruling coalition.  
H2: The longer the time left before the end of the justice‘ term (the larger JUDICIAL 
CYCLE), the less likely it is that the Justice will vote to strike the statute down. 
H3: It is less likely that a Justice votes to overturn the statute when the case is more 
salient for the government (EXECUTIVE DECREE=1) than when it is less salient 
(EXECUTIVE DECREE=0).  
H4: It is more likely that a Justice votes to strike down the statute when the Inspector 
General recommends so (IG STRIKES DOWN=1) than when he does not (IG STRIKES 
DOWN=0). 
H5: The higher the level of government‘s strength (eiher PRESIDENTIAL APPROVAL or 
SUPPORT IN THE LOWER HOUSE) the less likely it is that a Justice will vote to 
overturn the statute. 
 
In addition to modeling the empirical implications of the game, I also include variables to test 
two alternative hypotheses. First, perhaps the most successful account of judicial decision 
making, especially in the case of the United States Supreme Court, is the so called attitudinal 
model (Segal and Spaeth 2002, 1993). This model sustains that judges decide based on their 
personal attitudes and policy preferences. In order to test this hypothesis, I use Justices‘ scores 
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on a left-right ideology scale, according to an expert survey I conducted between April and July, 
2009. I assume that presidents are usually to the right of the Court (García-Villegas 2009). 
Therefore, I expect this variable to negatively impact the likelihood of a decision striking down 
legislation. In other words, a more rightist Justice should be more deferent to the government 
than a left-leaning one. In a later section of this chapter, I will discuss in more detail the method I 
used to measure ideology for Justices in the Colombian Constitutional Court, the findings 
regarding the impact of ideology on judicial behavior, and the implications of those findings. 
Second, Helmke (2005) has proposed a theory of strategic defection which she has tested on 
the Argentine Supreme Court. In broad terms, this theory posits that justices who usually defer to 
the government may start to strike down legislation at the end of a presidential term when they 
perceive that the outgoing administration is losing popular support. In order to empirically 
address this hypothesis here, I include a variable, ELECTORAL CYCLE, measured as the number of 
months left before the end of the presidential term. In general, this variable ranges from 0 to 47. 
However, in October, 2005, the Court upheld a constitutional amendment, promoted by the 
Uribe administration, allowing the incumbent to run for reelection.
149
 Therefore, I added 48 more 
months to this indicator for decisions made after that moment to reflect the updated temporal 
horizon faced by justices. In other words, once the reelection amendment was approved and 
found constitutional by the Court, justices knew that they would have to coexist with president 
Uribe for four additional years and therefore they had to update their expectations.
150
 
I include in the model two control dummy variables to indicate whether the justice was 
nominated by the SUPREME COURT or by the COUNCIL OF STATE (coded 1 in either case). A value 
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 The 1991 Constitution had explicitly forbidden presidential reelection. 
150
 The president‘s approval rate at the time made it clear to everyone that, once approved and upheld by 
the Court, the amendment would mean an electoral victory and a second term for Uribe. 
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of 0 for both dummies means that the justice was nominated by the president (either during the 
incumbent or a previous administration). 
Finally, in order to control for unobserved, idiosyncratic features of each of the four 
administrations covered by the analysis, other than their level of strength (public approval or 
legislative support), I include alternate models with dummies for each administration (GAVIRIA, 
SAMPER, and PASTRANA, leaving the first URIBE administration as the base category). This 
specification helps improving my ability to reach general findings despite the fact that there are 
few presidential terms. 
Table 5.2 shows the results of logistic models on justices‘ decisions to overturn 
legislation. Given that the dataset contains multiple decisions made by 20 justices on a set of 
cases, observations are not independent from each other. If the estimation does not take this data 
structure into account, it is possible to obtain downwardly biased standard errors and, therefore 
inflated statistical significance (Zorn 2006). Therefore, I cluster observations on justice to 
estimate robust standard errors. 
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Table 5.2. Determinants of a Justice’s decision of unconstitutionality 
Dependent variable:  
Justice decision of 
UNCONSTITUTIONALITY 
Strength as  
PRESIDENTIAL APPROVAL 
Strength as  
SUPPORT IN THE LOWER HOUSE 
 
Coefficient 
(Robust  
std. err) 
Coefficient 
(Robust  
std. err) 
Coefficient 
(Robust  
std. err) 
Coefficient 
(Robust  
std. err) 
PRESIDENTIAL STRENGTH -0.010 ** -0.018 *** -1.112 *** -1.674 *** 
 
(0.003)  (0.005)  (0.286)  (0.344)  
DIVERGENCE 0.579 *** 0.519 ‡ 0.592 *** 0.362 ** 
 
(0.174)  (0.305)  (0.156)  (0.174)  
JUDICIAL CYCLE 0.004  0.004  0.000  -0.002  
 
(0.004)  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.003)  
EXECUTIVE DECREE -0.213 *** -0.201 *** -0.150 *** -0.120 ** 
 
(0.039)  (0.040)  (0.045)  (0.046)  
IG STRIKES DOWN 0.380 *** 0.381 *** 0.358 *** 0.377 *** 
 
(0.068)  (0.069)  (0.070)  (0.069)  
IDEOLOGY -0.128 *** -0.132 *** -0.125 *** -0.133 *** 
 
(0.031)  (0.030)  (0.033)  (0.030)  
ELECTORAL CYCLE -0.009 *** -0.007 ** -0.010 *** -0.011 *** 
 
(0.003)  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.003)  
NOM. BY SUPREME COURT -0.024  -0.019  -0.037  -0.019  
 
(0.105)  (0.111)  (0.102)  (0.111)  
NOM. BY COUNCIL OF STATE 0.182 ‡ 0.183 ‡ 0.176  0.178 ‡ 
 
(0.109)  (0.104)  (0.116)  (0.102)  
GAVIRIA   -0.260    -0.590 ** 
 
  (0.257)    (0.181)  
SAMPER   -0.305 ‡   -0.242 ‡ 
 
  (0.184)    (0.139)  
PASTRANA   -0.484 *   -0.403 ** 
 
  (0.219)    (0.145)  
Constant 1.279 *** 1.955 *** 1.699 *** 2.618 *** 
 
(0.290)  (0.533)  (0.279)  (0.400)  
Observations 4,397  4,397  4,573  4,573  
Percent correct 65.89%  65.66%  65.71%  65.80%  
Wald Chi-2 536.98 *** 736.57 *** 308.90 *** 648.01 *** 
Observations clustered on Justice   
 
     
Robust standard errors in parentheses         
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ‡ p<0.1        
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5.2.3 Discussion 
Before engaging in the discussion of the findings related to each hypothesis, it is worth noting 
that these findings are robust to different model specifications. On the one hand, the use of 
alternative measures of presidential strength, namely, presidential approval rates and 
government‘s legislative support in the Lower House, yields practically identical results. 
Moreover, on the other hand, the inclusion of dummies for each administration leaves virtually 
unchanged the significance of the estimates. In other words, although the empirical analysis 
conducted here covers only four administrations and therefore the generality of the conclusions 
derived from it must be asserted with caution, the substantive findings related to each hypothesis 
do not seem to be the result of the particular presidents analyzed here.  
Regarding hypothesis H1, the models show a significant impact of the timing of justices‘ 
appointments on their decision making. Justices appointed during a previous presidential term 
are more likely to strike down a statute than justices who were sworn in during the incumbent 
administration. The substantive meanings of coefficients in a logistic regression model are better 
understood by means of graphical representations.
151
 Figure 5.1 shows the predicted probabilities 
of unconstitutionality, along with their 95% confidence intervals,
152
 for the cases when the 
Justice was appointed either by the incumbent administration or by a previous one.
153
  
                                                 
151
 Unless noted otherwise, the substantive and graphical analyses that follow correspond to the model 
specification with presidential approval as the measure of government‘s strength, without dummies for individual 
administrations. 
152
 The dark grey area represents the 95% confidence interval around the point estimate. 
153
 In all post-estimation analyses presented in this chapter I coded in Stata 11 the computation of predicted 
probabilities using the predictnl command for the expression of the logistic function: 
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Figure 5.1. Predicted probability of unconstitutionality for Justices appointed  
during either the incumbent or a previous administration 
 
While the estimated probability of a decision supporting the unconstitutionality of the 
norm is .53 when the Justice was appointed during the current administration, this probability 
rises to .67 when the Justice nomination was made during a previous presidential term. It is 
apparent from the models‘ results that the level of alignment between the ruling coalition and a 
Justice has a significant impact on the decision regarding the constitutionality of a statute that 
has been challenged in Court.  
The analysis does not provide empirical support for H2. Not only the sign of the 
coefficient is the opposite to what the theory predicts but also the ratio of the coefficient to its 
                                                                                                                                                             
predictnl also computes standard errors of the estimates along with 95% confidence intervals‘ lower and 
upper boundaries. In all cases, the predictions are made for different values of the variable being discussed, with the 
remaining variables fixed at their modal/central values, as indicated in the graphs‘ legends.  
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standard error is not large enough to allow us to conclude that the effect of the time left before a 
Justice‘s term ends on the probability of a decision for the unconstitutionality of the statute is 
significantly different from zero. 
In contrast, the statistical models provide empirical evidence to support H3. As Figure 5.2 
shows, the predicted probability that a Justice makes a decision for the unconstitutionality is 
lower when the reviewed statute is an executive decree (.62) than in the case of ordinary 
legislation (.67). This difference is small but statistically significant. Ceteris paribus, a Justice 
tends to be more deferent regarding pieces of legislation that are more salient for the Executive 
than when the norm under review is an ordinary act approved by Congress.  
 
 
Figure 5.2. Predicted probabilities of unconstitutionality for ordinary legislation and executive decrees 
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Figure 5.3. Predicted probabilities of unconstitutionality when the IG suggests  
either to uphold or strike down the statute 
 
H4 also receives strong support from the statistical models estimated above. Justices are 
significantly more likely to decide for the unconstitutionality of the reviewed statute when the 
Inspector General (IG) suggests doing so (.74) than when the IG‘s opinion purports that the 
statute should be upheld (.67), as shown in Figure 5.3. The IG‘s opinion seems to be a strong 
signal for justices regarding the support that the latter would enjoy should they opt for striking 
down the statute.  
The statistical models provide even further evidence supporting the strategic account of 
judicial behavior in Colombia. All other things being equal, Justices tend to be more deferent 
towards stronger presidents. In fact, justices are more likely to strike down legislation when the 
president enjoys lower levels of approval than when they face a popular administration, as shown 
in Figure 5.4.  
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Figure 5.4. Predicted probability of unconstitutionality for different values of presidential approval 
 
For a president with 20 points of approval, for instance, the estimated probability of 
unconstitutionality is .72. This probability drops to .60 for a popular president with 75 points of 
approval. Around the mean approval, the probability of unconstitutionality is .67. In sum, 
stronger presidents face significantly more deferent justices. 
Using the alternate measure of government‘s strength, that is, its share of legislative 
support in the Lower House, shows the same pattern, as shown in Figure 5.5. For instance, the 
probability of a decision of unconstitutionality when the Lower House seat share is 40% is 
predicted to be .72, while when the government‘s legislative support reaches 80% this 
probability drops to .62.  
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Figure 5.5. Predicted probability of unconstitutionality  
for different values of the Executive‘s legislative support in the Lower House 
 
In sum, the empirical evidence presented here, which refers to abstract review cases, 
shows a Court that strategically defers to the Executive depending on the costs for the players 
associated with both giving up policy and clashing with each other. The discussion on strategic 
prudence and the findings presented here may run counter the view, common in the literature, of 
the Colombian Constitutional Court as a highly independent tribunal. This popular view, 
however, results from the study of specific highly salient cases in which the Court made 
decisions enforcing citizen rights, not from a systematic analysis of all cases reviewed by the 
Court. Moreover, these instances are typically concrete review cases (tutelas). Overall, from a 
comparative perspective the Colombian Constitutional Court has earned a well-deserved 
reputation for its autonomy. In fact, unlike other countries where the puzzle lies in why a weak 
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court chooses to act independently (e.g. the Argentine Supreme Court; see Helmke 2005), in 
Colombia the Court is expected to exhibit an autonomous behavior. A closer look, however, also 
shows that this autonomy is somehow constrained by political factors of which justices seem 
well aware. 
The empirical models specified and tested here assess a first glance at the empirical 
implications of the game-theoretical model regarding the strategic nature of the interaction of the 
Court with the Executive in the Colombian case. Their findings provide partial support to a 
Separation-of-Powers account of the Court‘s anticipation of other political actors‘ reactions to its 
decisions –particularly by the Executive branch– and its resulting strategic behavior. In the 
following section I will show how the comparative statics analysis emanated from the theoretical 
model can derive more nuanced hypotheses regarding the interplay of the different parameters of 
the game. A final section in this chapter will discuss the impact of justices‘ personal preferences 
on their voting behavior in abstract review cases in order to assess the empirical performance of 
the attitudinal model (Segal and Spaeth 2002, 1993). 
5.3 A MORE COMPREHENSIVE EMPIRICAL TEST 
5.3.1 A new, slightly different set of hypotheses 
The previous section provided a first test of the strategic prudence theory based on a ―simple‖ 
derivation of hypotheses from the comparative statics analysis summarized in Table 5.1. 
However, a closer look at the expected changes in the equilibrium regimes resulting from 
 143 
changes in the parameters of the game may lead to more nuanced and comprehensive hypotheses 
to be empirically tested. 
 This insight results from a closer look at the comparative statics of the game, shown in 
Table 5.1. In fact, the impact of increases in the four game parameters related to costs for the 
players, namely, A, B, , and , on the likelihood of the game switching from one regime to the 
next seemingly depend on which regime the game is in the first place, which in turn depends on 
the level of presidential strength (i.e. parameter p), as depicted in Figure 2.2. In other words, 
there might be the case that the strength of the president is a factor conditioning the way the 
players‘ behavior is influenced by the costs associated with their giving up policy and clashing 
with each other. This more nuanced analysis leads to the following hypotheses, which are a 
reformulation of the first four hypotheses stated in the previous section: 
H1: The more a Justice dislikes a norm under review (A), the more likely it is that 
such Justice will vote to strike such a norm down. This effect should be larger 
for higher levels presidential political strength (p). 
H2: The higher the cost paid by a Justice for government retribution (B), the less likely 
it is that such Justice will vote to strike the norm down. This effect should be 
larger for lower levels of presidential political strength (p). 
H3: The higher the cost paid by the government if the Court strikes down legislation it 
favors (α), the less likely it is that a Justice will vote to strike the norm down. This 
effect should be larger for lower levels of presidential political strength (p). 
H4: The higher the cost paid by the government for a failed retaliation against the 
Court (β), the more likely it is that a Justice will vote to strike down the norm 
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under review. This effect should be larger for higher levels of presidential political 
strength (p). 
Following the same operationalization strategy described in the previous section, these 
hypotheses lead to the following operational hypotheses: 
H1: A Justice who was appointed during an administration prior to the incumbent 
(DIVERGENCE=1) is more likely to vote for the unconstitutionality of the 
challenged statute than a Justice appointed by the current ruling coalition, 
especially when the government‘s strength (PRESIDENTIAL APPROVAL or SUPPORT 
IN THE LOWER HOUSE) is higher.  
H2: The longer the time left before the end of the justice‘ term (the larger JUDICIAL 
CYCLE), the less likely it is that the Justice will vote to strike the statute down, 
especially when the government is weaker (i.e. when PRESIDENTIAL APPROVAL or 
SUPPORT IN THE LOWER HOUSE are lower). 
H3: It is less likely that a Justice votes to overturn the statute when the case is more 
salient for the government (EXECUTIVE DECREE=1) than when it is less salient 
(EXECUTIVE DECREE=0), especially when PRESIDENTIAL APPROVAL or SUPPORT IN 
THE LOWER HOUSE are lower.  
H4: It is more likely that a Justice votes to strike down the statute when the Inspector 
General recommends so (IG STRIKES DOWN=1) than when he does not (IG STRIKES 
DOWN=0), especially when the government is stronger (i.e. when PRESIDENTIAL 
APPROVAL or SUPPORT IN THE LOWER HOUSE are higher). 
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5.3.2 Estimation and discussion 
These hypotheses call for model specifications which include interactive terms in order to 
account for the conditional effects described above. The results of these models are shown in 
Table 5.3. A first glance at the coefficients and their signs suggests that most hypotheses in their 
interactive form seem to receive strong empirical support. Not only there is evidence of strategic 
behavior by the CCC justices but also the impact of the four parameters of the game A, B, , and 
, seems to be conditional to the executive‘s strength (p). These findings are rather robust to the 
different specifications incorporated in the analysis, including both measures of presidential 
strength (presidential approval and seat chare in the Lower House). Again, the strategic judicial 
behavior and the interactive pattern unveiled in the analysis do not seem to be the result of 
particular features of the presidential terms included in the analysis, as shown in the models 
including dummies for each administration. 
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Table 5.3. Determinants of a Justice‘s decision of unconstitutionality (interactive models) 
 
  
Dependent variable:  
Justice decision of 
UNCONSTITUTIONALITY 
Strength as  
PRESIDENTIAL APPROVAL 
Strength as  
SUPPORT IN THE LOWER HOUSE 
 
Coefficient 
(Robust  
std. err) 
Coefficient 
(Robust  
std. err) 
Coefficient 
(Robust  
std. err) 
Coefficient 
(Robust  
std. err) 
PRESIDENTIAL STRENGTH -0.065 *** -0.095 *** -5.248 *** -6.798 *** 
 
(0.011)  (0.018)  (1.024)  (1.331)  
DIVERGENCE -0.719 ** -1.374 *** -0.500  -1.032 * 
 
(0.228)  (0.308)  (0.425)  (0.507)  
DIVERGENCE X 0.028 *** 0.039 *** 1.693 ** 1.943 * 
PRES. STRENGTH (0.004)  (0.006)  (0.611)  (0.803)  
JUDICIAL CYCLE -0.021 *** -0.028 ** -0.025 ** -0.036 *** 
 
(0.006)  (0.008)  (0.009)  (0.010)  
JUDICIAL CYCLE X 0.001 *** 0.001 *** 0.042 *** 0.053 *** 
PRES. STRENGTH (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.012)  (0.013)  
EXECUTIVE DECREE -0.338 *** -0.322 ** -0.532 *** -0.504 *** 
 
(0.101)  (0.104)  (0.138)  (0.134)  
EXECUTIVE DECREE X 0.003 ‡ 0.003 ‡ 0.617 ** 0.614 *** 
PRES. STRENGTH (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.193)  (0.186)  
IG STRIKES DOWN -0.408 *** -0.383 *** -0.651 *** -0.606 *** 
 
(0.106)  (0.104)  (0.114)  (0.115)  
IG STRIKES DOWN X 0.016 *** 0.016 *** 1.579 *** 1.533 *** 
PRES. STRENGTH (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.184)  (0.187)  
IDEOLOGY -0.148 *** -0.161 *** -0.136 *** -0.148 *** 
 
(0.026)  (0.025)  (0.031)  (0.027)  
ELECTORAL CYCLE -0.010 ** -0.005 * -0.009 * -0.008 * 
 
(0.003)  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.003)  
NOM. BY SUPREME COURT 0.032  0.068  -0.006  0.027  
 
(0.109)  (0.124)  (0.097)  (0.107)  
NOM. BY COUNCIL OF STATE 0.157  0.163 ‡ 0.151  0.142  
 
(0.102)  (0.098)  (0.114)  (0.100)  
GAVIRIA   -0.212    -0.688 *** 
 
  (0.224)    (0.192)  
SAMPER   -0.411 *   -0.282 ‡ 
 
  (0.185)    (0.149)  
PASTRANA   -0.891 ***   -0.596 *** 
 
  (0.232)    (0.165)  
Constant 3.874 *** 5.784 *** 4.288 *** 6.094 *** 
 
(0.522)  (0.911)  (0.721)  (0.953)  
Observations 4,397  4,397  4,573  4,573  
Percent correct 66.25%  66.70%  66.21%  65.78%  
Wald Chi-2 458.30 *** 1716.90 *** 280.25 *** 506.77 *** 
Observations clustered on Justice;    
 
     
Robust standard errors in parentheses  
 
     
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ‡ p<0.1  
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Examining only the coefficients in models with interactive terms, however, can hardly 
suffice to assess the effects of the different factors, especially on a binary dependent variable. In 
other words, it is not accurate to reach valid conclusions based solely on the magnitudes and 
significances of the individual coefficients and of the multiplicative terms. It is necessary to 
conduct a more careful analysis of the marginal effects on the dependent variable of the factors 
of interest depending on the values of the conditioning variable (Ai and Norton 2003; Berry and 
Rubin 2007; Brambor, Clark, and Golder 2006; Kam and Franzese 2007; Mitchell and Chen 
2005; Norton, Wang, and Ai 2004). The discussion that follows takes into account this detailed 
analytical strategy to assess the hypotheses‘ empirical support.154 
The interactive nature of H1 in its new formulation is apparent in Figure 5.6, which shows 
the marginal effect (and its 95% confidence interval) of DIVERGENCE on the dependent variable 
for different values of presidential approval. As shown in Figure 5.7, the probability of 
unconstitutionality is lower for a Justice appointed during the incumbent administration than for 
one appointed during a previous term, but only at sufficiently high levels of presidential 
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 Technically, if in the logistic model with an interaction we have that 
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I coded the syntax to compute this expression and the predicted probabilities for the various interactions in 
the model and then graphed their shape in Stata 11 to present my results here. (The Stata code is available upon 
request.) These graphs correspond to the models using presidential approval as the measure of government‘s 
strength without administration dummies. 
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approval. The alignment of a Justice with the ruling coalition only makes a difference on judicial 
behavior when a strong administration leads such a coalition. 
 
 
Figure 5.6. Marginal effect of divergence on the probability of unconstitutionality,  
for various levels of presidential approval 
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Figure 5.7. Predicted probabilities of unconstitutionality for Justices appointed during either the incumbent or a 
previous administration, at different levels of presidential approval 
 
The analysis in the previous section found no empirical support for H2. Its new 
formulation, including an interaction between judicial cycle and presidential approval, shows a 
different, richer picture. The hypothesis predicts that, ceteris paribus, justices at the beginning of 
their tenure should be less likely to decide for the unconstitutionality than justices about to finish 
their terms, but only for administrations enjoying lower levels of strength.  
Figure 5.8 shows that this expectation is partially warranted. It also shows, however, that 
justices with a long time left before the end of their tenure is significantly less deferent to 
popular administrations. The statistical models, in fact, estimate that the likelihood that justices 
finishing their time in office make a decision of unconstitutionality sharply declines with the 
Executive‘s approval, while such a probability remains stable in the case of justices starting their 
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tenures, as shown in Figure 5.9 (what seems a slight increase is not significant for the range of 
approval).  
 
 
Figure 5.8. Marginal effect of the judicial cycle on the probability of unconstitutionality  
for different values of presidential approval 
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Figure 5.9. Predicted probabilities of unconstitutionality for justices starting and ending their tenures,  
at different values of presidential approval 
 
 
As for H3, the analysis of the interactive effect shows that the fact that the norm under 
review is an executive decree, as a signal of the level of salience of the case for the 
administration, is an effective deterrent for court justices, though this effect declines as the 
government get stronger, as shown in Figure 5.10. Moreover, the effect of the type of legislation 
is small in magnitude, as is apparent in Figure 5.11. Perhaps using a finer measure of case 
salience, such as an analysis of the briefs filed by government officials and agencies for each 
case, could provide stronger support for H3. This analysis, however, goes beyond the scope of 
this dissertation. 
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Figure 5.10. Marginal effect of executive decree on the probability of unconstitutionality  
for different values of presidential approval 
 
 
Figure 5.11. Predicted probabilities of unconstitutionality for ordinary legislation and executive decrees  
at different values of presidential approval 
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Figure 5.12. Marginal effect of a strike down opinion by the IG on the probability of unconstitutionality,  
for different values of presidential approval 
 
 
Figure 5.13. Predicted probabilities of unconstitutionality for an IG opinion of either 
uphold or strike down the statute, at different values of presidential approval 
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Finally, the effect of the IG‘s support for a decision of unconstitutionality is also 
mediated by the government‘s strength, as stated in the interactive formulation of H4. Figure 5.12 
shows that this effect is only significant, and positive, beyond a certain level of presidential 
approval, as purported by the hypothesis. For weak administrations, the likelihood of a decision 
of unconstitutionality is high, regardless of the IG‘s opinion. This probability declines when a 
Justice faces a popular president and the IG suggests upholding the statute under review (see 
Error! Reference source not found.). An IG‘s opinion that favors striking down the statute 
counteracts the effect of the Executive‘s strength on the probability of a Justice making a 
decision of unconstitutionality. 
The analysis developed in this section highlights the importance of conducting a careful 
derivation of hypotheses from the theoretical model‘s analysis of comparative statics (Carrubba, 
Yuen, and Zorn 2007). In this case, such an analysis uncovers the interactive nature of the impact 
of the game‘s parameter on the phenomenon under study. This leads to stating multiplicative 
terms to be included in the estimation of a statistical model which provides a more accurate test 
of the theoretical model presented in Chapter 2.
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In any case, whether or not the specification contains interactions, the data on individual 
justices‘ decisions provide strong empirical support for the theory of strategic prudence in the 
case of the Colombian Constitutional Court. These findings suggest that, when facing a decision 
on abstract review of legislation, justices take into account the political context in which they 
must make such decisions and their personal situations within that context.  
Before turning to the next section in which I assess the findings regarding the attitudinal 
model (Segal and Spaeth 2002, 1993), it is worth mentioning that the president‘s electoral cycle 
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 In general, the comparative statics analyses derived from game-theoretical models of this type (e.g. 
Vanberg 2005) should be empirically tested using interactive specifications such as the one presented in this section. 
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also plays a role in explaining justices‘ behavior. As shown in Table 5.3, the coefficient for the 
time left before the end of the incumbent‘s term is significant.156 Table 5.4, in turn, shows the 
predicted probabilities that a justice will decide against the statute for different values of the 
president‘s time left in office (when all other variables are at their modal values). Although this 
is a rough test of the strategic defection theory advanced by Helmke (2002, 2005), these results 
show that, ceteris paribus, justices tend to defer more often to Executives who have a long time 
ahead than to presidents reaching the end of their tenures. 
 
 
Table 5.4. Predicted probabilities of unconstitutionality  
for different values of the time left before the president's term ends 
Months to end 
president’s term 
Predicted 
probability of 
unconstitutionality 
95%  
confidence 
interval 
54 .573 [.512 .635] 
48 .588 [. 534 .641] 
42 .602 [.555 .648] 
36 .619 [.575 .657] 
30 .630 [.592 .667] 
24 .643 [.607 .679] 
18 .657 [.620 .693] 
12 .670 [.630 .709] 
6 .683 [.639 .726] 
0 .695 [.647 .744] 
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 This finding is robust to different model specifications, as shown in Appendix D. 
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5.4 TESTING THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL IN THE COLOMBIAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 
The attitudinal model has been advanced by scholars studying mainly the United States Supreme 
Court (Segal and Spaeth 2002, 1993).
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 This model purports that Justices make their decisions 
based on their own attitudes and preferences. More specifically, these attitudes interact with the 
facts of a case to produce a decision on the merits. Although some scholars have suggested a 
strategic account of US Supreme Court justices‘ decision making, the attitudinal model is 
perhaps the most successful explanatory approach to the US Supreme Court case. 
As the model‘s promoters acknowledge, this approach does not necessarily travel well to 
other cases, either to lower levels courts in the United States or to high courts in other countries 
(Segal and Spaeth 2002). The reason lies in the variation in the institutional setting within those 
cases. US Supreme Court justices are able to make decisions based mainly on their own 
preferences (i.e. they are able to act sincerely) because of the insulation provided by institutional 
features such as life tenure. In contexts in which justices are more institutionally exposed to 
external pressures, it is expectable to observe strategic behavior. 
Of course, this does not mean that in cases where courts lack the institutional insulation 
enjoyed by the US Supreme Court individual preferences are irrelevant. As one former justice I 
interviewed put it, ―it cannot be denied that the philosophical positions and political conceptions 
of judges impact their decisions.‖ (J4). Moreover, as I showed in the empirical models of 
behavior of justices in the Colombian Constitutional Court, summarized in Table 5.2 and Table 
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 Some tests of the attitudinal model in countries other than the U.S. include Songer and Johnson (2007) 
for Canada, and Basabe (2008) for Ecuador. 
 157 
5.3, and will discussed further in this section, justices‘ ideological positions have a robust impact 
on their decisions regarding cases of abstract constitutional review. 
Coming up with an independent measure of political attitudes for justices is not an easy 
task. As has been pointed out, using justices‘ votes to estimate their preferences would lead to 
circularity in the determination of causes and effects since one would be predicting judicial 
behavior by means of attitudes inferred by the very same judicial behavior. Using past votes to 
derive preferences used in turn to predict future votes would only assess judicial consistency, not 
the impact of judicial attitudes on judicial behavior; to the extent that past votes may be in part 
determined by strategic behavior, it is impossible to discern the effect of preferences on votes 
(Segal and Spaeth 2002). 
This task is harder in the case of the Colombian Constitutional Court. Replicating the 
measurement strategy used in the case of US Supreme Court justices (Segal and Cover 1989) is 
unfeasible since there is no systematic record of journalistic reviews for candidates to the bench. 
An attempt to derive justices‘ ideologies from the preferences of their nominators (the president, 
the Supreme Court, and the Council of State) or their appointers (the Senate) only begs the 
question of trying to estimate these actors‘ preferences in the first place. 
Given this difficulties, and following the idea developed in Basabe (2008), I decided to 
survey experts on the court. More concretely, I devised a sample of public law professors at 
universities around the country, as well as former and current court clerks, and conducted an e-
mail survey on this sample. Although justices‘ political preferences have probably more than one 
dimension, as was pointed out by more than one of the respondents, for the sake of simplicity the 
questionnaire contained a single question for each justice. I simply asked respondents to provide 
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an ideological score (on a left-right 1-to-10 scale) for each of the justices that have been sworn in 
from 1992 to 2006.  
Two caveats should be made regarding this measure of ideology. First, constraining 
judicial ideology to a one-dimensional scale certainly obscures richer descriptions of justices‘ 
preferences which may vary along two or more dimensions. For instance, a justice such as José 
G. Hernández (1993-2001) was said to lean to the left in socioeconomic matters, thus supporting 
an active role of the state in the economy and favoring court decisions aimed at protecting social 
and economic rights, but he was more conservative regarding ―moral‖ issues related to civil 
liberties such as abortion and euthanasia. The survey could have addressed more than one 
attitude dimension, but I decided to keep it simple in order to increase the response rate. Second, 
it is possible that survey respondents may not provide a measure of justices‘ ideological position 
that is entirely independent from the justices‘ behavior. In other words, respondents‘ perceptions 
of justices‘ attitudes and preferences may result from their knowledge of them prior to their 
appointments, in combination with their assessments of their behavior in court. Unfortunately, as 
was previously discussed, there is no other reliable source for Colombian Constitutional Court 
justices‘ ideological position such as the analysis of newspapers editorials used for the U.S. 
Supreme Court (Segal and Cover 1989). In fact, mine is, to my knowledge, the first attempt at 
systematically recording Constitutional Court attitudes. 
The online survey obtained responses from 43 experts. For each justice‘s IDEOLOGY I 
recorded the mean response in the survey.
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 Figure 5.14 shows the ideological scores for all 
twenty justices included in the sample, along with 95% confidence intervals.. 
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 I include the survey questionnaire in Appendix C. 
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Figure 5.14. Ideological scores for Justices in the Colombian Constitutional Court, 1993-2006
159
 
                                                 
159
 The Justices‘ initials have, from left to right, the following meanings: CGD: Carlos Gaviria Díaz; JAR: 
Jaime Araújo Rentería; AMC: Alejandro Martínez Caballero; ABS: Alfredo Beltrán Sierra; ECM: Eduardo 
Cifuentes Muñoz; JCT: Jaime Córdoba Triviño; MJC: Manuel José Cepeda; FMD: Fabio Morón Díaz; HSP: 
Humberto Sierra Porto; CIV: Clara Inés Vargas; ABC: Antonio Barrera Carbonell; LEM: Luis Eduardo Montealegre 
Lynett; JAM: Jorge Arango Mejía; JGH: José Gregorio Hernández; HHV: Hernando Herrera Vergara; ATG: Álvaro 
Tafur Galvis; REG: Rodrigo Escobar Gil; NPP: Nilson Pinilla Pinilla; VNM: Vladimiro Naranjo Mejía; MGM: 
Marco Gerardo Monroy Cabra. 
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Justices‘ ideology turned out to be a robust predictor of their behavior, not only in the 
models shown in previous sections of this chapter but also in other alternative specifications 
(shown in Appendix D). Based on the model discussed in the previous section (i.e. the model 
including multiplicative terms), Figure 5.15 shows the predicted probabilities of a decision for 
the unconstitutionality of the statute for the range of justices‘ ideological positions. The shape of 
the graph clearly suggests that justices on the right are more likely to uphold legislation than left-
leaning justices.  
 
 
Figure 5.15. Predicted probabilities of unconstitutionality for different values of justices' ideology 
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Moreover, Error! Reference source not found. shows the ideological score, the 
predicted probability of unconstitutionality, and the actual rate of decisions striking down the 
statute under review, for each justice in the sample. Although in a few cases the model‘s 
predictions deviates somewhat from the actual behavior (especially in the case of Justice J. G. 
Hernández, for whom the deference rate is overestimated in the statistical model, and in the case 
of Justice H. Sierra Porto, for whom the opposite occurs), justices ideological positions, as 
perceived by experts on the Court, tend to predict well their decisions on abstract review 
cases.
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Table 5.5. Predicted probabilities and actual rates of unconstitutionality decisions  
according to justices' ideological scores 
Initials Name Ideology Predicted Actual 
CGD Carlos Gaviria Díaz 2.186 .75 .78 
JAR Jaime Araújo Rentería 3.256 .72 .78 
AMC Alejandro Martínez Caballero 3.262 .72 .76 
ABS Alfredo Beltrán Sierra 3.619 .71 .67 
ECM Eduardo Cifuentes Muñoz 4.762 .67 .69 
JCT Jaime Córboba Triviño 4.976 .66 .64 
MJC Manuel José Cepeda 5.488 .65 .58 
FMD Fabio Morón Díaz 5.691 .64 .67 
HSP Humberto Sierra Porto 5.762 .64 .51 
CIV Clara Inés Vargas 5.837 .63 .63 
ABC Antonio Barrera Carbonell 5.923 .63 .72 
LEM Luis Eduardo Montealegre Lynett 6.119 .62 .65 
JAM Jorge Arango Mejía 6.625 .61 .59 
JGH José Gregorio Hernández 6.628 .61 .72 
HHV Hernando Herrera Vergara 6.737 .60 .57 
ATG Álvaro Tafur Galvis 7.093 .59 .59 
REG Rodrigo Escobar Gil 7.465 .58 .64 
NPP Nilson Pinilla Pinilla 7.476 .58 N/A 
VNM Vladimiro Naranjo Mejía 7.884 .56 .57 
MGM Marco Gerardo Monroy Cabra 8.093 .55 .59 
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 It is worth reminding that the analysis discussed here includes only non-unanimous decisions, that is, 
decisions on the most contentious cases and where the effect of individual justices traits are more likely to play a 
role in explaining their behavior. When the entire universe of cases is included in the model, the effect of justices‘ 
ideological positions on their decisions is smaller, although still statistically significant, as shown in Appendix D. 
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One of the former law clerks in the court I interviewed interprets this finding in Colombia 
by stating that it reflects the tension between a constitution which is progressive in terms of 
social rights and liberal in terms of civil liberties, and governments which tend to be more 
conservative. According to this view, the relationship found between the justices ideological 
positions and their decisions ―makes sense in the Colombian case because there has not been a 
left leaning administration and therefore the function of leftist justices is more to strike down 
than to uphold [legislation]‖ (LC4). Although there is no systematic measure of the ideological 
position of the different administrations, especially relative to the court justices‘, putting this 
impressionistic interpretation in spatial terms would mean that ruling coalitions are located to the 
right in the ideological spectrum. In consequence, conservative justices tend to be aligned more 
often with such coalitions and therefore are more likely to uphold legislation issued by them. 
That is what the statistical models analyzed above seemingly show. This finding, therefore, 
reflects the effect of the ideological distance between a justice and the administration rather than 
some essential behavior on the part of left-leaning justices, although this would require further 
investigation in contexts where there is more variation in the ideological configuration of the 
polity. 
These findings notwithstanding, however, the empirical models discussed in the previous 
sections clearly illustrate that the justices‘ attitudes are insufficient to fully explain judicial 
behavior in the Colombian Constitutional Court. The multivariate analysis shows that, 
controlling for their preferences, justices‘ decisions reflect their assessment of the political 
context in which the Court operates and, more concretely, conform to the theory of strategic 
prudence introduced in this dissertation.  
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5.5 CONCLUSION 
The previous sections of this chapter provide a fairly convincing test of the empirical 
implications of the theory introduced in Chapter 2. The comparative statics analysis of the formal 
model allowed me to state a series of testable hypotheses which I then operationalized using the 
information included in the original dataset of abstract review decisions made by the Colombian 
Constitutional Court between 1992 and 2006. The statistical models I specified based on those 
hypotheses and some alternative hypotheses and control variables confirm my theoretical 
expectations. Alternative model specifications shown in Appendix D suggest that the findings 
are robust.  
As I showed above, the CCC is reputed for its autonomy and its progressive protection of 
individual and collective rights. Given this reputation, one would expect to find justices behaving 
sincerely when making decisions on abstract review of legislation based mainly on their own 
attitudes. In fact, the empirical tests show that justices‘ ideological preferences play a consistent 
role in shaping their decision making. Paraphrasing Gibson (1983: 32), justices in the CCC 
indeed tend to do what they prefer to do. Their behavior, however, is tempered by the constraints 
imposed upon them by the political environment in which they operate. More concretely, justices 
in the CCC face a tradeoff between their preferences over policy involved in each case and their 
concern for their institutional stability and that of the court. The evaluation of this tradeoff in 
each case is a function of the justices‘ assessment of the strength of the government they face 
and of its ability to react to their decisions. In sum, in order to preserve their status and to be able 
to advance their own agenda regarding the protection of constitutional rights, justices seem to be 
strategically prudent. 
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6.0  CONCLUSION 
This dissertation has introduced a theory of interbranch relations within the separation-of-powers 
view of judicial behavior. The theory is simple: justices have policy preferences over issues 
under their review, but they also care for their own stability and that of the court as an institution. 
The formalization of this intuition leads to a derivation of equilibria of the strategic prudence 
game and to an analysis of the comparative statics resulting from such equilibria, that is, the 
expectations of going from one equilibrium to the next as a consequence of increases in each of 
the game parameters. 
The theory is indeed simple, but it is also powerful in the sense that it provides clear-cut 
expectations regarding judicial behavior that can be tested in a wide range of institutional and 
political environments in which constitutional review takes place. In this sense, the formal model 
is but a first step, a means towards the goal of empirically investigating the conditions under 
which courts are able to make decisions contrary to the executive‘s preferences in strong 
presidential systems such as those in Latin America. 
I test the theory in the case of the Colombian Constitutional Court, created in the 
constitution of 1991. For this I make use of an original dataset of all individual justice decisions 
made on abstract review between 1992 and 2006. A simple test provides strong evidence 
supporting the hypotheses derived from the comparative statics analysis. Justices tend to be 
prudent when they face a strong administration and when the case under review is particularly 
 165 
salient for the executive. Also they are more likely to annul legislation when they have stronger 
preferences against it and when they anticipate that the incumbent would have to pay a higher 
cost should it attempt sanctioning the court. 
A more sophisticated test takes into account the interactive nature of the strategic 
interbranch relation. It captures, for instance, the intuition that the freedom having been 
appointed during a previous administration creates on justices only expresses itself when the 
incumbent is strong. Justices will tend to oppose weaker presidents regardless of the timing of 
their appointments. Also, the salience of a case for the executive is a clearer deterrent on justices 
when the president is weak. This effect disappears when the administration gets stronger. 
The case of Colombia is particularly demanding as a test of the strategic prudence theory. 
Impressionistic evidence suggests that the Colombian Constitutional Court (CCC) is one of the 
most autonomous judicial bodies in Latin America. Its rulings protecting citizen rights and 
checking the power of presidents have created for the court a reputation of progressive activism 
that would make strategic behavior unlikely. The evidence presented here, both qualitative and 
quantitative, however, suggests that despite this reputation there are indeed elements of strategic 
prudence in the justices behavior. As in other courts around the world, justices in the CCC do not 
only have policy preferences but also have institutional concerns that make them include in their 
decisions considerations of the political climate in which they make decisions. Moreover, the 
reputation of the Colombian court might be the result of having been strategically prudent in 
order not only to advance a constitutional right protection agenda but also to preserve the 
stability of a new institution. This last conjecture, however, demands further investigation. 
What are the implications of the findings presented in this dissertation for understanding 
Colombian politics? The Constitutional Court is perceived as a major player in the political 
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system. Individual and collective actors in Colombia now acknowledge that they need to take 
into account the view of the court in the policy-making process (Cárdenas, Junguito, and Pachón 
2006). As we have seen, some think that the court is taking this central role too far and is 
substituting its preferences for those of representatives elected by the people. This criticism has 
mainly arisen in decisions imposing upon the government public expenditures in the provision of 
services. The fact, however, is that some of the court‘s most salient rulings have dealt with issues 
that have remained mostly unaddressed by the legislature and the government, such as the 
promotion of rights of vulnerable populations and minorities and the protection of civil liberties, 
such as in the case of euthanasia and abortion. Moreover, as the drafters of the constitution 
expected, the CCC has become a major check on the power of the other branches of government. 
Despite these criticisms, the court is largely perceived as a legitimate body. Public 
opinion data, such as the Americas Barometer, show that it has consistently enjoyed higher levels 
of citizen trust than other institutions including Congress (Rodríguez-Raga and Seligson 2010). 
Do the findings presented in this dissertation undermine the court‘s legitimacy? As in most 
countries, the sanctity of justice and of high courts lies precisely on being perceived as non-
political institutions, as players above politics. That is true regarding party politics in the 
Colombian case. There is no evidence suggesting that the CCC has a partisan agenda. Although 
some media still refer to justices as belonging to the liberal or the conservative parties, a legacy 
of the parity imposed by the National Front on the Supreme Court in the second half of the 20
th
 
century, these labels are increasingly meaningless and are now rarely used. As the findings 
presented here suggest, on the other hand, the attitudes of justices matter for their decision 
making. This fact has been increasingly acknowledged by observers of the court and political 
actors, although until now there had been just anecdotal evidence. Despite the fact that the 
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measure of ideology employed here is far from perfect, it seems clear that justices located on the 
left of the ideological spectrum tend to annul legislative acts more often than those on the right.  
One way of interpretation of this finding is by realizing that all presidents in this period 
can be located right of the center of the scale. If this is true, the effect of justices‘ ideology on 
their likelihood of striking down a norm can be interpreted in a spatial manner, that is, justices 
closer to the administration in terms of ideology tend to uphold its acts more often than justices 
who are more distant, on the left. A slightly more qualified interpretation may emerge from the 
way the constitution was drafted in the first place. As I described in Chapter 3, the constitutional 
convention elected in 1990 had a rather atypical partisan distribution, with the left-wing AD-
M19 holding almost a third of the seats in the convention. This unprecedented representation of 
the left led to a constitution that shifted to the liberal/progressive end of the spectrum. 
Subsequent elections, however, proved that the success of leftist parties was ephemeral, and 
center-to-right parties have dominated the electoral arena since. In this sense, the constitution 
was out of phase vis-à-vis the political system. The policy agenda of left-leaning justices in the 
Constitutional Court, therefore, consisted in safeguarding a liberal constitution from conservative 
attacks. That is why they appear annulling legislation more often. 
There seems to be an increasing awareness of the relevance of justices‘ attitudes on 
constitutional adjudication. Nominators, especially executives, have realized this already, and 
there seems to be a slight shift to the right in the ideological score of the median justice. 
Moreover, society in general seems to be more willing to acknowledge the political nature of the 
court and of its role in policy-making in Colombia, although this deserves further investigation. 
Moving beyond the findings related to the attitudes of court justices, the evidence of 
strategic behavior may also be potentially damaging for the court‘s legitimacy. In an anecdotal 
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note, my students seem shocked when they first hear that the court is ―strategic.‖ The lay 
meaning attributed to the term tends to carry dark shades of illegitimate behavior, which would 
place justices at the same level of politicians. It is clear, though, that throughout this dissertation 
strategic behavior simple means taking into account what other political players may or may not 
do in response. It is rather obvious that the court, being a political institution, does not operate in 
a vacuum and that, in addition to analyzing the merits of each constitutional controversy, it must 
consider the political consequences of its ruling. The evidence presented here makes this fact 
clear. 
One of the central findings is that the strength of the court varies in inverse proportion to 
the strength of the president. Justices tend to cave more often to the executive when the latter 
enjoys stronger support either in the form of a larger coalition in the legislature or as high 
approval rates. Also, it is important to note other findings related to the impact of justices‘ 
nominations. There seems to be no effect of the identity of the nominator (the president, the 
Supreme Court, or the Council of State). What matters is the timing of the nomination. Justices 
tend to be more prudent when they face the administration during which they were appointed, 
even controlling for the time they have spent on the bench. This is another manifestation of the 
centrality of the executive in Latin American presidential regimes. Finally, it is worth noting the 
robust effect of the opinion cast by the Inspector General, which may be interpreted as a signal 
both of the merits of the case and of the support the court could obtain with a particular decision. 
These interpretations, however, should receive further research. The general pattern found in the 
Colombian Constitutional Court, and the specific factors involved in its decision making, had not 
been studied in a systematic way before. In a sense, then, this dissertation and the court‘s 
decision dataset supply a first stone upon which further research can be built. 
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6.1 RESEARCH AGENDA 
As I mentioned above, this dissertation is the first thorough analysis of judicial decision making 
in Colombia.
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 It is therefore a mere initial step in a promising research path on the politics of 
constitutional review in Colombia. This project belongs to the literature on judicial politics in 
Latin America and its theoretical argument has the potential of illuminating such literature. 
A first, direct extension for the theoretical model introduced here should be to provide a 
broader test of its implications. This could be done by incorporating in such a test other countries 
and other points in time. This would allow variation in the institutional setting the impact of 
which is a central prediction of the model. Courts in other countries enjoy different levels of 
institutional insulation which in turn should shape the extent to which justices are compelled to 
engage in strategic behavior. Even in the Colombian context, combining the data used here with 
dataset of decisions on constitutional review made by the Supreme Court before 1991 would also 
provide such institutional variation. 
In the same vein, adding more ―systems‖ would allow for variation in the political 
context, particularly regarding the ideological configuration of the polity. In Colombia most 
administrations are located on the center-right of the spectrum, but in other countries this may 
vary.  A comparative analysis would provide more conclusive evidence regarding the impact of 
justices‘ attitudes. Are left-leaning justices aligned with leftist governments? This question could 
be answered with this new research design. 
The model itself can be extended in several ways to incorporate the impact of other 
factors. Of particular interest is the inclusion of the public as a player. Although the public 
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 But see Nunes (2010). 
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reaction to the behavior of justices and executives is tacitly included in the costs these players 
have when they engage in interbranch conflict, explicitly modeling this factor in the game could 
lead to interesting predictions beyond those already introduced here (see Vanberg 2005). 
Another way to include the ―public‖ could be by modeling litigants into the game. As Helmke 
and Staton (2011) pointed out, courts typically do not have the initiative and therefore must rely 
on litigants to bring cases in.  Including them, as these authors do, and testing the implications of 
the incentives involved in such interaction would lead to a better understanding of judicial 
behavior. Yet another alternative is to model and test the impact of amici curiae (see Arteaga-
Iriarte and Rodríguez-Raga 2010). In fact, modeling the interventions by groups in society who 
are either invited by the court or ask to be heard by it in public hearings regarding a particular 
case may also produce interesting insights regarding the strategic use made by the court of amici 
curiae briefs. 
On a slightly different note, models of judicial behavior could go beyond one-shot games. 
It is intuitive to think of court decision making as a process in which all matters are not dealt in a 
per case basis. In other words, cases may not be entirely independent from each other. As some 
of the interviews I conducted suggest, courts gain power and legitimacy in a cumulative way 
over a range of cases. As in Marbury v. Madison for the U.S. Supreme Court, other courts may 
also affirm or expand their competences one step at a time, by being prudent in salient, risky 
cases and being bolder in cases which are seemingly less relevant. This may have been the case 
of the CCC when, in reviewing the first declaration of state of exception by president Gaviria in 
1992, it caved to the president‘s preferences while at the same time it affirmed its competence to 
review not only the procedural aspects of such declaration but also its substantive motivations. 
The CCC slowly created a precedent on which it could lean when it decided to openly defy a 
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president trying to make use of exceptional powers. One-shot games are not able to capture this 
dynamic process that calls for other theoretical and empirical modeling techniques. 
The analysis presented here could also be extended by including jurisdictions in which 
courts have more control over their dockets. As in the case of concrete review of tutela writs by 
the Colombian Constitutional Court, this tribunal only reviews a tiny proportion of controversies, 
as in the case of the U.S. Supreme Court. The analysis of the criteria used by the court to 
strategically grant certiorari has not been done for Latin American courts and seems a promising 
way to go. 
Many other aspects of judicial behavior, which have received considerable attention from 
scholars studying U.S. courts, still need investigation in other countries, particularly in Latin 
America. These include not only the process of case selection by the court I already mentioned 
but also issues related to the selection of justices and the creation of precedent. However, one 
particular aspect of interbranch relations deserves special attention: the impact of courts on 
legislatures and executives. Just as justices are constrained by their anticipation of the reactions 
by strong administrations, it may well be the case that legislators and governments anticipate the 
court‘s review decisions on legislation. There is at least anecdotal evidence in Colombia that 
congress members are increasingly aware of the role of the CCC and have this role in mind when 
they approve legislative acts. Some even argue that legislators who oppose a particular norm but 
do not have enough seats to prevent its approval would intentionally try to create procedural 
flaws in its passage in Congress to provide grounds for the court to annul it. This may not be 
only the case of Colombia. Other countries with abstract constitutional review could also witness 
this pattern of behavior. There is, to my knowledge, no systematic study of the impact of courts 
on legislatures in Latin America. 
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APPENDIX A 
QUESTIONNAIRE FOR INTERVIEWS WITH FORMER JUSTICES, ASSISTANT 
JUSTICES, AND LAW CLERKS 
The following is my translation from Spanish of the questionnaire I drafted and used in my 
interviews to former justices, assistant justices, and law clerks. Since some issues in the 
questionnaire refer to specific cases, the first column includes an indication on who is supposed 
to be asked each question. 
 
Table A.1. Questionnaire for interviews 
  GENERAL 
ALL 1.  How would you describe in general the relationship of the court with the Executive and 
with Congress? 
ALL 2.  Since the beginning of the court in 1992, have there been changes in the relationship 
between the court and the president? Why? 
ALL 3.  During your time in the court, which was the moment of greatest tension with the 
government? Why? 
ALL 4.  Did you ever felt pressure, direct or indirect, to vote in one sense or another? [EXPLORE 
WHAT KIND OF PRESSURE, FROM WHOM, IN WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES, ETC.] 
 173 
ALL 5.  Do you think that another justice was put under pressure at some point? [EXPLORE WHAT 
KIND OF PRESSURE, FROM WHOM, IN WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES, ETC.] 
  INTERPRETATION OF FINDINGS 
ALL 6.  As part of my dissertation, I built a dataset with all abstract review decisions made 
between 1992 and 2006. As a result of the analysis of these data I found that there is a 
great deal of agreement between the opinion submitted by the Inspector General (IG) 
and the final decision made by the court. However, there are also several cases in which 
they disagree. What is the role played by the IG‟s opinion when a justice must make a 
decision regarding the constitutionality of a norm? Why does this role vary from case to 
case? Why do you think there are differences among justices regarding whether or not 
the IG‟s opinion is taken into account? 
 7.  Is it possible that, in controversial or hard cases, the IG‟s opinion is used as a strategic 
support, as an ally with whom the burden of a controversial decision could be shared? 
ALL 8.  In my analysis I also found that it is more frequent that a justice decides that a norm is 
unconstitutional towards the end of a president‟s term than at the beginning of it. Why 
do you think this is the case?  
ALL 9.  I also found that justices tend to uphold norms more often during the presidential term 
in which they were nominated than during the following administrations (and this is 
regardless of who nominated them –the  Supreme Court, Council of State or the 
President). Why do you think this happens? 
ALL 10.  As part of my research I have also conducted a survey of “experts” on the Court 
including academics, former assistant justices, law clerks, etc. In that survey I asked my 
respondents to classify all justices, from 1992 until 2006, in an ideological scale from left 
to right. Looking at these data together with the decisions‟ data I found that justices 
that are more on the right tend to uphold norms more often than those more on the 
left. What‟s your opinion on this finding? 
ALL 11.  Another one of my findings was that there seems to be a relationship between justices‟ 
behavior and the approval of the incumbent president. When a president is popular 
(according to Gallup‟s quarterly opinion polls) it is more likely that a justice makes more 
decisions upholding the norm under review. Yet, when the president‟s approval lowers, 
the likelihood of unconstitutionality decisions increases. How do you interpret this 
result? 
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  CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS: LIMITATION OF COMPETENCES 
ALL 12.  Scholars who have studied the Court and its role in the control of declarations of states 
of emergency argue that during the Court‟s first years there was a paradoxical situation 
in which the Court, while upholding the first declarations of internal commotion (by 
pres. Gaviria), in those same decisions it affirmed its competence to review those 
declarations substantively and not only in terms of their procedural aspects. This could 
have made it possible for the Court to have more legitimacy and support in subsequent 
decisions to strike other declarations of internal commotion, like the one by Samper in 
1995. This perspective compares this move with that of the American Supreme Court in 
Marbury v. Madison. What do you think about this interpretation? 
[SAMPER 
1995] 
JAM 
HHV 
ECM 
VNM 
ABC 
FMD 
JGH 
CGD 
13.  Cepeda, in his book Polémicas Constitucionales, says that since the Court was created 
each administration has announced constitutional reforms in response to its decisions. 
In fact, on many occasions after (and even before) a decision strikes down, say, a 
declaration of internal commotion or economic emergency, the government, angry at 
the Court‟s decision, announced constitutional reforms to limit the Court‟s competences 
to review those decisions substantively. As an example, this happened during the 
Samper administration after the Court stroke down a declaration of internal commotion 
in 1995. How were these threats of constitutional amendment felt inside the Court? 
Where they credible?  
[URIBE] 
LEM 
ABS 
ATG 
REG 
MJC 
JCT 
CIV 
JAR 
MGM 
14.  Cepeda, in his book, Polémicas Constitucionales, says that since the Court was created 
each administration has announced constitutional reforms in response to Court‟s 
decisions. On some occasions, the government announced a constitutional reform to 
modify the Court‟s competences or its form of operation trying to limit its capacity to 
control executive or Congress acts. This happened during the Uribe government when 
the executive announced a reform requiring that the Court could only strike down laws 
or decrees with a qualified majority. On some occasions there was also talk of reforms 
trying to eliminate the Court. How were these threats of constitutional amendment felt 
inside the Court? Where they credible? 
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[URIBE 
2004] 
ABS 
ATG 
REG 
MJC 
JCT 
CIV 
JAR 
MGM 
15.  Looking at the history of the Court I found that on one occasion, when it declared 
unconstitutional for procedural flaws the Anti Terrorism Act of the Uribe‟s 
administration, former president Gaviria warned that if the Court kept opposing 
constitutional reforms, there would be a situation like the one in the seventies and 
eighties when the Supreme Court blocked all the reforms proposed by the governments 
of López Michelsen, Turbay, Betancur, and Barco. The risk, according to Gaviria, was that 
the whole 1991 Constitution would fall dawn. Coming from a former president that had 
promoted the 1991 Constitution and the creation of the Constitutional Court, this 
warning did not seem innocuous. Was it? Do you remember how this warning was 
received by the Court? 
[GAVIRIA 
& 
SAMPER] 
JAM 
HHV 
ECM 
VNM 
ABC 
AMC 
FMD 
JGH 
CGD 
16.  On other occasions what happened was that in response to a Court‟s decision, the 
government and Congress introduced constitutional reforms to overturn that decision. 
That happened, for example, during the Gaviria and Samper administrations with the 
decriminalization of the personal use of drugs. Gaviria announced a referendum with 
signatures to include the prohibition of carrying drugs in the Constitution. Samper 
abandoned the idea of a referendum but tried to introduce a constitutional amendment 
with the same goal. I understand this reform was almost approved in Congress. How did 
the Court perceive these measures? Were they perceived as measures trying to bypass 
Court‟s decisions? Were they forms to undermine the prestige or the legitimacy of the 
Court?  
[SAMPER 
1995] 
JAM 
HHV 
ECM 
VNM 
ABC 
AMC 
FMD 
JGH 
CGD 
17.  A similar situation happened with the decision about the military jurisdiction during the 
Samper administration. A Court‟s divided decision (5-4) established in 1995 that military 
tribunals could only be constituted by retired officials to avoid the possibility of judges 
having less power than those being prosecuted. The Samper administration and 
members of his coalition in Congress, clearly influenced by the military elite, managed 
to approve in 1996 a constitutional reform that re-established martial courts with active 
members of the military (although it specified that military jurisdiction only operated to 
crimes related to service acts). Were these reforms perceived as mocking or overlooking 
the Court‟s jurisprudence? 
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[URIBE 
2004] 
ABS 
ATG 
REG 
MJC 
JCT 
CIV 
JAR 
MGM 
 
18.  During the discussion about the Anti Terrorism Act of president Uribe, the Court had 
initially (August 2004) declared that constitutional reforms not only should leave intact 
the main foundations of the 1991 Constitution but also that they could not violate 
fundamental rights. Yet in October 2004 the Court changed its jurisprudence and 
decided that the government could introduce constitutional amendments including 
restrictions to fundamental rights in the future and that those would not be reviewed by 
the Court as long as they did not affect the constitutional foundations. What were the 
reasons behind this change in jurisprudcence [Only to RUY, Do you think this happened 
because you were not in the Court anymore and you were replaced by HSP? Or was it for 
something else?] 
  STATES OF EMERGENCY: INTERNAL COMMOTION 
[SAMPER 
1995] 
JAM 
HHV 
ECM 
VNM 
ABC 
AMC 
FMD 
JGH 
CGD 
19.  The Samper administration declared its first internal commotion in August 1995. On 
October that year the Court struck down that commotion. After the angry response 
from the government and from some political sectors that even called the Court “fascist 
and dictatorial”, some justices denounced having received even death threats. [To JGH: 
You were the Court‟s Chief Justice at the time and spoke in defense of the Court‟s 
autonomy.] What do you remember from that time? How was this moment lived inside 
the Court?  
[SAMPER 
1995] 
JAM 
HHV 
ECM 
VNM 
ABC 
AMC 
FMD 
JGH 
CGD 
20.  Then, in November of that year (1995), „Alvaro Gómez Hurtado was murdered. And the 
Samper administration immediately declared an internal commotion state. This time the 
Court did support the declaration. Was this only because of the unfortunate events of 
the murder of Mr. Gómez Hurtado? Was there any connection between the strong 
reactions that the first adverse decision of the Court provoked in Samper and some 
political sectors and this new decision to support a state of internal commotion declared 
by the president? 
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[SAMPER 
Y 
PASTRAN
A] 
HHV 
ECM 
VNM 
ABC 
AMC 
FMD 
JGH 
CGD 
21.  A revision of the press of that time left me the impression that the relation between the 
Court and the Pastrana administration was kinder than the one it had had with the 
Samper administration. Do you agree with this impression? If so, what are the reasons 
behind this differential relation?  
[URIBE 
2002] 
LEM 
ABS 
ATG 
REG 
MJC 
JCT 
CIV 
JAR 
MGM 
22.  A few days after taking office, president Uribe declared a state of internal commotion. 
The goal was to face problems in public security that, according to the government, had 
been deepened by terrorists acts in urban areas. In fact, the day of his inauguration 
there was an attack to the Presidential palace. In that occasion, the Interior Minister 
Fernando Londoño Hoyos stated that this decree was not to be reviewed by the Court. 
How did you receive the minister‟s declaration inside the Court?  
[URIBE 
2002] 
LEM 
ABS 
ATG 
REG 
MJC 
JCT 
CIV 
JAR 
MGM 
23.  In fact, the government sent the decrees issued during the internal commotion for the 
Court to revise, but it didn‟t send the decree that declared that commotion. According 
to the press, that produced a reaction by the Court voiced by its then Chief Justice, Mr. 
Monroy Cabra, reaffirming the Court‟s competence to review the decree that declared 
the commotion. How do you remember this episode?   
  STATES OF EMERGENCY: ECONOMIC EMERGENCY 
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[PASTRA
NA 
1998] 
ECM 
VNM 
ABC 
AMC 
FMD 
JGH 
CGD 
ABS 
ATG 
24.  During the discussion of the Pastrana Economic Emergency (declared on November 
1998), everybody expected it to be declared unconstitutional. There were only some 
press reports (e.g. El Tiempo) saying there was a majority of 7 to 2 for the 
unconstitutionality. The press also reported government pressures by the Economics 
Minister, Juan Camilo Restrepo and by some trade unions who said that a declaration of 
unconstitutionality would lead to complete economic crisis. There was also talk that the 
financial markets were relatively stagnant waiting for the Court to decide. Yet, 
eventually, the Court‟s decision of declaring the emergency (conditionally) constitutional 
(7-2) (C-122/1999) surprised everybody. Do you remember what happened with this 
decision? Why did the press got it wrong? Were all the rumors that there was a majority 
against the unconstitutionality completely flawed? Did the scenario of economic disaster 
that the government and some unions were threatening with exercise any pressure on 
the Court?  
[PASTRA
NA 
1998] 
ECM 
VNM 
ABC 
AMC 
FMD 
JGH 
CGD 
ABS 
ATG 
25.  Justice Fabio Morón was in charge of drafting the opinion about the declaration of the 
state of emergency (and JGH was in charge of the opinión about the 2*1000 tax, right)? 
The press announced a negative opinion. Was there a change in the opinion? Why?  
[SAMPER 
1997] 
JAM 
HHV 
ECM 
VNM 
ABC 
AMC 
FMD 
JGH 
CGD 
26.  In 1997 the Court had declared the Economic Emergency of Samper unconstitutional. 
That decision had generated strong reactions from the government questioning the 
legitimacy of the Court and announcing measures to limit its competence. On that 
occasion, some justices publicly expressed their concern for the threats that the Court 
was receiving, including reducing its competences and even its elimination. What do 
you remember about this situation?  
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[PASTRA
NA 
1998-
99] 
ECM 
VNM 
ABC 
AMC 
FMD 
JGH 
CGD 
ABS 
ATG 
27.  In the Court‟s discussions about the Pastrana Emergency, do you remember any 
reference to the economic emergency of Samper, to that 1997 decision or to its 
consequences/reactions? Was there a relationship between these two decisions? What 
were the differences in both emergency declarations, one found unconstitutional 
(during Samper) and the other one declared constitutional (Pastrana)?  
ALL 28.  Someone told me that in cases involving economic topics, the government used to send 
ministers to try to lecture some justices on economic matters and hoping to get their 
favorable votes. Did you ever see this happening while you were in the Court?  
ALL 29.  Do you remember any other episode of conflict between the Court and the government 
during the time you were in the Court?  
ALL 30.  In general, are justices aware of  the cases that will generate more controversy?  
ALL 31.  And do justices know or foresee which will be the government‟s reaction?  
ALL 32.  Di you ever feel that if you made a decision to either side you could put the institutional 
continuity of the Court at risk?  
ALL 33.  How do you compare the Court‟s performance and its relation to the executive in 
regarding other courts in Latin America?  
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APPENDIX B 
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT ABSTRACT REVIEW DECISION DATASET: 
CODEBOOK IN SPANISH 
Libro de códigos v16 – 043010 
 
Table B.1. Abstract review decision dataset codebook 
AÑO Año (AAAA): 1982 – 2006 
SENTENCIA 
Número de la sentencia (Cxxx); se puede incluir al final una letra (ej. CxxxA) 
en caso de que sea necesario 
EXPED1 Número del primer expediente (Dxxxx) 
EXPED2 Número del segundo expediente o 9999 si no existe 
EXPED3 Número del tercer expediente o 9999 si no existe 
EXPED4 Número del cuarto expediente o 9999 si no existe 
APELDEM1 Apellidos del primer demandante o 9999 si de oficio 
NOMBDEM1 Nombres del primer demandante o 9999 si de oficio 
APELDEM2 Apellidos del segundo demandante o 9999 si no existe 
NOMBDEM2 Nombres del segundo demandante o 9999 si no existe 
APELDEM3 Apellidos del tercer demandante o 9999 si no existe 
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NOMBDEM3 Nombres del tercer demandante o 9999 si no existe 
APELDEM4 Apellidos del cuarto demandante o 9999 si no existe 
NOMBDEM4 Nombres del cuarto demandante o 9999 si no existe 
APELDEM5 Apellidos del quinto demandante o 9999 si no existe 
NOMBDEM5 Nombres del quinto demandante o 9999 si no existe 
ADMISION 
Decisión de admisión 
[1] Admitida 
[2] Inadmitida parcialmente 
[3] Inadmitida totalmente 
[4] Rechazada 
[5] De oficio 
[9] No hay información/No aplica 
MOTINAD 
Motivo de la inadmisión o rechazo 
[1] Problemas formales en la formulación de la demanda 
[2] Cosa juzgada constitucional 
 Otro  ___________________________________ 
[9] No hay información/No aplica 
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TIPOCASO 
Tipo de caso en discusión 
[01] Ley Estatutaria 
[02] Acto Legislativo 
[03] Decretos de Estados de Excepción 
[04] Decretos con Fuerza de Ley 
[05] Ley Ordinaria 
[06] Tratado Internacional 
[07] Convocatoria de Referendo 
[08] Plebiscito 
[09] Consulta Popular 
[10] Convocatoria a Asamblea Constituyente 
[11] Objeción del Ejecutivo 
[12] Ley orgánica  
IDNORMA Número de identificación de la norma demandada 
TITNORMA Título de la norma demandada 
MASNORM 
¿Hay otras normas demandadas? 
[0] No 
[1] Sí 
OTRASNOR 
Incluir como texto cuáles son las normas demandadas adicionales, 
separadas por punto y coma (ej. „Ley xxx de 1993; Ley www de 1987‟); 9999 
si no hay otras normas (si MASNORM=0). 
IDSENADO 
Número de identificación de la norma en su debate en el Senado (para 
proyectos de ley y leyes estatutarias); 9999 si no aplica. 
IDCAMARA 
Número de identificación de la norma en su debate en la Cámara de 
Representantes (para proyectos de ley y leyes estatutarias); 9999 si no 
aplica. 
 183 
TIPODEM 
Tipo de demanda 
[1] Procedimental 
[2] Sustantiva 
[3] Ambas 
[9] No aplica 
OFICIO 
Indica si la revisión de la Corte es de oficio 
[0] Acción Pública de Inconstitucionalidad 
[1] Revisión de oficio 
ARTCP01 
Primer artículo de la Constitución Política mencionado como objeto de 
violación por la norma demandada,  
o  
Si se refiere a un decreto emitido con base en facultades extraordinarias 
que han sido declaradas inexequibles, anotar 150,  
o 
Si es de oficio, anotar 8888. 
ARTCP02 
Segundo artículo de la Constitución Política mencionado como objeto de 
violación por la norma demandada, o 9999 si no aplica. 
ARTCP03 
Tercer artículo de la Constitución Política mencionado como objeto de 
violación por la norma demandada, o 9999 si no aplica. 
ARTCP04 
Cuarto artículo de la Constitución Política mencionado como objeto de 
violación por la norma demandada, o 9999 si no aplica. 
ARTCP05 
Quinto artículo de la Constitución Política mencionado como objeto de 
violación por la norma demandada, o 9999 si no aplica. 
ARTCP06 
Sexto artículo de la Constitución Política mencionado como objeto de 
violación por la norma demandada, o 9999 si no aplica. 
ARTCP07 
Séptimo artículo de la Constitución Política mencionado como objeto de 
violación por la norma demandada, o 9999 si no aplica. 
ARTCP08 
Octavo artículo de la Constitución Política mencionado como objeto de 
violación por la norma demandada, o 9999 si no aplica. 
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ARTCP09 
Noveno artículo de la Constitución Política mencionado como objeto de 
violación por la norma demandada, o 9999 si no aplica. 
ARTCP10 
Décimo artículo de la Constitución Política mencionado como objeto de 
violación por la norma demandada, o 9999 si no aplica. 
AÑONORMA Año (AAAA) de expedición de la norma demandada 
MESNORMA Mes (MM) de expedición de la norma demandada 
DIANORMA Día (DD) de expedición de la norma demandada 
AÑODEM Año (AAAA) de la demanda 
MESDEM Mes (MM) de la demanda 
DIADEM Día (DD) de la demanda 
AÑOADM 
Año (AAAA) de admisión/rechazo de la demanda por parte de la Corte 
(auto admisorio) – Si de oficio, año de reparto. 
MESADM 
Mes (MM) de admisión/rechazo de la demanda por parte de la Corte (auto 
admisorio) – Si de oficio, mes de reparto. 
DIAADM 
Día (DD) de admisión/rechazo de la demanda por parte de la Corte (auto 
admisorio) – Si de oficio, día de reparto. 
AÑOSENT Año (AAAA) de la sentencia de la Corte, o 9999 si no aplica 
MESSENT Mes (MM) de la sentencia de la Corte, o 99 si no aplica 
DIASENT Día (DD) de la sentencia de la Corte, o 99 si no aplica 
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TEMANOR1 
Primer tema o materia de la norma demandada 
[01] Económico 
[02] Electoral / Partidos políticos 
[03] Separación de poderes 
[04] Derechos civiles y/o políticos 
[05] Derechos sociales y/o económicos 
[06] Conflicto armado, orden público 
[07] Derechos ambientales y colectivos 
 Otro tema _________________________ 
[09] No aplica 
TEMANOR2 
Segundo tema o materia de la norma demandada 
[01] Económico 
[02] Electoral / Partidos políticos 
[03] Separación de poderes 
[04] Derechos civiles y/o políticos 
[05] Derechos sociales y/o económicos 
[06] Conflicto armado, orden público 
[07] Derechos ambientales y colectivos 
 Otro tema _________________________ 
[09] No aplica 
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TEMANOR3 
Tercer tema o materia de la norma demandada 
[01] Económico 
[02] Electoral / Partidos políticos 
[03] Separación de poderes 
[04] Derechos civiles y/o políticos 
[05] Derechos sociales y/o económicos 
[06] Conflicto armado, orden público 
[07] Derechos ambientales y colectivos 
 Otro tema _________________________ 
[09] No aplica 
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TIPONORM 
Tipo de norma demandada 
[01] Acuerdo/Canje de notas/Convención internacional/Convenio/etc. 
[02] Código Civil 
[03] Código Contencioso Administrativo 
[04] Código de Comercio 
[05] Código Penal 
[06] Código de Procedimiento Civil 
[07] Código de Procedimiento Penal 
[08] Código Sustantivo del Trabajo 
[09] Ley 100 de 1993 
[10] Ley 80 de 1993 
[11] Decreto 
[12] Ley
162
 
[13] Acto Legislativo 
[14] Código Procesal Laboral 
[15] Código Disciplinario Único 
[16] Estatuto Tributario 
[17] Código Penal Militar 
 Otro __________________________________ 
[99] No aplica 
APELPROC 
Apellidos del Procurador General de la Nación o de quien actúe en su 
nombre 
NOMBPROC 
Nombres del Procurador General de la Nación o de quien actúe en su 
nombre 
                                                 
162
 No incluye decretos-ley, que deben tener el valor 11.  
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CONCPROC 
Concepto del Procurador General de la Nación 
[01] Sentencia inhibitoria
163
 
[02] Cosa juzgada constitucional
164
 
[03] Cosa juzgada constitucional desde el punto de vista formal
165
 
[04] Exequible 
[05] Exequible (únicamente) por los cargos formulados 
[06] Condicionalmente exequible 
[07] Parcialmente inexequible
166
 
[08] Parcial y condicionalmente inexequible 
[09] Inexequible 
[99] No aplica
167
 
MININT 
Participación del Ministerio del Interior 
[0] No participó 
[1] Participó 
MINJUS 
Participación del Ministerio de Justicia y del Derecho 
[0] No participó 
[1] Participó 
[9] Si el caso fue después de la fusión con el Ministerio del Interior 
MINHAC 
Participación del Ministerio de Hacienda y Crédito Público 
[0] No participó 
[1] Participó 
                                                 
163
 En el caso de una sentencia inhibitoria parcial, se codificará la otra decisión. 
164
 Si se combina con otra sentencia parcial o condicionalmente exequible o inexequible, se codificará esta 
última. 
165
 Si se combina con otra sentencia parcial o condicionalmente exequible o inexequible, se codificará esta 
última. 
166
 También se usa este código en el caso de una sentencia parcialmente exequible. 
167
 El Procurador no emitió un concepto. 
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MINDEF 
Participación del Ministerio de Defensa Nacional 
[0] No participó 
[1] Participó 
MINREL 
Participación del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores 
[0] No participó 
[1] Participó 
MINAGR 
Participación del Ministerio de Agricultura 
[0] No participó 
[1] Participó 
MINTRA 
Participación del Ministerio del trabajo y Seguridad Social 
[0] No participó 
[1] Participó 
MINSAL 
Participación del Ministerio de Salud 
[0] No participó 
[1] Participó 
[9] Si el caso fue después de la fusión con el Ministerio de Trabajo en el 
Ministerio de Protección Social 
MINMIN 
Participación del Ministerio de Minas y Energía 
[0] No participó 
[1] Participó 
MINCEX 
Participación del Ministerio de Comercio Exterior 
[0] No participó 
[1] Participó 
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MINDES 
Participación del Ministerio de Desarrollo Económico 
[0] No participó 
[1] Participó 
[9] Si el caso fue después de la fusión con el Ministerio de Comercio 
Exterior en el Ministerio de Comercio, Industria y Turismo (o con el 
Ministerio del Medio Ambiente) 
MINEDU 
Participación del Ministerio de Educación 
[0] No participó 
[1] Participó 
MINAMB 
Participación del Ministerio del Medio Ambiente 
[0] No participó 
[1] Participó 
MINTRN 
Participación del Ministerio de Transporte 
[0] No participó 
[1] Participó 
MINCUL 
Participación del Ministerio de Cultura 
[0] No participó 
[1] Participó 
MINCOM 
Participación del Ministerio de Comunicaciones 
[0] No participó 
[1] Participó 
INTCSJ 
Intervención de la Corte Suprema de Justicia 
[01] Interviniente invitado 
[02] Interviniente sin ser invitado 
[99] No participó 
 191 
CONCCSJ 
Concepto de la Corte Suprema de Justicia 
[01] Sentencia inhibitoria
168
 
[02] Cosa juzgada constitucional
169
 
[03] Cosa juzgada constitucional desde el punto de vista formal
170
 
[04] Exequible 
[05] Exequible (únicamente) por los cargos formulados 
[06] Condicionalmente exequible 
[07] Parcialmente inexequible
171
 
[08] Parcial y condicionalmente inexequible 
[09] Inexequible  
[98] Participó pero no emitió concepto 
[99] No participó 
INTCE 
Intervención del Consejo de Estado 
[01] Interviniente invitado 
[02] Interviniente sin ser invitado 
[99] No participó 
                                                 
168
 En el caso de una sentencia inhibitoria parcial, se codificará la otra decisión. 
169
 Si se combina con otra sentencia parcial o condicionalmente exequible o inexequible, se codificará esta 
última. 
170
 Si se combina con otra sentencia parcial o condicionalmente exequible o inexequible, se codificará esta 
última. 
171
 También se usa este código en el caso de una sentencia parcialmente exequible. 
 192 
CONCCE 
Concepto del Consejo de Estado 
[01] Sentencia inhibitoria
172
 
[02] Cosa juzgada constitucional
173
 
[03] Cosa juzgada constitucional desde el punto de vista formal
174
 
[04] Exequible 
[05] Exequible (únicamente) por los cargos formulados 
[06] Condicionalmente exequible 
[07] Parcialmente inexequible
175
 
[08] Parcial y condicionalmente inexequible 
[09] Inexequible 
[98] Participó pero no emitió concepto 
[99] No participó 
INTCJUD 
Intervención del Consejo Superior de la Judicatura 
[01] Interviniente invitado 
[02] Interviniente sin ser invitado 
[99] No participó 
                                                 
172
 En el caso de una sentencia inhibitoria parcial, se codificará la otra decisión. 
173
 Si se combina con otra sentencia parcial o condicionalmente exequible o inexequible, se codificará esta 
última. 
174
 Si se combina con otra sentencia parcial o condicionalmente exequible o inexequible, se codificará esta 
última. 
175
 También se usa este código en el caso de una sentencia parcialmente exequible. 
 193 
CONCJUD 
Concepto del Consejo Superior de la Judicatura 
[01] Sentencia inhibitoria
176
 
[02] Cosa juzgada constitucional
177
 
[03] Cosa juzgada constitucional desde el punto de vista formal
178
 
[04] Exequible 
[05] Exequible (únicamente) por los cargos formulados 
[06] Condicionalmente exequible 
[07] Parcialmente inexequible
179
 
[08] Parcial y condicionalmente inexequible 
[09] Inexequible 
[98] Participó pero no emitió concepto 
[99] No participó 
INTCNE 
Intervención de Consejo Nacional Electoral 
[01] Interviniente invitado 
[02] Interviniente sin ser invitado 
[99] No participó 
                                                 
176
 En el caso de una sentencia inhibitoria parcial, se codificará la otra decisión. 
177
 Si se combina con otra sentencia parcial o condicionalmente exequible o inexequible, se codificará esta 
última. 
178
 Si se combina con otra sentencia parcial o condicionalmente exequible o inexequible, se codificará esta 
última. 
179
 También se usa este código en el caso de una sentencia parcialmente exequible. 
 194 
CONCCNE 
Concepto del Consejo Nacional Electoral 
[01] Sentencia inhibitoria
180
 
[02] Cosa juzgada constitucional
181
 
[03] Cosa juzgada constitucional desde el punto de vista formal
182
 
[04] Exequible 
[05] Exequible (únicamente) por los cargos formulados 
[06] Condicionalmente exequible 
[07] Parcialmente inexequible
183
 
[08] Parcial y condicionalmente inexequible 
[09] Inexequible 
[98] Participó pero no emitió concepto 
[99] No participó 
INTRNEC 
Intervención de la Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil 
[01] Interviniente invitado 
[02] Interviniente sin ser invitado 
[99] No participó 
                                                 
180
 En el caso de una sentencia inhibitoria parcial, se codificará la otra decisión. 
181
 Si se combina con otra sentencia parcial o condicionalmente exequible o inexequible, se codificará esta 
última. 
182
 Si se combina con otra sentencia parcial o condicionalmente exequible o inexequible, se codificará esta 
última. 
183
 También se usa este código en el caso de una sentencia parcialmente exequible. 
 195 
CONCRNEC 
Concepto de la Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil 
[01] Sentencia inhibitoria
184
 
[02] Cosa juzgada constitucional
185
 
[03] Cosa juzgada constitucional desde el punto de vista formal
186
 
[04] Exequible 
[05] Exequible (únicamente) por los cargos formulados 
[06] Condicionalmente exequible 
[07] Parcialmente inexequible
187
 
[08] Parcial y condicionalmente inexequible 
[09] Inexequible 
[98] Participó pero no emitió concepto 
[99] No participó 
INTFIS 
Intervención de la Fiscalía General de la Nación 
[01] Interviniente invitado 
[02] Interviniente sin ser invitado 
[99] No participó 
                                                 
184
 En el caso de una sentencia inhibitoria parcial, se codificará la otra decisión. 
185
 Si se combina con otra sentencia parcial o condicionalmente exequible o inexequible, se codificará esta 
última. 
186
 Si se combina con otra sentencia parcial o condicionalmente exequible o inexequible, se codificará esta 
última. 
187
 También se usa este código en el caso de una sentencia parcialmente exequible. 
 196 
CONCFIS 
Concepto de la Fiscalía General de la Nación 
[01] Sentencia inhibitoria
188
 
[02] Cosa juzgada constitucional
189
 
[03] Cosa juzgada constitucional desde el punto de vista formal
190
 
[04] Exequible 
[05] Exequible (únicamente) por los cargos formulados 
[06] Condicionalmente exequible 
[07] Parcialmente inexequible
191
 
[08] Parcial y condicionalmente inexequible 
[09] Inexequible 
[98] Participó pero no emitió concepto 
[99] No participó 
INTCGR 
Intervención de la Contraloría General de la República 
[01] Interviniente invitado 
[02] Interviniente sin ser invitado 
[99] No participó 
                                                 
188
 En el caso de una sentencia inhibitoria parcial, se codificará la otra decisión. 
189
 Si se combina con otra sentencia parcial o condicionalmente exequible o inexequible, se codificará esta 
última. 
190
 Si se combina con otra sentencia parcial o condicionalmente exequible o inexequible, se codificará esta 
última. 
191
 También se usa este código en el caso de una sentencia parcialmente exequible. 
 197 
CONCCGR 
Concepto de la Contraloría General de la República 
[01] Sentencia inhibitoria
192
 
[02] Cosa juzgada constitucional
193
 
[03] Cosa juzgada constitucional desde el punto de vista formal
194
 
[04] Exequible 
[05] Exequible (únicamente) por los cargos formulados 
[06] Condicionalmente exequible 
[07] Parcialmente inexequible
195
 
[08] Parcial y condicionalmente inexequible 
[09] Inexequible 
[98] Participó pero no emitió concepto 
[99] No participó 
INTSEN 
Intervención del Senado 
[01] Interviniente invitado 
[02] Interviniente sin ser invitado 
[99] No participó 
                                                 
192
 En el caso de una sentencia inhibitoria parcial, se codificará la otra decisión. 
193
 Si se combina con otra sentencia parcial o condicionalmente exequible o inexequible, se codificará esta 
última. 
194
 Si se combina con otra sentencia parcial o condicionalmente exequible o inexequible, se codificará esta 
última. 
195
 También se usa este código en el caso de una sentencia parcialmente exequible. 
 198 
CONCSEN 
Concepto del Senado 
[01] Sentencia inhibitoria
196
 
[02] Cosa juzgada constitucional
197
 
[03] Cosa juzgada constitucional desde el punto de vista formal
198
 
[04] Exequible 
[05] Exequible (únicamente) por los cargos formulados 
[06] Condicionalmente exequible 
[07] Parcialmente inexequible
199
 
[08] Parcial y condicionalmente inexequible 
[09] Inexequible 
[98] Participó pero no emitió concepto 
[99] No participó 
INTCAM 
Intervención de la Cámara de Representantes 
[01] Interviniente invitado 
[02] Interviniente sin ser invitado 
[99] No participó 
                                                 
196
 En el caso de una sentencia inhibitoria parcial, se codificará la otra decisión. 
197
 Si se combina con otra sentencia parcial o condicionalmente exequible o inexequible, se codificará esta 
última. 
198
 Si se combina con otra sentencia parcial o condicionalmente exequible o inexequible, se codificará esta 
última. 
199
 También se usa este código en el caso de una sentencia parcialmente exequible. 
 199 
CONCCAM 
Concepto de la Cámara de Representantes 
[01] Sentencia inhibitoria
200
 
[02] Cosa juzgada constitucional
201
 
[03] Cosa juzgada constitucional desde el punto de vista formal
202
 
[04] Exequible 
[05] Exequible (únicamente) por los cargos formulados 
[06] Condicionalmente exequible 
[07] Parcialmente inexequible
203
 
[08] Parcial y condicionalmente inexequible 
[09] Inexequible 
[98] Participó pero no emitió concepto 
[99] No participó 
INTVP 
Intervención de la Vicepresidencia de la República 
[01] Interviniente invitado 
[02] Interviniente sin ser invitado 
[99] No participó 
                                                 
200
 En el caso de una sentencia inhibitoria parcial, se codificará la otra decisión. 
201
 Si se combina con otra sentencia parcial o condicionalmente exequible o inexequible, se codificará esta 
última. 
202
 Si se combina con otra sentencia parcial o condicionalmente exequible o inexequible, se codificará esta 
última. 
203
 También se usa este código en el caso de una sentencia parcialmente exequible. 
 200 
CONCVP 
Concepto de la Vicepresidencia de la República 
[01] Sentencia inhibitoria
204
 
[02] Cosa juzgada constitucional
205
 
[03] Cosa juzgada constitucional desde el punto de vista formal
206
 
[04] Exequible 
[05] Exequible (únicamente) por los cargos formulados 
[06] Condicionalmente exequible 
[07] Parcialmente inexequible
207
 
[08] Parcial y condicionalmente inexequible 
[09] Inexequible 
[98] Participó pero no emitió concepto 
[99] No participó 
INTDNP 
Intervención del Departamento Nacional de Planeación 
[01] Interviniente invitado 
[02] Interviniente sin ser invitado 
[99] No participó 
                                                 
204
 En el caso de una sentencia inhibitoria parcial, se codificará la otra decisión. 
205
 Si se combina con otra sentencia parcial o condicionalmente exequible o inexequible, se codificará esta 
última. 
206
 Si se combina con otra sentencia parcial o condicionalmente exequible o inexequible, se codificará esta 
última. 
207
 También se usa este código en el caso de una sentencia parcialmente exequible. 
 201 
CONCDNP 
Concepto del Departamento Nacional de Planeación 
[01] Sentencia inhibitoria
208
 
[02] Cosa juzgada constitucional
209
 
[03] Cosa juzgada constitucional desde el punto de vista formal
210
 
[04] Exequible 
[05] Exequible (únicamente) por los cargos formulados 
[06] Condicionalmente exequible 
[07] Parcialmente inexequible
211
 
[08] Parcial y condicionalmente inexequible 
[09] Inexequible 
[98] Participó pero no emitió concepto 
[99] No participó 
INTBR 
Intervención del Banco de la República 
[01] Interviniente invitado 
[02] Interviniente sin ser invitado 
[99] No participó 
                                                 
208
 En el caso de una sentencia inhibitoria parcial, se codificará la otra decisión. 
209
 Si se combina con otra sentencia parcial o condicionalmente exequible o inexequible, se codificará esta 
última. 
210
 Si se combina con otra sentencia parcial o condicionalmente exequible o inexequible, se codificará esta 
última. 
211
 También se usa este código en el caso de una sentencia parcialmente exequible. 
 202 
CONCBR 
Concepto del Banco de la República 
[01] Sentencia inhibitoria
212
 
[02] Cosa juzgada constitucional
213
 
[03] Cosa juzgada constitucional desde el punto de vista formal
214
 
[04] Exequible 
[05] Exequible (únicamente) por los cargos formulados 
[06] Condicionalmente exequible 
[07] Parcialmente inexequible
215
 
[08] Parcial y condicionalmente inexequible 
[09] Inexequible 
[98] Participó pero no emitió concepto 
[99] No participó 
INTPOL 
Intervención de la Policía Nacional 
[01] Interviniente invitado 
[02] Interviniente sin ser invitado 
[99] No participó 
                                                 
212
 En el caso de una sentencia inhibitoria parcial, se codificará la otra decisión. 
213
 Si se combina con otra sentencia parcial o condicionalmente exequible o inexequible, se codificará esta 
última. 
214
 Si se combina con otra sentencia parcial o condicionalmente exequible o inexequible, se codificará esta 
última. 
215
 También se usa este código en el caso de una sentencia parcialmente exequible. 
 203 
CONCPOL 
Concepto de la Policía Nacional 
[01] Sentencia inhibitoria
216
 
[02] Cosa juzgada constitucional
217
 
[03] Cosa juzgada constitucional desde el punto de vista formal
218
 
[04] Exequible 
[05] Exequible (únicamente) por los cargos formulados 
[06] Condicionalmente exequible 
[07] Parcialmente inexequible
219
 
[08] Parcial y condicionalmente inexequible 
[09] Inexequible 
[98] Participó pero no emitió concepto 
[99] No participó 
INTFFMM 
Intervención de las Fuerzas Militares 
[01] Interviniente invitado 
[02] Interviniente sin ser invitado 
[99] No participó 
                                                 
216
 En el caso de una sentencia inhibitoria parcial, se codificará la otra decisión. 
217
 Si se combina con otra sentencia parcial o condicionalmente exequible o inexequible, se codificará esta 
última. 
218
 Si se combina con otra sentencia parcial o condicionalmente exequible o inexequible, se codificará esta 
última. 
219
 También se usa este código en el caso de una sentencia parcialmente exequible. 
 204 
CONCFFMM 
Concepto de las Fuerzas Militares 
[01] Sentencia inhibitoria
220
 
[02] Cosa juzgada constitucional
221
 
[03] Cosa juzgada constitucional desde el punto de vista formal
222
 
[04] Exequible 
[05] Exequible (únicamente) por los cargos formulados 
[06] Condicionalmente exequible 
[07] Parcialmente inexequible
223
 
[08] Parcial y condicionalmente inexequible 
[09] Inexequible 
[98] Participó pero no emitió concepto 
[99] No participó 
INTDP 
Intervención de la Defensoría del Pueblo 
[01] Interviniente invitado 
[02] Interviniente sin ser invitado 
[99] No participó 
                                                 
220
 En el caso de una sentencia inhibitoria parcial, se codificará la otra decisión. 
221
 Si se combina con otra sentencia parcial o condicionalmente exequible o inexequible, se codificará esta 
última. 
222
 Si se combina con otra sentencia parcial o condicionalmente exequible o inexequible, se codificará esta 
última. 
223
 También se usa este código en el caso de una sentencia parcialmente exequible. 
 205 
CONCDP 
Concepto de la Defensoría del Pueblo 
[01] Sentencia inhibitoria
224
 
[02] Cosa juzgada constitucional
225
 
[03] Cosa juzgada constitucional desde el punto de vista formal
226
 
[04] Exequible 
[05] Exequible (únicamente) por los cargos formulados 
[06] Condicionalmente exequible 
[07] Parcialmente inexequible
227
 
[08] Parcial y condicionalmente inexequible 
[09] Inexequible 
[98] Participó pero no emitió concepto 
[99] No participó 
INTSIND 
Intervención de central sindical 
[01] Interviniente invitado 
[02] Interviniente sin ser invitado 
[99] No participó 
                                                 
224
 En el caso de una sentencia inhibitoria parcial, se codificará la otra decisión. 
225
 Si se combina con otra sentencia parcial o condicionalmente exequible o inexequible, se codificará esta 
última. 
226
 Si se combina con otra sentencia parcial o condicionalmente exequible o inexequible, se codificará esta 
última. 
227
 También se usa este código en el caso de una sentencia parcialmente exequible. 
 206 
CONCSIND 
Concepto de centrales sindicales 
[01] Sentencia inhibitoria
228
 
[02] Cosa juzgada constitucional
229
 
[03] Cosa juzgada constitucional desde el punto de vista formal
230
 
[04] Exequible 
[05] Exequible (únicamente) por los cargos formulados 
[06] Condicionalmente exequible 
[07] Parcialmente inexequible
231
 
[08] Parcial y condicionalmente inexequible 
[09] Inexequible 
[98] Participó pero no emitió concepto 
[99] No participó 
INTGREM 
Intervención de gremio de la producción 
[01] Interviniente invitado 
[02] Interviniente sin ser invitado 
[99] No participó 
                                                 
228
 En el caso de una sentencia inhibitoria parcial, se codificará la otra decisión. 
229
 Si se combina con otra sentencia parcial o condicionalmente exequible o inexequible, se codificará esta 
última. 
230
 Si se combina con otra sentencia parcial o condicionalmente exequible o inexequible, se codificará esta 
última. 
231
 También se usa este código en el caso de una sentencia parcialmente exequible. 
 207 
CONCGREM 
Concepto de gremio de la producción 
[01] Sentencia inhibitoria
232
 
[02] Cosa juzgada constitucional
233
 
[03] Cosa juzgada constitucional desde el punto de vista formal
234
 
[04] Exequible 
[05] Exequible (únicamente) por los cargos formulados 
[06] Condicionalmente exequible 
[07] Parcialmente inexequible
235
 
[08] Parcial y condicionalmente inexequible 
[09] Inexequible 
[98] Participó pero no emitió concepto 
[99] No participó 
INTUNIV 
Intervención de universidad 
[01] Interviniente invitado 
[02] Interviniente sin ser invitado 
[99] No participó 
                                                 
232
 En el caso de una sentencia inhibitoria parcial, se codificará la otra decisión. 
233
 Si se combina con otra sentencia parcial o condicionalmente exequible o inexequible, se codificará esta 
última. 
234
 Si se combina con otra sentencia parcial o condicionalmente exequible o inexequible, se codificará esta 
última. 
235
 También se usa este código en el caso de una sentencia parcialmente exequible. 
 208 
CONCUNIV 
Concepto de universidad 
[01] Sentencia inhibitoria
236
 
[02] Cosa juzgada constitucional
237
 
[03] Cosa juzgada constitucional desde el punto de vista formal
238
 
[04] Exequible 
[05] Exequible (únicamente) por los cargos formulados 
[06] Condicionalmente exequible 
[07] Parcialmente inexequible
239
 
[08] Parcial y condicionalmente inexequible 
[09] Inexequible 
[98] Participó pero no emitió concepto 
[99] No participó 
INTACAD 
Intervención de academia o centro de pensamiento 
[01] Interviniente invitado 
[02] Interviniente sin ser invitado 
[99] No participó 
                                                 
236
 En el caso de una sentencia inhibitoria parcial, se codificará la otra decisión. 
237
 Si se combina con otra sentencia parcial o condicionalmente exequible o inexequible, se codificará esta 
última. 
238
 Si se combina con otra sentencia parcial o condicionalmente exequible o inexequible, se codificará esta 
última. 
239
 También se usa este código en el caso de una sentencia parcialmente exequible. 
 209 
CONCACAD 
Concepto de academia o centro de pensamiento 
[01] Sentencia inhibitoria
240
 
[02] Cosa juzgada constitucional
241
 
[03] Cosa juzgada constitucional desde el punto de vista formal
242
 
[04] Exequible 
[05] Exequible (únicamente) por los cargos formulados 
[06] Condicionalmente exequible 
[07] Parcialmente inexequible
243
 
[08] Parcial y condicionalmente inexequible 
[09] Inexequible 
[98] Participó pero no emitió concepto 
[99] No participó 
INTONG 
Intervención de ONG 
[01] Interviniente invitado 
[02] Interviniente sin ser invitado 
[99] No participó 
                                                 
240
 En el caso de una sentencia inhibitoria parcial, se codificará la otra decisión. 
241
 Si se combina con otra sentencia parcial o condicionalmente exequible o inexequible, se codificará esta 
última. 
242
 Si se combina con otra sentencia parcial o condicionalmente exequible o inexequible, se codificará esta 
última. 
243
 También se usa este código en el caso de una sentencia parcialmente exequible. 
 210 
CONCONG 
Concepto de ONG 
[01] Sentencia inhibitoria
244
 
[02] Cosa juzgada constitucional
245
 
[03] Cosa juzgada constitucional desde el punto de vista formal
246
 
[04] Exequible 
[05] Exequible (únicamente) por los cargos formulados 
[06] Condicionalmente exequible 
[07] Parcialmente inexequible
247
 
[08] Parcial y condicionalmente inexequible 
[09] Inexequible 
[98] Participó pero no emitió concepto 
[99] No participó 
                                                 
244
 En el caso de una sentencia inhibitoria parcial, se codificará la otra decisión. 
245
 Si se combina con otra sentencia parcial o condicionalmente exequible o inexequible, se codificará esta 
última. 
246
 Si se combina con otra sentencia parcial o condicionalmente exequible o inexequible, se codificará esta 
última. 
247
 También se usa este código en el caso de una sentencia parcialmente exequible. 
 211 
PRESID 
Presidente de la Corte Constitucional 
[001] Jaime Sanín Greiffenstein 
[002] Simón Rodríguez Rodríguez 
[003] Ciro Angarita Barón 
[004] Jorge Arango Mejía 
[005] Hernando Herrera Vergara 
[006] Eduardo Cifuentes  
[007] Vladimiro Naranjo Mesa 
[008] Antonio Barrera Carbonell 
[009] Alejandro Martínez Caballero 
[010] Fabio Morón Díaz 
[011] José Gregorio Hernández Galindo  
[012] Carlos Gaviria Díaz 
[013] Luis Eduardo Montealegre Lynett  
[014] Alfredo Beltrán Sierra 
[015] Álvaro Tafur Galvis 
[016] Rodrigo Escobar Gil 
[017] Manuel José Cepeda Espinosa 
[018] Jaime Córdoba Triviño 
[019] Clara Inés Vargas Hernández 
[020] Jaime Araújo Rentería 
[021] Marco Gerardo Monroy Cabra 
[022] Humberto Sierra Porto 
[023] Nilson Pinilla Pinilla 
[024] Rodrigo Uprimny Yépez 
[025] Martha Victoria Sáchica de Moncaleano 
[026] Carmenza Isaza de Gómez 
[027] Julio César Ortiz Gutiérrez 
[028] Cristina Pardo Schlessinger  
[029] Jairo Charry Rivas. 
[030] Maria Teresa Garcés Lloreda 
 212 
MAGPONOR 
Magistrado Ponente original 
[001] Jaime Sanín Greiffenstein 
[002] Simón Rodríguez Rodríguez 
[003] Ciro Angarita Barón 
[004] Jorge Arango Mejía 
[005] Hernando Herrera Vergara 
[006] Eduardo Cifuentes  
[007] Vladimiro Naranjo Mesa 
[008] Antonio Barrera Carbonell 
[009] Alejandro Martínez Caballero 
[010] Fabio Morón Díaz 
[011] José Gregorio Hernández Galindo  
[012] Carlos Gaviria Díaz 
[013] Luis Eduardo Montealegre Lynett  
[014] Alfredo Beltrán Sierra 
[015] Álvaro Tafur Galvis 
[016] Rodrigo Escobar Gil 
[017] Manuel José Cepeda Espinosa 
[018] Jaime Córdoba Triviño 
[019] Clara Inés Vargas Hernández 
[020] Jaime Araújo Rentería 
[021] Marco Gerardo Monroy Cabra 
[022] Humberto Sierra Porto 
[023] Nilson Pinilla Pinilla 
[024] Rodrigo Uprimny Yépez 
[025] Martha Victoria Sáchica de Moncaleano 
[026] Carmenza Isaza de Gómez 
[027] Julio César Ortiz Gutiérrez 
[028] Cristina Pardo Schlessinger  
[029] Jairo Charry Rivas. 
[030] Maria Teresa Garcés Lloreda 
[555] Ponencia múltiple 
 213 
MAGPONDE1 
Primer Magistrado Ponente definitivo 
[001] Jaime Sanín Greiffenstein 
[002] Simón Rodríguez Rodríguez 
[003] Ciro Angarita Barón 
[004] Jorge Arango Mejía 
[005] Hernando Herrera Vergara 
[006] Eduardo Cifuentes  
[007] Vladimiro Naranjo Mesa 
[008] Antonio Barrera Carbonell 
[009] Alejandro Martínez Caballero 
[010] Fabio Morón Díaz 
[011] José Gregorio Hernández Galindo  
[012] Carlos Gaviria Díaz 
[013] Luis Eduardo Montealegre Lynett  
[014] Alfredo Beltrán Sierra 
[015] Álvaro Tafur Galvis 
[016] Rodrigo Escobar Gil 
[017] Manuel José Cepeda Espinosa 
[018] Jaime Córdoba Triviño 
[019] Clara Inés Vargas Hernández 
[020] Jaime Araújo Rentería 
[021] Marco Gerardo Monroy Cabra 
[022] Humberto Sierra Porto 
[023] Nilson Pinilla Pinilla 
[024] Rodrigo Uprimny Yépez 
[025] Martha Victoria Sáchica de Moncaleano 
[026] Carmenza Isaza de Gómez 
[027] Julio César Ortiz Gutiérrez 
[028] Cristina Pardo Schlessinger  
[029] Jairo Charry Rivas. 
[030] Maria Teresa Garcés Lloreda 
 214 
MAGPONDE2 
Segundo Magistrado Ponente definitivo 
[001] Jaime Sanín Greiffenstein 
[002] Simón Rodríguez Rodríguez 
[003] Ciro Angarita Barón 
[004] Jorge Arango Mejía 
[005] Hernando Herrera Vergara 
[006] Eduardo Cifuentes  
[007] Vladimiro Naranjo Mesa 
[008] Antonio Barrera Carbonell 
[009] Alejandro Martínez Caballero 
[010] Fabio Morón Díaz 
[011] José Gregorio Hernández Galindo  
[012] Carlos Gaviria Díaz 
[013] Luis Eduardo Montealegre Lynett  
[014] Alfredo Beltrán Sierra 
[015] Álvaro Tafur Galvis 
[016] Rodrigo Escobar Gil 
[017] Manuel José Cepeda Espinosa 
[018] Jaime Córdoba Triviño 
[019] Clara Inés Vargas Hernández 
[020] Jaime Araújo Rentería 
[021] Marco Gerardo Monroy Cabra 
[022] Humberto Sierra Porto 
[023] Nilson Pinilla Pinilla 
[024] Rodrigo Uprimny Yépez 
[025] Martha Victoria Sáchica de Moncaleano 
[026] Carmenza Isaza de Gómez 
[027] Julio César Ortiz Gutiérrez 
[028] Cristina Pardo Schlessinger  
[029] Jairo Charry Rivas. 
[030] Maria Teresa Garcés Lloreda 
[999] No aplica 
 215 
MAGPONDE3 
Tercer Magistrado Ponente definitivo 
[001] Jaime Sanín Greiffenstein 
[002] Simón Rodríguez Rodríguez 
[003] Ciro Angarita Barón 
[004] Jorge Arango Mejía 
[005] Hernando Herrera Vergara 
[006] Eduardo Cifuentes  
[007] Vladimiro Naranjo Mesa 
[008] Antonio Barrera Carbonell 
[009] Alejandro Martínez Caballero 
[010] Fabio Morón Díaz 
[011] José Gregorio Hernández Galindo  
[012] Carlos Gaviria Díaz 
[013] Luis Eduardo Montealegre Lynett  
[014] Alfredo Beltrán Sierra 
[015] Álvaro Tafur Galvis 
[016] Rodrigo Escobar Gil 
[017] Manuel José Cepeda Espinosa 
[018] Jaime Córdoba Triviño 
[019] Clara Inés Vargas Hernández 
[020] Jaime Araújo Rentería 
[021] Marco Gerardo Monroy Cabra 
[022] Humberto Sierra Porto 
[023] Nilson Pinilla Pinilla 
[024] Rodrigo Uprimny Yépez 
[025] Martha Victoria Sáchica de Moncaleano 
[026] Carmenza Isaza de Gómez 
[027] Julio César Ortiz Gutiérrez 
[028] Cristina Pardo Schlessinger  
[029] Jairo Charry Rivas. 
[030] Maria Teresa Garcés Lloreda 
[999] No aplica 
 216 
DECISIÓN 
Decisión de la mayoría en la Corte 
[01] Sentencia inhibitoria
248
 
[02] Cosa juzgada constitucional
249
 
[03] Cosa juzgada constitucional desde el punto de vista formal
250
 
[04] Exequible 
[05] Exequible (únicamente) por los cargos formulados 
[06] Condicionalmente exequible 
[07] Parcialmente inexequible
251
 
[08] Parcial y condicionalmente inexequible 
[09] Inexequible 
[8888] Sentencia anulada 
[9999] Sentencia de Tutela 
DECCOJU 
Cosa juzgada, decisión previa a la que se remite 
[99] No hay cosa juzgada. 
[01] Sentencia inhibitoria
252
 
[04] Exequible 
[05] Exequible (únicamente) por los cargos formulados 
[06] Condicionalmente exequible 
[07] Parcialmente inexequible
253
 
[08] Parcial y condicionalmente inexequible 
[09] Inexequible 
SENTP1 
Número de la primera sentencia previa citada en caso de Cosa Juzgada 
Constitucional (Cxxxx o CSJxxxx), o 9999 si no aplica 
                                                 
248
 En el caso de una sentencia inhibitoria parcial, se codificará la otra decisión. 
249
 Si se combina con otra sentencia parcial o condicionalmente exequible o inexequible, se codificará esta 
última. 
250
 Si se combina con otra sentencia parcial o condicionalmente exequible o inexequible, se codificará esta 
última. 
251
 También se usa este código en el caso de una sentencia parcialmente exequible. 
252
 En el caso de una sentencia inhibitoria parcial, se codificará la otra decisión. 
253
 También se usa este código en el caso de una sentencia parcialmente exequible. 
 217 
AÑOP1 
Año (AAAA) de la primera sentencia previa citada en caso de Cosa Juzgada 
Constitucional, o 9999 si no aplica 
SENTP2 
Número de la segunda sentencia previa citada en caso de Cosa Juzgada 
Constitucional (Cxxxx o CSJxxxx), o 9999 si no aplica 
AÑOP2 
Año (AAAA) de la segunda sentencia previa citada en caso de Cosa 
Juzgada Constitucional, o 9999 si no aplica 
SENTP3 
Número de la tercera sentencia previa citada en caso de Cosa Juzgada 
Constitucional (Cxxxx o CSJxxxx), o 9999 si no aplica 
AÑOP3 
Año (AAAA) de la tercera sentencia previa citada en caso de Cosa Juzgada 
Constitucional, o 9999 si no aplica 
 218 
JSG 
Votación del Magistrado Jaime Sanín Greiffenstein 
[11] Sustituido por magistrado encargado 
[66] Votó con la mayoría 
[77] Aclaró el voto 
[88] Ausente 
[99] No aplica (no era magistrado en el momento de la sentencia  
Salvamento de voto 
[01] Sentencia inhibitoria
254
 
[02] Cosa juzgada constitucional
255
 
[03] Cosa juzgada constitucional desde el punto de vista formal
256
 
[04] Exequible 
[05] Exequible (únicamente) por los cargos formulados 
[06] Condicionalmente exequible 
[06,5] Más o menos condicionalmente exequible 
[07] Parcialmente inexequible
257
 
[07,5] Más o menos parcialmente exequible 
[08] Parcial y condicionalmente inexequible 
[08,5] Más o menos parcial y condicionalmente inexequible 
[09] Inexequible 
[09,5] Más inexequible (Más normas o temporalmente) 
[10] No inhibirse / No declarar cosa juzgada 
                                                 
254
 En el caso de una sentencia inhibitoria parcial, se codificará la otra decisión. 
255
 Si se combina con otra sentencia parcial o condicionalmente exequible o inexequible, se codificará esta 
última. 
256
 Si se combina con otra sentencia parcial o condicionalmente exequible o inexequible, se codificará esta 
última. 
257
 También se usa este código en el caso de una sentencia parcialmente exequible. 
 219 
SRR 
Votación del Magistrado Simón Rodríguez Rodríguez 
[11] Sustituido por magistrado encargado 
[66] Votó con la mayoría 
[77] Aclaró el voto 
[88] Ausente 
[99] No aplica (no era magistrado en el momento de la sentencia  
Salvamento de voto 
[01] Sentencia inhibitoria
258
 
[02] Cosa juzgada constitucional
259
 
[03] Cosa juzgada constitucional desde el punto de vista formal
260
 
[04] Exequible 
[05] Exequible (únicamente) por los cargos formulados 
[06] Condicionalmente exequible 
[06,5] Más o menos condicionalmente exequible 
[07] Parcialmente inexequible
261
 
[07,5] Más o menos parcialmente exequible 
[08] Parcial y condicionalmente inexequible 
[08,5] Más o menos parcial y condicionalmente inexequible 
[09] Inexequible 
[09,5] Más inexequible (Más normas o temporalmente) 
[10] No inhibirse / No declarar cosa juzgada 
                                                 
258
 En el caso de una sentencia inhibitoria parcial, se codificará la otra decisión. 
259
 Si se combina con otra sentencia parcial o condicionalmente exequible o inexequible, se codificará esta 
última. 
260
 Si se combina con otra sentencia parcial o condicionalmente exequible o inexequible, se codificará esta 
última. 
261
 También se usa este código en el caso de una sentencia parcialmente exequible. 
 220 
CAB 
Votación del Magistrado Ciro Angarita Barón 
[11] Sustituido por magistrado encargado 
[66] Votó con la mayoría 
[77] Aclaró el voto 
[88] Ausente 
[99] No aplica (no era magistrado en el momento de la sentencia  
Salvamento de voto 
[01] Sentencia inhibitoria
262
 
[02] Cosa juzgada constitucional
263
 
[03] Cosa juzgada constitucional desde el punto de vista formal
264
 
[04] Exequible 
[05] Exequible (únicamente) por los cargos formulados 
[06] Condicionalmente exequible 
[06,5] Más o menos condicionalmente exequible 
[07] Parcialmente inexequible
265
 
[07,5] Más o menos parcialmente exequible 
[08] Parcial y condicionalmente inexequible 
[08,5] Más o menos parcial y condicionalmente inexequible 
[09] Inexequible 
[09,5] Más inexequible (Más normas o temporalmente) 
[10] No inhibirse / No declarar cosa juzgada 
                                                 
262
 En el caso de una sentencia inhibitoria parcial, se codificará la otra decisión. 
263
 Si se combina con otra sentencia parcial o condicionalmente exequible o inexequible, se codificará esta 
última. 
264
 Si se combina con otra sentencia parcial o condicionalmente exequible o inexequible, se codificará esta 
última. 
265
 También se usa este código en el caso de una sentencia parcialmente exequible. 
 221 
JAM 
Votación del Magistrado Jorge Arango Mejía 
[11] Sustituido por magistrado encargado 
[66] Votó con la mayoría 
[77] Aclaró el voto 
[88] Ausente 
[99] No aplica (no era magistrado en el momento de la sentencia  
Salvamento de voto 
[01] Sentencia inhibitoria
266
 
[02] Cosa juzgada constitucional
267
 
[03] Cosa juzgada constitucional desde el punto de vista formal
268
 
[04] Exequible 
[05] Exequible (únicamente) por los cargos formulados 
[06] Condicionalmente exequible 
[06,5] Más o menos condicionalmente exequible 
[07] Parcialmente inexequible
269
 
[07,5] Más o menos parcialmente exequible 
[08] Parcial y condicionalmente inexequible 
[08,5] Más o menos parcial y condicionalmente inexequible 
[09] Inexequible 
[09,5] Más inexequible (Más normas o temporalmente) 
[10] No inhibirse / No declarar cosa juzgada 
                                                 
266
 En el caso de una sentencia inhibitoria parcial, se codificará la otra decisión. 
267
 Si se combina con otra sentencia parcial o condicionalmente exequible o inexequible, se codificará esta 
última. 
268
 Si se combina con otra sentencia parcial o condicionalmente exequible o inexequible, se codificará esta 
última. 
269
 También se usa este código en el caso de una sentencia parcialmente exequible. 
 222 
HHV 
Votación del Magistrado Hernando Herrera Vergara 
[11] Sustituido por magistrado encargado 
[66] Votó con la mayoría 
[77] Aclaró el voto 
[88] Ausente 
[99] No aplica (no era magistrado en el momento de la sentencia  
Salvamento de voto 
[01] Sentencia inhibitoria
270
 
[02] Cosa juzgada constitucional
271
 
[03] Cosa juzgada constitucional desde el punto de vista formal
272
 
[04] Exequible 
[05] Exequible (únicamente) por los cargos formulados 
[06] Condicionalmente exequible 
[06,5] Más o menos condicionalmente exequible 
[07] Parcialmente inexequible
273
 
[07,5] Más o menos parcialmente exequible 
[08] Parcial y condicionalmente inexequible 
[08,5] Más o menos parcial y condicionalmente inexequible 
[09] Inexequible 
[09,5] Más inexequible (Más normas o temporalmente) 
[10] No inhibirse / No declarar cosa juzgada 
                                                 
270
 En el caso de una sentencia inhibitoria parcial, se codificará la otra decisión. 
271
 Si se combina con otra sentencia parcial o condicionalmente exequible o inexequible, se codificará esta 
última. 
272
 Si se combina con otra sentencia parcial o condicionalmente exequible o inexequible, se codificará esta 
última. 
273
 También se usa este código en el caso de una sentencia parcialmente exequible. 
 223 
ECM 
Votación del Magistrado Eduardo Cifuentes Muñoz 
[11] Sustituido por magistrado encargado 
[66] Votó con la mayoría 
[77] Aclaró el voto 
[88] Ausente 
[99] No aplica (no era magistrado en el momento de la sentencia  
Salvamento de voto 
[01] Sentencia inhibitoria
274
 
[02] Cosa juzgada constitucional
275
 
[03] Cosa juzgada constitucional desde el punto de vista formal
276
 
[04] Exequible 
[05] Exequible (únicamente) por los cargos formulados 
[06] Condicionalmente exequible 
[06,5] Más o menos condicionalmente exequible 
[07] Parcialmente inexequible
277
 
[07,5] Más o menos parcialmente exequible 
[08] Parcial y condicionalmente inexequible 
[08,5] Más o menos parcial y condicionalmente inexequible 
[09] Inexequible 
[09,5] Más inexequible (Más normas o temporalmente) 
[10] No inhibirse / No declarar cosa juzgada 
                                                 
274
 En el caso de una sentencia inhibitoria parcial, se codificará la otra decisión. 
275
 Si se combina con otra sentencia parcial o condicionalmente exequible o inexequible, se codificará esta 
última. 
276
 Si se combina con otra sentencia parcial o condicionalmente exequible o inexequible, se codificará esta 
última. 
277
 También se usa este código en el caso de una sentencia parcialmente exequible. 
 224 
VNM 
Votación del Magistrado Vladimiro Naranjo Mesa 
[11] Sustituido por magistrado encargado 
[66] Votó con la mayoría 
[77] Aclaró el voto 
[88] Ausente 
[99] No aplica (no era magistrado en el momento de la sentencia  
Salvamento de voto 
[01] Sentencia inhibitoria
278
 
[02] Cosa juzgada constitucional
279
 
[03] Cosa juzgada constitucional desde el punto de vista formal
280
 
[04] Exequible 
[05] Exequible (únicamente) por los cargos formulados 
[06] Condicionalmente exequible 
[06,5] Más o menos condicionalmente exequible 
[07] Parcialmente inexequible
281
 
[07,5] Más o menos parcialmente exequible 
[08] Parcial y condicionalmente inexequible 
[08,5] Más o menos parcial y condicionalmente inexequible 
[09] Inexequible 
[09,5] Más inexequible (Más normas o temporalmente) 
[10] No inhibirse / No declarar cosa juzgada 
                                                 
278
 En el caso de una sentencia inhibitoria parcial, se codificará la otra decisión. 
279
 Si se combina con otra sentencia parcial o condicionalmente exequible o inexequible, se codificará esta 
última. 
280
 Si se combina con otra sentencia parcial o condicionalmente exequible o inexequible, se codificará esta 
última. 
281
 También se usa este código en el caso de una sentencia parcialmente exequible. 
 225 
ABC 
Votación del Magistrado Antonio Barrera Carbonell 
[11] Sustituido por magistrado encargado 
[66] Votó con la mayoría 
[77] Aclaró el voto 
[88] Ausente 
[99] No aplica (no era magistrado en el momento de la sentencia  
Salvamento de voto 
[01] Sentencia inhibitoria
282
 
[02] Cosa juzgada constitucional
283
 
[03] Cosa juzgada constitucional desde el punto de vista formal
284
 
[04] Exequible 
[05] Exequible (únicamente) por los cargos formulados 
[06] Condicionalmente exequible 
[06,5] Más o menos condicionalmente exequible 
[07] Parcialmente inexequible
285
 
[07,5] Más o menos parcialmente exequible 
[08] Parcial y condicionalmente inexequible 
[08,5] Más o menos parcial y condicionalmente inexequible 
[09] Inexequible 
[09,5] Más inexequible (Más normas o temporalmente) 
[10] No inhibirse / No declarar cosa juzgada 
                                                 
282
 En el caso de una sentencia inhibitoria parcial, se codificará la otra decisión. 
283
 Si se combina con otra sentencia parcial o condicionalmente exequible o inexequible, se codificará esta 
última. 
284
 Si se combina con otra sentencia parcial o condicionalmente exequible o inexequible, se codificará esta 
última. 
285
 También se usa este código en el caso de una sentencia parcialmente exequible. 
 226 
AMC 
Votación del Magistrado Alejandro Martínez Caballero 
[11] Sustituido por magistrado encargado 
[66] Votó con la mayoría 
[77] Aclaró el voto 
[88] Ausente 
[99] No aplica (no era magistrado en el momento de la sentencia  
Salvamento de voto 
[01] Sentencia inhibitoria
286
 
[02] Cosa juzgada constitucional
287
 
[03] Cosa juzgada constitucional desde el punto de vista formal
288
 
[04] Exequible 
[05] Exequible (únicamente) por los cargos formulados 
[06] Condicionalmente exequible 
[06,5] Más o menos condicionalmente exequible 
[07] Parcialmente inexequible
289
 
[07,5] Más o menos parcialmente exequible 
[08] Parcial y condicionalmente inexequible 
[08,5] Más o menos parcial y condicionalmente inexequible 
[09] Inexequible 
[09,5] Más inexequible (Más normas o temporalmente) 
[10] No inhibirse / No declarar cosa juzgada 
                                                 
286
 En el caso de una sentencia inhibitoria parcial, se codificará la otra decisión. 
287
 Si se combina con otra sentencia parcial o condicionalmente exequible o inexequible, se codificará esta 
última. 
288
 Si se combina con otra sentencia parcial o condicionalmente exequible o inexequible, se codificará esta 
última. 
289
 También se usa este código en el caso de una sentencia parcialmente exequible. 
 227 
FMD 
Votación del Magistrado Fabio Morón Díaz 
[11] Sustituido por magistrado encargado 
[66] Votó con la mayoría 
[77] Aclaró el voto 
[88] Ausente 
[99] No aplica (no era magistrado en el momento de la sentencia  
Salvamento de voto 
[01] Sentencia inhibitoria
290
 
[02] Cosa juzgada constitucional
291
 
[03] Cosa juzgada constitucional desde el punto de vista formal
292
 
[04] Exequible 
[05] Exequible (únicamente) por los cargos formulados 
[06] Condicionalmente exequible 
[06,5] Más o menos condicionalmente exequible 
[07] Parcialmente inexequible
293
 
[07,5] Más o menos parcialmente exequible 
[08] Parcial y condicionalmente inexequible 
[08,5] Más o menos parcial y condicionalmente inexequible 
[09] Inexequible 
[09,5] Más inexequible (Más normas o temporalmente) 
[10] No inhibirse / No declarar cosa juzgada 
                                                 
290
 En el caso de una sentencia inhibitoria parcial, se codificará la otra decisión. 
291
 Si se combina con otra sentencia parcial o condicionalmente exequible o inexequible, se codificará esta 
última. 
292
 Si se combina con otra sentencia parcial o condicionalmente exequible o inexequible, se codificará esta 
última. 
293
 También se usa este código en el caso de una sentencia parcialmente exequible. 
 228 
JGH 
Votación del Magistrado José Gregorio Hernández 
[11] Sustituido por magistrado encargado 
[66] Votó con la mayoría 
[77] Aclaró el voto 
[88] Ausente 
[99] No aplica (no era magistrado en el momento de la sentencia  
Salvamento de voto 
[01] Sentencia inhibitoria
294
 
[02] Cosa juzgada constitucional
295
 
[03] Cosa juzgada constitucional desde el punto de vista formal
296
 
[04] Exequible 
[05] Exequible (únicamente) por los cargos formulados 
[06] Condicionalmente exequible 
[06,5] Más o menos condicionalmente exequible 
[07] Parcialmente inexequible
297
 
[07,5] Más o menos parcialmente exequible 
[08] Parcial y condicionalmente inexequible 
[08,5] Más o menos parcial y condicionalmente inexequible 
[09] Inexequible 
[09,5] Más inexequible (Más normas o temporalmente) 
[10] No inhibirse / No declarar cosa juzgada 
                                                 
294
 En el caso de una sentencia inhibitoria parcial, se codificará la otra decisión. 
295
 Si se combina con otra sentencia parcial o condicionalmente exequible o inexequible, se codificará esta 
última. 
296
 Si se combina con otra sentencia parcial o condicionalmente exequible o inexequible, se codificará esta 
última. 
297
 También se usa este código en el caso de una sentencia parcialmente exequible. 
 229 
CGD 
Votación del Magistrado Carlos Gaviria Díaz 
[11] Sustituido por magistrado encargado 
[66] Votó con la mayoría 
[77] Aclaró el voto 
[88] Ausente 
[99] No aplica (no era magistrado en el momento de la sentencia  
Salvamento de voto 
[01] Sentencia inhibitoria
298
 
[02] Cosa juzgada constitucional
299
 
[03] Cosa juzgada constitucional desde el punto de vista formal
300
 
[04] Exequible 
[05] Exequible (únicamente) por los cargos formulados 
[06] Condicionalmente exequible 
[06,5] Más o menos condicionalmente exequible 
[07] Parcialmente inexequible
301
 
[07,5] Más o menos parcialmente exequible 
[08] Parcial y condicionalmente inexequible 
[08,5] Más o menos parcial y condicionalmente inexequible 
[09] Inexequible 
[09,5] Más inexequible (Más normas o temporalmente) 
[10] No inhibirse / No declarar cosa juzgada 
                                                 
298
 En el caso de una sentencia inhibitoria parcial, se codificará la otra decisión. 
299
 Si se combina con otra sentencia parcial o condicionalmente exequible o inexequible, se codificará esta 
última. 
300
 Si se combina con otra sentencia parcial o condicionalmente exequible o inexequible, se codificará esta 
última. 
301
 También se usa este código en el caso de una sentencia parcialmente exequible. 
 230 
LEM 
Votación del Magistrado Luis Eduardo Montealegre Lynett 
[11] Sustituido por magistrado encargado 
[66] Votó con la mayoría 
[77] Aclaró el voto 
[88] Ausente 
[99] No aplica (no era magistrado en el momento de la sentencia  
Salvamento de voto 
[01] Sentencia inhibitoria
302
 
[02] Cosa juzgada constitucional
303
 
[03] Cosa juzgada constitucional desde el punto de vista formal
304
 
[04] Exequible 
[05] Exequible (únicamente) por los cargos formulados 
[06] Condicionalmente exequible 
[06,5] Más o menos condicionalmente exequible 
[07] Parcialmente inexequible
305
 
[07,5] Más o menos parcialmente exequible 
[08] Parcial y condicionalmente inexequible 
[08,5] Más o menos parcial y condicionalmente inexequible 
[09] Inexequible 
[09,5] Más inexequible (Más normas o temporalmente) 
[10] No inhibirse / No declarar cosa juzgada 
                                                 
302
 En el caso de una sentencia inhibitoria parcial, se codificará la otra decisión. 
303
 Si se combina con otra sentencia parcial o condicionalmente exequible o inexequible, se codificará esta 
última. 
304
 Si se combina con otra sentencia parcial o condicionalmente exequible o inexequible, se codificará esta 
última. 
305
 También se usa este código en el caso de una sentencia parcialmente exequible. 
 231 
ABS 
Votación del Magistrado Alfredo Beltrán Sierra 
[11] Sustituido por magistrado encargado 
[66] Votó con la mayoría 
[77] Aclaró el voto 
[88] Ausente 
[99] No aplica (no era magistrado en el momento de la sentencia  
Salvamento de voto 
[01] Sentencia inhibitoria
306
 
[02] Cosa juzgada constitucional
307
 
[03] Cosa juzgada constitucional desde el punto de vista formal
308
 
[04] Exequible 
[05] Exequible (únicamente) por los cargos formulados 
[06] Condicionalmente exequible 
[06,5] Más o menos condicionalmente exequible 
[07] Parcialmente inexequible
309
 
[07,5] Más o menos parcialmente exequible 
[08] Parcial y condicionalmente inexequible 
[08,5] Más o menos parcial y condicionalmente inexequible 
[09] Inexequible 
[09,5] Más inexequible (Más normas o temporalmente) 
[10] No inhibirse / No declarar cosa juzgada 
                                                 
306
 En el caso de una sentencia inhibitoria parcial, se codificará la otra decisión. 
307
 Si se combina con otra sentencia parcial o condicionalmente exequible o inexequible, se codificará esta 
última. 
308
 Si se combina con otra sentencia parcial o condicionalmente exequible o inexequible, se codificará esta 
última. 
309
 También se usa este código en el caso de una sentencia parcialmente exequible. 
 232 
ATG 
Votación del Magistrado Álvaro Tafur Galvis 
[11] Sustituido por magistrado encargado 
[66] Votó con la mayoría 
[77] Aclaró el voto 
[88] Ausente 
[99] No aplica (no era magistrado en el momento de la sentencia  
Salvamento de voto 
[01] Sentencia inhibitoria
310
 
[02] Cosa juzgada constitucional
311
 
[03] Cosa juzgada constitucional desde el punto de vista formal
312
 
[04] Exequible 
[05] Exequible (únicamente) por los cargos formulados 
[06] Condicionalmente exequible 
[06,5] Más o menos condicionalmente exequible 
[07] Parcialmente inexequible
313
 
[07,5] Más o menos parcialmente exequible 
[08] Parcial y condicionalmente inexequible 
[08,5] Más o menos parcial y condicionalmente inexequible 
[09] Inexequible 
[09,5] Más inexequible (Más normas o temporalmente) 
[10] No inhibirse / No declarar cosa juzgada 
                                                 
310
 En el caso de una sentencia inhibitoria parcial, se codificará la otra decisión. 
311
 Si se combina con otra sentencia parcial o condicionalmente exequible o inexequible, se codificará esta 
última. 
312
 Si se combina con otra sentencia parcial o condicionalmente exequible o inexequible, se codificará esta 
última. 
313
 También se usa este código en el caso de una sentencia parcialmente exequible. 
 233 
REG 
Votación del Magistrado Rodrigo Escobar Gil 
[11] Sustituido por magistrado encargado 
[66] Votó con la mayoría 
[77] Aclaró el voto 
[88] Ausente 
[99] No aplica (no era magistrado en el momento de la sentencia  
Salvamento de voto 
[01] Sentencia inhibitoria
314
 
[02] Cosa juzgada constitucional
315
 
[03] Cosa juzgada constitucional desde el punto de vista formal
316
 
[04] Exequible 
[05] Exequible (únicamente) por los cargos formulados 
[06] Condicionalmente exequible 
[06,5] Más o menos condicionalmente exequible 
[07] Parcialmente inexequible
317
 
[07,5] Más o menos parcialmente exequible 
[08] Parcial y condicionalmente inexequible 
[08,5] Más o menos parcial y condicionalmente inexequible 
[09] Inexequible 
[09,5] Más inexequible (Más normas o temporalmente) 
[10] No inhibirse / No declarar cosa juzgada 
                                                 
314
 En el caso de una sentencia inhibitoria parcial, se codificará la otra decisión. 
315
 Si se combina con otra sentencia parcial o condicionalmente exequible o inexequible, se codificará esta 
última. 
316
 Si se combina con otra sentencia parcial o condicionalmente exequible o inexequible, se codificará esta 
última. 
317
 También se usa este código en el caso de una sentencia parcialmente exequible. 
 234 
MJC 
Votación del Magistrado Manuel José Cepeda Espinosa 
[11] Sustituido por magistrado encargado 
[66] Votó con la mayoría 
[77] Aclaró el voto 
[88] Ausente 
[99] No aplica (no era magistrado en el momento de la sentencia  
Salvamento de voto 
[01] Sentencia inhibitoria
318
 
[02] Cosa juzgada constitucional
319
 
[03] Cosa juzgada constitucional desde el punto de vista formal
320
 
[04] Exequible 
[05] Exequible (únicamente) por los cargos formulados 
[06] Condicionalmente exequible 
[06,5] Más o menos condicionalmente exequible 
[07] Parcialmente inexequible
321
 
[07,5] Más o menos parcialmente exequible 
[08] Parcial y condicionalmente inexequible 
[08,5] Más o menos parcial y condicionalmente inexequible 
[09] Inexequible 
[09,5] Más inexequible (Más normas o temporalmente) 
[10] No inhibirse / No declarar cosa juzgada 
                                                 
318
 En el caso de una sentencia inhibitoria parcial, se codificará la otra decisión. 
319
 Si se combina con otra sentencia parcial o condicionalmente exequible o inexequible, se codificará esta 
última. 
320
 Si se combina con otra sentencia parcial o condicionalmente exequible o inexequible, se codificará esta 
última. 
321
 También se usa este código en el caso de una sentencia parcialmente exequible. 
 235 
JCT 
Votación del Magistrado Jaime Córdoba Triviño 
[11] Sustituido por magistrado encargado 
[66] Votó con la mayoría 
[77] Aclaró el voto 
[88] Ausente 
[99] No aplica (no era magistrado en el momento de la sentencia  
Salvamento de voto 
[01] Sentencia inhibitoria
322
 
[02] Cosa juzgada constitucional
323
 
[03] Cosa juzgada constitucional desde el punto de vista formal
324
 
[04] Exequible 
[05] Exequible (únicamente) por los cargos formulados 
[06] Condicionalmente exequible 
[06,5] Más o menos condicionalmente exequible 
[07] Parcialmente inexequible
325
 
[07,5] Más o menos parcialmente exequible 
[08] Parcial y condicionalmente inexequible 
[08,5] Más o menos parcial y condicionalmente inexequible 
[09] Inexequible 
[09,5] Más inexequible (Más normas o temporalmente) 
[10] No inhibirse / No declarar cosa juzgada 
                                                 
322
 En el caso de una sentencia inhibitoria parcial, se codificará la otra decisión. 
323
 Si se combina con otra sentencia parcial o condicionalmente exequible o inexequible, se codificará esta 
última. 
324
 Si se combina con otra sentencia parcial o condicionalmente exequible o inexequible, se codificará esta 
última. 
325
 También se usa este código en el caso de una sentencia parcialmente exequible. 
 236 
CIV 
Votación de la Magistrada Clara Inés Vargas Hernández 
[11] Sustituido por magistrado encargado 
[66] Votó con la mayoría 
[77] Aclaró el voto 
[88] Ausente 
[99] No aplica (no era magistrado en el momento de la sentencia  
Salvamento de voto 
[01] Sentencia inhibitoria
326
 
[02] Cosa juzgada constitucional
327
 
[03] Cosa juzgada constitucional desde el punto de vista formal
328
 
[04] Exequible 
[05] Exequible (únicamente) por los cargos formulados 
[06] Condicionalmente exequible 
[06,5] Más o menos condicionalmente exequible 
[07] Parcialmente inexequible
329
 
[07,5] Más o menos parcialmente exequible 
[08] Parcial y condicionalmente inexequible 
[08,5] Más o menos parcial y condicionalmente inexequible 
[09] Inexequible 
[09,5] Más inexequible (Más normas o temporalmente) 
[10] No inhibirse / No declarar cosa juzgada 
                                                 
326
 En el caso de una sentencia inhibitoria parcial, se codificará la otra decisión. 
327
 Si se combina con otra sentencia parcial o condicionalmente exequible o inexequible, se codificará esta 
última. 
328
 Si se combina con otra sentencia parcial o condicionalmente exequible o inexequible, se codificará esta 
última. 
329
 También se usa este código en el caso de una sentencia parcialmente exequible. 
 237 
JAR 
Votación del Magistrado Jaime Araújo Rentería 
[11] Sustituido por magistrado encargado 
[66] Votó con la mayoría 
[77] Aclaró el voto 
[88] Ausente 
[99] No aplica (no era magistrado en el momento de la sentencia  
Salvamento de voto 
[01] Sentencia inhibitoria
330
 
[02] Cosa juzgada constitucional
331
 
[03] Cosa juzgada constitucional desde el punto de vista formal
332
 
[04] Exequible 
[05] Exequible (únicamente) por los cargos formulados 
[06] Condicionalmente exequible 
[06,5] Más o menos condicionalmente exequible 
[07] Parcialmente inexequible
333
 
[07,5] Más o menos parcialmente exequible 
[08] Parcial y condicionalmente inexequible 
[08,5] Más o menos parcial y condicionalmente inexequible 
[09] Inexequible 
[09,5] Más inexequible (Más normas o temporalmente) 
[10] No inhibirse / No declarar cosa juzgada 
                                                 
330
 En el caso de una sentencia inhibitoria parcial, se codificará la otra decisión. 
331
 Si se combina con otra sentencia parcial o condicionalmente exequible o inexequible, se codificará esta 
última. 
332
 Si se combina con otra sentencia parcial o condicionalmente exequible o inexequible, se codificará esta 
última. 
333
 También se usa este código en el caso de una sentencia parcialmente exequible. 
 238 
MGM 
Votación del Magistrado Marco Gerardo Monroy Cabra 
[11] Sustituido por magistrado encargado 
[66] Votó con la mayoría 
[77] Aclaró el voto 
[88] Ausente 
[99] No aplica (no era magistrado en el momento de la sentencia  
Salvamento de voto 
[01] Sentencia inhibitoria
334
 
[02] Cosa juzgada constitucional
335
 
[03] Cosa juzgada constitucional desde el punto de vista formal
336
 
[04] Exequible 
[05] Exequible (únicamente) por los cargos formulados 
[06] Condicionalmente exequible 
[06,5] Más o menos condicionalmente exequible 
[07] Parcialmente inexequible
337
 
[07,5] Más o menos parcialmente exequible 
[08] Parcial y condicionalmente inexequible 
[08,5] Más o menos parcial y condicionalmente inexequible 
[09] Inexequible 
[09,5] Más inexequible (Más normas o temporalmente) 
[10] No inhibirse / No declarar cosa juzgada 
                                                 
334
 En el caso de una sentencia inhibitoria parcial, se codificará la otra decisión. 
335
 Si se combina con otra sentencia parcial o condicionalmente exequible o inexequible, se codificará esta 
última. 
336
 Si se combina con otra sentencia parcial o condicionalmente exequible o inexequible, se codificará esta 
última. 
337
 También se usa este código en el caso de una sentencia parcialmente exequible. 
 239 
HSP 
Votación del Magistrado Humberto Sierra Porto 
[11] Sustituido por magistrado encargado 
[66] Votó con la mayoría 
[77] Aclaró el voto 
[88] Ausente 
[99] No aplica (no era magistrado en el momento de la sentencia  
Salvamento de voto 
[01] Sentencia inhibitoria
338
 
[02] Cosa juzgada constitucional
339
 
[03] Cosa juzgada constitucional desde el punto de vista formal
340
 
[04] Exequible 
[05] Exequible (únicamente) por los cargos formulados 
[06] Condicionalmente exequible 
[06,5] Más o menos condicionalmente exequible 
[07] Parcialmente inexequible
341
 
[07,5] Más o menos parcialmente exequible 
[08] Parcial y condicionalmente inexequible 
[08,5] Más o menos parcial y condicionalmente inexequible 
[09] Inexequible 
[09,5] Más inexequible (Más normas o temporalmente) 
[10] No inhibirse / No declarar cosa juzgada 
                                                 
338
 En el caso de una sentencia inhibitoria parcial, se codificará la otra decisión. 
339
 Si se combina con otra sentencia parcial o condicionalmente exequible o inexequible, se codificará esta 
última. 
340
 Si se combina con otra sentencia parcial o condicionalmente exequible o inexequible, se codificará esta 
última. 
341
 También se usa este código en el caso de una sentencia parcialmente exequible. 
 240 
NPP 
Votación del Magistrado Nilson Pinilla Pinilla 
[11] Sustituido por magistrado encargado 
[66] Votó con la mayoría 
[77] Aclaró el voto 
[88] Ausente 
[99] No aplica (no era magistrado en el momento de la sentencia  
Salvamento de voto 
[01] Sentencia inhibitoria
342
 
[02] Cosa juzgada constitucional
343
 
[03] Cosa juzgada constitucional desde el punto de vista formal
344
 
[04] Exequible 
[05] Exequible (únicamente) por los cargos formulados 
[06] Condicionalmente exequible 
[06,5] Más o menos condicionalmente exequible 
[07] Parcialmente inexequible
345
 
[07,5] Más o menos parcialmente exequible 
[08] Parcial y condicionalmente inexequible 
[08,5] Más o menos parcial y condicionalmente inexequible 
[09] Inexequible 
[09,5] Más inexequible (Más normas o temporalmente) 
[10] No inhibirse / No declarar cosa juzgada 
                                                 
342
 En el caso de una sentencia inhibitoria parcial, se codificará la otra decisión. 
343
 Si se combina con otra sentencia parcial o condicionalmente exequible o inexequible, se codificará esta 
última. 
344
 Si se combina con otra sentencia parcial o condicionalmente exequible o inexequible, se codificará esta 
última. 
345
 También se usa este código en el caso de una sentencia parcialmente exequible. 
 241 
RUY 
Votación del Magistrado Rodrigo Uprimny Yépez 
[66] Votó con la mayoría 
[77] Aclaró el voto 
[88] Ausente 
[99] No aplica (no era magistrado en el momento de la sentencia  
Salvamento de voto 
[01] Sentencia inhibitoria
346
 
[02] Cosa juzgada constitucional
347
 
[03] Cosa juzgada constitucional desde el punto de vista formal
348
 
[04] Exequible 
[05] Exequible (únicamente) por los cargos formulados 
[06] Condicionalmente exequible 
[06,5] Más o menos condicionalmente exequible 
[07] Parcialmente inexequible
349
 
[07,5] Más o menos parcialmente exequible 
[08] Parcial y condicionalmente inexequible 
[08,5] Más o menos parcial y condicionalmente inexequible 
[09] Inexequible 
[09,5] Más inexequible (Más normas o temporalmente) 
[10] No inhibirse / No declarar cosa juzgada 
                                                 
346
 En el caso de una sentencia inhibitoria parcial, se codificará la otra decisión. 
347
 Si se combina con otra sentencia parcial o condicionalmente exequible o inexequible, se codificará esta 
última. 
348
 Si se combina con otra sentencia parcial o condicionalmente exequible o inexequible, se codificará esta 
última. 
349
 También se usa este código en el caso de una sentencia parcialmente exequible. 
 242 
MVS 
Votación de la Magistrada Martha Victoria Sáchica 
[66] Votó con la mayoría 
[77] Aclaró el voto 
[88] Ausente 
[99] No aplica (no era magistrado en el momento de la sentencia  
Salvamento de voto 
[01] Sentencia inhibitoria
350
 
[02] Cosa juzgada constitucional
351
 
[03] Cosa juzgada constitucional desde el punto de vista formal
352
 
[04] Exequible 
[05] Exequible (únicamente) por los cargos formulados 
[06] Condicionalmente exequible 
[06,5] Más o menos condicionalmente exequible 
[07] Parcialmente inexequible
353
 
[07,5] Más o menos parcialmente exequible 
[08] Parcial y condicionalmente inexequible 
[08,5] Más o menos parcial y condicionalmente inexequible 
[09] Inexequible 
[09,5] Más inexequible (Más normas o temporalmente) 
[10] No inhibirse / No declarar cosa juzgada 
                                                 
350
 En el caso de una sentencia inhibitoria parcial, se codificará la otra decisión. 
351
 Si se combina con otra sentencia parcial o condicionalmente exequible o inexequible, se codificará esta 
última. 
352
 Si se combina con otra sentencia parcial o condicionalmente exequible o inexequible, se codificará esta 
última. 
353
 También se usa este código en el caso de una sentencia parcialmente exequible. 
 243 
CIG 
Votación de la Magistrada Carmenza Isaza de Gómez 
[66] Votó con la mayoría 
[77] Aclaró el voto 
[88] Ausente 
[99] No aplica (no era magistrado en el momento de la sentencia  
Salvamento de voto 
[01] Sentencia inhibitoria
354
 
[02] Cosa juzgada constitucional
355
 
[03] Cosa juzgada constitucional desde el punto de vista formal
356
 
[04] Exequible 
[05] Exequible (únicamente) por los cargos formulados 
[06] Condicionalmente exequible 
[06,5] Más o menos condicionalmente exequible 
[07] Parcialmente inexequible
357
 
[07,5] Más o menos parcialmente exequible 
[08] Parcial y condicionalmente inexequible 
[08,5] Más o menos parcial y condicionalmente inexequible 
[09] Inexequible 
[09,5] Más inexequible (Más normas o temporalmente) 
[10] No inhibirse / No declarar cosa juzgada  
                                                 
354
 En el caso de una sentencia inhibitoria parcial, se codificará la otra decisión. 
355
 Si se combina con otra sentencia parcial o condicionalmente exequible o inexequible, se codificará esta 
última. 
356
 Si se combina con otra sentencia parcial o condicionalmente exequible o inexequible, se codificará esta 
última. 
357
 También se usa este código en el caso de una sentencia parcialmente exequible. 
 244 
JCO 
Votación del Magistrado Julio César Ortiz Gutiérrez 
[66] Votó con la mayoría 
[77] Aclaró el voto 
[88] Ausente 
[99] No aplica (no era magistrado en el momento de la sentencia  
Salvamento de voto 
[01] Sentencia inhibitoria
358
 
[02] Cosa juzgada constitucional
359
 
[03] Cosa juzgada constitucional desde el punto de vista formal
360
 
[04] Exequible 
[05] Exequible (únicamente) por los cargos formulados 
[06] Condicionalmente exequible 
[06,5] Más o menos condicionalmente exequible 
[07] Parcialmente inexequible
361
 
[07,5] Más o menos parcialmente exequible 
[08] Parcial y condicionalmente inexequible 
[08,5] Más o menos parcial y condicionalmente inexequible 
[09] Inexequible 
[09,5] Más inexequible (Más normas o temporalmente) 
[10] No inhibirse / No declarar cosa juzgada 
                                                 
358
 En el caso de una sentencia inhibitoria parcial, se codificará la otra decisión. 
359
 Si se combina con otra sentencia parcial o condicionalmente exequible o inexequible, se codificará esta 
última. 
360
 Si se combina con otra sentencia parcial o condicionalmente exequible o inexequible, se codificará esta 
última. 
361
 También se usa este código en el caso de una sentencia parcialmente exequible. 
 245 
CPS 
Votación de la Magistrada Cristina Pardo Schlessinger 
[66] Votó con la mayoría 
[77] Aclaró el voto 
[88] Ausente 
[99] No aplica (no era magistrado en el momento de la sentencia  
Salvamento de voto 
[01] Sentencia inhibitoria
362
 
[02] Cosa juzgada constitucional
363
 
[03] Cosa juzgada constitucional desde el punto de vista formal
364
 
[04] Exequible 
[05] Exequible (únicamente) por los cargos formulados 
[06] Condicionalmente exequible 
[06,5] Más o menos condicionalmente exequible 
[07] Parcialmente inexequible
365
 
[07,5] Más o menos parcialmente exequible 
[08] Parcial y condicionalmente inexequible 
[08,5] Más o menos parcial y condicionalmente inexequible 
[09] Inexequible 
[09,5] Más inexequible (Más normas o temporalmente) 
[10] No inhibirse / No declarar cosa juzgada  
                                                 
362
 En el caso de una sentencia inhibitoria parcial, se codificará la otra decisión. 
363
 Si se combina con otra sentencia parcial o condicionalmente exequible o inexequible, se codificará esta 
última. 
364
 Si se combina con otra sentencia parcial o condicionalmente exequible o inexequible, se codificará esta 
última. 
365
 También se usa este código en el caso de una sentencia parcialmente exequible. 
 246 
JCR 
Votación del Magistrado Jairo Charry Rivas 
[66] Votó con la mayoría 
[77] Aclaró el voto 
[88] Ausente 
[99] No aplica (no era magistrado en el momento de la sentencia  
Salvamento de voto 
[01] Sentencia inhibitoria
366
 
[02] Cosa juzgada constitucional
367
 
[03] Cosa juzgada constitucional desde el punto de vista formal
368
 
[04] Exequible 
[05] Exequible (únicamente) por los cargos formulados 
[06] Condicionalmente exequible 
[06,5] Más o menos condicionalmente exequible 
[07] Parcialmente inexequible
369
 
[07,5] Más o menos parcialmente exequible 
[08] Parcial y condicionalmente inexequible 
[08,5] Más o menos parcial y condicionalmente inexequible 
[09] Inexequible 
[09,5] Más inexequible (Más normas o temporalmente) 
[10] No inhibirse / No declarar cosa juzgada 
                                                 
366
 En el caso de una sentencia inhibitoria parcial, se codificará la otra decisión. 
367
 Si se combina con otra sentencia parcial o condicionalmente exequible o inexequible, se codificará esta 
última. 
368
 Si se combina con otra sentencia parcial o condicionalmente exequible o inexequible, se codificará esta 
última. 
369
 También se usa este código en el caso de una sentencia parcialmente exequible. 
 247 
MTG 
Votación de la Magistrada Maria Teresa Garces Lloreda 
[66] Votó con la mayoría 
[77] Aclaró el voto 
[88] Ausente 
[99] No aplica (no era magistrado en el momento de la sentencia  
Salvamento de voto 
[01] Sentencia inhibitoria
370
 
[02] Cosa juzgada constitucional
371
 
[03] Cosa juzgada constitucional desde el punto de vista formal
372
 
[04] Exequible 
[05] Exequible (únicamente) por los cargos formulados 
[06] Condicionalmente exequible 
[06,5] Más o menos condicionalmente exequible 
[07] Parcialmente inexequible
373
 
[07,5] Más o menos parcialmente exequible 
[08] Parcial y condicionalmente inexequible 
[08,5] Más o menos parcial y condicionalmente inexequible 
[09] Inexequible 
[09,5] Más inexequible (Más normas o temporalmente) 
[10] No inhibirse / No declarar cosa juzgada 
RELATOR 
Texto completo de la descripción del tema hecha por la Relatoría de la 
Corte. 
                                                 
370
 En el caso de una sentencia inhibitoria parcial, se codificará la otra decisión. 
371
 Si se combina con otra sentencia parcial o condicionalmente exequible o inexequible, se codificará esta 
última. 
372
 Si se combina con otra sentencia parcial o condicionalmente exequible o inexequible, se codificará esta 
última. 
373
 También se usa este código en el caso de una sentencia parcialmente exequible. 
 248 
SENTCONJ 
Participación de conjuez en la sentencia 
[01] En la decisión participó sentencia por lo menos un conjuez 
[99] No participó ningún conjuez 
 
REL_EXP  Número del expediente tomado directamente de la página de la Corte. 
REL_DEM  Nombre del demandante tomado directamente de la página de la Corte. 
REL_AVSV  
Aclaraciones y salvamentos tomado directamente de la página de la Corte 
(sólo para sentencias a partir de 2001). 
REL_REL Texto de la relatoría tomado directamente de la página de la Corte. 
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REL_PONENTE 
Magistrado ponente tomado directamente de la página de la Corte 
[001] Jaime Sanín Greiffenstein 
[002] Simón Rodríguez Rodríguez 
[003] Ciro Angarita Barón 
[004] Jorge Arango Mejía 
[005] Hernando Herrera Vergara 
[006] Eduardo Cifuentes  
[007] Vladimiro Naranjo Mesa 
[008] Antonio Barrera Carbonell 
[009] Alejandro Martínez Caballero 
[010] Fabio Morón Díaz 
[011] José Gregorio Hernández Galindo  
[012] Carlos Gaviria Díaz 
[013] Luis Eduardo Montealegre Lynett  
[014] Alfredo Beltrán Sierra 
[015] Álvaro Tafur Galvis 
[016] Rodrigo Escobar Gil 
[017] Manuel José Cepeda Espinosa 
[018] Jaime Córdoba Triviño 
[019] Clara Inés Vargas Hernández 
[020] Jaime Araújo Rentería 
[021] Marco Gerardo Monroy Cabra 
[022] Humberto Sierra Porto 
[023] Nilson Pinilla Pinilla 
[024] Rodrigo Uprimny Yépez 
[025] Martha Victoria Sáchica de Moncaleano 
[026] Carmenza Isaza de Gómez 
[027] Julio César Ortiz Gutiérrez 
[028] Cristina Pardo Schlessinger  
[029] Jairo Charry Rivas. 
[030] Maria Teresa Garcés Lloreda 
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SALVCOJU 
Sentido de la cosa juzgada en el salvamento de voto 
[01] Sentencia inhibitoria
374
 
[04] Exequible 
[05] Exequible (únicamente) por los cargos formulados 
[06] Condicionalmente exequible 
[07] Parcialmente inexequible
375
 
[08] Parcial y condicionalmente inexequible 
[09] Inexequible 
                                                 
374
 En el caso de una sentencia inhibitoria parcial, se codificará la otra decisión. 
375
 También se usa este código en el caso de una sentencia parcialmente exequible. 
 251 
APPENDIX C 
QUESTIONNAIRE FOR EXPERT SURVEY ON JUSTICES’ IDEOLOGICAL 
LOCATIONS 
The following is my translation of the cover letter for the e-mail survey expert on justices‘ 
ideological locations: 
 
                                                                                      
 
Bogotá, April 28, 2009 
<Name> 
<Title> 
Dear <Mr/Ms> <Name>, 
 
My name is Juan Carlos Rodríguez-Raga, a Ph.D. student in Political Science at University of Pittsburgh 
and professor of the Political Science Department at Universidad de los Andes. 
My Ph.D. dissertation analyzes the behavior of the Constitutional Court since its creation until 
now. For this reason, I would like to resort to your knowledge on this court. Concretely, I would like to ask 
your qualified opinion regarding the ideological locations of the Court‟s justices. 
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You will find attached a form with a list of all justices appointed to the court from the moment it 
started its operation in 1992, including those who in some circumstances have taken the bench 
temporarily.  
In order to fill this form, which will take around ten minutes, I ask you to please mark the box 
which, in your opinion, best represents each justice‟s ideological location in a 1-to-10 scale where 1 
means “Left” and 10 means “Right”. 
Once you have completed the form, you have several options: 
- If you have a local e-mail system (such as Outlook, Outlook Express, or Eudora, for example), 
you can click the button labeled E-mail to send the form automatically to my electronic 
address. 
- If you use a web-base e-mail system (Yahoo, Gmail, Hotmail, etc.), you can click on the button 
labeled Save, save the form in some folder, and then append it to an e-mail message 
addressed to juanrodr@uniandes.edu.co. 
- Or, if you prefer, you can print the form (using the button labeled Print) and send it by fax to 
the number 3394949 Ext. 3202, addressed to me. 
- If you have any questions or any technical inconvenience, please do not hesitate in calling me 
to this number: 317-517-4931.  
This form has been sent to more than 300 experts in Public Law all around the nation. Naturally, your 
responses will be kept in absolute confidentiality, and the resulting data set will not include any personal 
identification, according to the academic norms of confidentiality ruling research at University of 
Pittsburgh. 
I really appreciate your help in this project. 
Best regards, 
 
Juan Carlos Rodríguez Raga 
ABD – Political Science - University of Pittsburgh 
Assistant Professor– Political Science – Universidad de los Andes 
juanrodr@uniandes.edu.co 
jcr753@pitt.edu 
Cell: +57-317-5174931 
 
The following is the image of the interactive PDF form: 
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Figure C.1. Ideology scoring questionnaire 
 257 
APPENDIX D 
ALTERNATIVE MODEL SPECIFICATIONS 
The following table shows several alternative specifications of the statistical models presented in 
Chapter 5. The description of the each model is the following: 
- Model 1 is the baseline model presented in Section 5.2, that is, the model without 
interactions. This model uses the sample of cases with non-unanimous decisions. 
- Model 2 is the model presented in Section 5.3, that is, the model with interactions 
between the parameters of the game and presidential approval. This model uses the 
sample of cases with non-unanimous decisions. 
- Model 3 takes the specification in Model 1 and substitutes the level of the president‘s 
support in the Lower House for the indicator of presidential approval as a measure of 
the government‘s strength.  
- Model 4 is the same Model 3 including interactions of the parameters of the game this 
time with the level of the president‘s legislative support in the Lower House. 
- Model 5 takes the specification in Model 1 and substitutes an indicator of amici 
curiae interventions in the case for the opinion of the Inspector General. 
- Model 6 is the same Model 5, with interactions. 
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- Model 7 uses the same specification as in Model 1 but includes in the sample all 
cases, both unanimous and non-unanimous. 
- Model 8 is the same Model 7, with interactions. 
 
Table D.1. Alternative model specifications: results 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
VARIABLES 
Coefficient 
(Robust  
std. err) 
Coefficient 
(Robust  
std. err) 
Coefficient 
(Robust  
std. err) 
Coefficient 
(Robust  
std. err) 
Coefficient 
(Robust  
std. err) 
Coefficient 
(Robust  
std. err) 
Coefficient 
(Robust  
std. err) 
Coefficient 
(Robust  
std. err) 
IDEOLOGY -0.128*** -0.148*** -0.125*** -0.136*** -0.129*** -0.146*** -0.026* -0.032** 
 
(0.031) (0.026) (0.033) (0.031) (0.031) (0.025) (0.013) (0.011) 
ELECTORAL CYCLE -0.009*** -0.010** -0.010*** -0.009* -0.009** -0.10** -0.004** -0.005*** 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) 
NOM. SUPREME COURT -0.024 0.032 -0.037 -0.006 -0.024 0.028 0.004 0.025 
 
(0.105) (0.109) (0.102) (0.097) (0.106) (0.108) (0.040) (0.032) 
NOM. COUNCIL STATE 0.182‡ 0.157 0.176 0.151 0.182‡ 0.159 0.043 0.054‡ 
 
(0.109) (0.102) (0.116) (0.114) (0.108) (0.101) (0.046) (0.032) 
PRES. APPROVAL -0.010** -0.065*** 
 
 -0.010** -0.058** 0.002* -0.013*** 
 
(0.003) (0.011) 
 
 (0.003) (0.010) (0.001) (0.004) 
DIVERGENCE 0.579*** -0.719** 0.592*** -0.500 0.589*** -0.658** 0.041 -0.462*** 
 
(0.174) (0.228) (0.156) (0.425) (0.175) (0.223) (0.057) (0.109) 
DIVERGENCE X 
 
0.028*** 
 
  0.027***  0.013*** 
PRES. APPROVAL 
 
(0.004) 
 
  (0.004)  (0.003) 
JUDICIAL CYCLE 0.004 -0.021*** 0.000 -0.025** 0.004 -0.019** 0.000 -0.004* 
 
(0.004) (0.006) (0.003) (0.009) (0.004) (0.006) (0.001) (0.002) 
JUDICIAL CYCLE X 
 
0.001*** 
 
  0.001***  0.000* 
PRES. APPROVAL 
 
(0.000) 
 
  (0.000)  (0.000) 
DECREE -0.213*** -0.338*** -0.150*** -0.532*** -0.210*** -0.309** -0.273*** -0.326*** 
 
(0.039) (0.101) (0.045) (0.138) (0.039) (0.109) (0.012) (0.052) 
DECREE X 
 
0.003‡ 
 
    0.001 
PRES. APPROVAL 
 
(0.002) 
 
    (0.001) 
IG STRIKES DOWN 0.380*** -0.408*** 0.358*** -0.651*** 0.379*** 0.380*** 1.498*** 1.682*** 
 
(0.068) (0.106) (0.070) (0.114) (0.068) (0.071) (0.041) (0.036) 
IG STRIKES DOWN X 
 
0.016*** 
 
    -0.004*** 
PRES. APPROVAL 
 
(0.002) 
 
    (0.001) 
SUPP. LOWER HOUSE 
  
-1.112*** -5.248***     
   
(0.286) (1.024)     
DIVERGENCE X 
   
1.693**     
SUPP. LOWER HOUSE 
   
(0.611)     
JUDICIAL CYCLE X 
   
0.042***     
SUPP. LOWER HOUSE 
   
(0.012)     
DECREE X 
   
0.617**     
SUPP. LOWER HOUSE 
   
(0.193)     
IG STRIKES DOWN X 
   
1.579***     
SUPP. LOWER HOUSE 
   
(0.184)     
 259 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
VARIABLES 
Coefficient 
(Robust  
std. err) 
Coefficient 
(Robust  
std. err) 
Coefficient 
(Robust  
std. err) 
Coefficient 
(Robust  
std. err) 
Coefficient 
(Robust  
std. err) 
Coefficient 
(Robust  
std. err) 
Coefficient 
(Robust  
std. err) 
Coefficient 
(Robust  
std. err) 
CIVIL SOCIETY 
   
 0.150‡ -0.203   
    
 (0.079) (0.206)   
CIVIL SOCIETY X 
   
  0.006*   
PRES. APPROVAL 
   
  (0.003)   
CONSTANT 1.279*** 3.874*** 1.699*** 4.288*** 1.269*** 3.546*** -0.645*** -0.032 
 
(0.290) (0.522) (0.279) (0.721) (0.285) (0.473) (0.091) (0.166) 
OBSERVATIONS 4,397 4,397 4,573 4,573 4,397 4,397 21,359 21,359 
PERCENT CORRECT 65.89% 66.25% 65.71% 66.21% 65.68% 66.20% 68.81% 68.81% 
WALD CHI-2 536.98 458.30 308.90 280.25 525.57 387.21 7,843.20 12,743.40 
Observations clustered on Justice: Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ‡ p<0.1 
Model 1: Baseline – Non unanimous, p  PRESIDENTIAL APPROVAL,    IG STRIKES DOWN, No interactions 
Model 2: Non unanimous, p  PRESIDENTIAL APPROVAL,    IG STRIKES DOWN, Interactions 
Model 3: Non unanimous, p  SUPPORT IN LOWER HOUSE,    IG STRIKES DOWN, No interactions 
Model 4: Non unanimous, p  SUPPORT IN LOWER HOUSE,    IG STRIKES DOWN, Interactions 
Model 5: Non unanimous, p  PRESIDENTIAL APPROVAL,    CIVIL SOCIETY STRIKES DOWN, No interactions 
Model 6: Non unanimous, p  PRESIDENTIAL APPROVAL,    CIVIL SOCIETY STRIKES DOWN, Interactions 
Model 7: Both unanimous & non unanimous, p  PRESIDENTIAL APPROVAL,    IG STRIKES DOWN, No interactions 
Model 8: Both unanimous & non unanimous, p  PRESIDENTIAL APPROVAL,    IG STRIKES DOWN, Interactions 
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